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## PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

No. 4, 1977

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## TRIUMPH OF SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1977 pp 3-14

[Summary] The Great October Socialist Revolution is the major event of the 20th century. It fundamentally changed the entire course of historical development and began a new era in the history of mankind--an era of transition from capitalism to socialism. The Great October Revolution marked the beginning of conscious social creativity by the workers, who had previously been only the object of history. This revolution represented the greatest triumph of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine by confirming the accuracy of its theories on social development.

The influence of the October Revolution spread far beyond the boundaries of Soviet Russia. The first successes of the national liberation movement were won soon after the triumph of this revolution. Its ideals had a tremendous effect on the development of the national liberation movement in Asia. Mongolia's independence was declared in July 1921, Afghanistan won political independence in February of the same year and the sovereign Republic of Turkey was born in October 1923.

From the first days of its existence, the young Republic of Soviets assisted the new states in Asia in every way possible. The revolutionary process in Korea, Indonesia, Ceylon and other Asian countries was activated by the revolution in Russia. The teachings of V. I. Lenin, the founder of the Soviet State, also had a profound effect on the political revolution in Sri Lanka, India and China.

The effects of the October Revolution on the course of world history were due largely to the fact that it served as a model of revolutionary democracy. It was based on strong ties between the proletarian vanguard and the fundamental interests and desires of the masses and represented the fruition of the historical and spiritual traditions of the democratic movement.

The Soviet Union has remained true to the ideals of October. When this new state first came into being, it became the standard bearer of the policy of peaceful coexistence and its first governmental act was Lenin's Decree on Peace. Today, now that the balance of power in the world has changed in

favor of socialism, the Soviet State is still adhering to the principles of peaceful coexistence and has initiated the current process of international detente. The Soviet Union is no longer surrounded by capitalism: A powerful socialist community has taken shape. This community now plays the deciding role in positive international processes. The continuous reinforcement of this community will ensure peace and social progress in the future.

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## PEARL OF SOVIET FAR EAST

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1977 pp 15-33

[Article by P. A. Lenonov, first secretary of the Sakhalinskaya CPSU Obkom]

[Text] The Soviet people are justifiably proud of the path they have traveled during the last 6 decades. Under the wise guidance of the communist party—"the party founded by Lenin, confidently taking Lenin's course and heading the construction of a communist society in accordance with Lenin's plans"—the most important and most difficult task of the socialist revolution—the constructive task—has been successfully carried out in our nation.

Socialist industrialization, the collectivization of agriculture, the cultural revolution and the just resolution of the ethnic problem within a brief period of time have changed our motherland into a strong and invincible power, into a reliable stronghold of peace and international security.

The highest goal of the policy of the Leninist Party and the Soviet State is consistently being attained—the construction of a communist society and a constant rise in the material and cultural standard of living of the Soviet people through a further increase in national production efficiency. Our nation's rate of progress during the last 60 years and its successes in socio-economic development have no precedent in history.

The workers of Sakhalinskaya Oblast, just as the rest of the Soviet population, unanimously, totally and completely approve and heartily support the Leninist, wise domestic and foreign policy of the communist party and the Soviet State and the untiring, multifaceted and productive activities of its Leninist Central Committee and the Politburo of the Central Committee, headed by Comrade L. . . Brezhnev.

The historic resolutions of the May (1977) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which approved the draft of the new Constitution of the USSR, evoked a new wave of labor and political enthusiasm in oblast workers.

Taking an active part in the nationwide discussion of the draft of the constitution, the inhabitants of Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands unanimously note that this outstanding political document of the present era, which was

drawn up under the direct guidance of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, chairman of the Constitutional Commission, represents a new and sizeable contribution to the theory and practice of scientific communism and will serve as a reliable basis for making socialist democracy even deeper and broader.

All workers and all of the inhabitants of the island territory were profoundly satisfied and enormously pleased with the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet which announced that Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, had been elected chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Participants in meetings of party activists, this year's first sessions of the newly elected local soviets, mass-meetings of workers and trade-union and Komsomol gatherings spoke with particular warmth and sincerity about Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's wholehearted service to the great cause of the party, the cause of peace and communism.

"The collective of our brigade," said M. S. Dorofey, renowned construction worker and leader of a brigade of fitters at the Sakhalin Residential Construction Combine imeni 50-letiya SSSR, "heartily approves the decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the election of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the position of chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. We, just as all other Soviet people, feel that this is in the highest interest of the Soviet people and of our socialist motherland."

During the discussion of the draft of the Constitution of the USSR, oblast workers proudly noted that all of the grand achievements and historic conquests of our socialist society during the last 60 years have been indissolubly connected with the activities of the great Lenin's party. This is why the precise definition of the outstanding role played by the communist party in the political system of our society, which was made part of the Basic Law of the Soviet Union, was heartily approved and unanimously supported by oblast workers, kolkhos fishermen, the intelligentsia and the entire population.

"The guiding and leading force in Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system of state and public organizations," the new constitution states, "is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CPSU exists for the people and serves the people. Armed with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the communist party defines the general developmental prospects of society, determines the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR, supervises the great constructive activity of the Soviet people and gives their struggle for the triumph of communism a planned and scientifically substantiated nature."

Basing its activities on a profound understanding of the laws of social development and the revolutionary creativity of the masses, who are thoroughly and consistently developing Marxist-Leninist theory, the party is honorably



bearing the triumphant standard of October and skillfully mobilizing the efforts of the entire Soviet population for the successful implementation of the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress.

One of the most important conquests along the path traveled by our people during the last 60 years has been the transformation of the backward, formerly neglected outlying districts of Russia, the equalization of the economic and cultural developmental levels in different regions of the nation and the accelerated development of productive forces and natural resources in Siberia and the Far East, including Sakhalinskaya Oblast. This naturally brings V. I. Lenin's famous words to mind: "Look at a map of the RSFSR. To the north of Vologda, to the southeast of Rostov-on-Don and Saratov, to the south of Orenburg and Omsk and to the north of Tomsk there are vast expanses which could accommodate dozens of huge cultured states. And yet all of these territories are of a patriarchal, semi-barbarian or completely and utterly barbarian nature."<sup>2</sup>

These words date back to 1921. Truly colossal energy had to be aroused in the people to totally transform this savage and uninhabitable land and to light the fires of turbulent creative activity in these expanses enveloped in centuries-old slumber! The revolutionary genius of V. I. Lenin, Great October and the communist party aroused this kind of energy.

By the will of the communist party and the selfless labor of the Soviet people, the rich natural resources of the Soviet Far East were placed at the service of socialism. The old conception of the outlying districts as out-of-the-way places and the division of krais and oblasts into developed and underdeveloped territories became a thing of the past forever.

The magnificent changes which took place in the appearance of the outlying districts during the years of Soviet rule are particularly clearly exemplified by Sakhalinskaya Oblast--the only island oblast in our nation.

Its convenient geographic location, its variety of mineral resources, its rapidly developing national economy and its gripping natural beauty all give us reason to call Sakhalinskaya Oblast Russia's pearl in the Pacific, an outpost of our fatherland on its Far Eastern borders. This is graphic and convincing proof of the fact that only socialism, as the most progressive social and governmental order, is capable of fundamentally changing the appearance of a nation and its most remote outlying districts, skillfully and carefully managing natural resources and using them in the interest of the workers themselves--the true owners of the land.

Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands are inhabited by representatives of more than 100 nationalities and ethnic groups in the USSR. This is a genuinely multinational family of Soviet peoples, a family united by communists. Together, shoulder to shoulder, they work in the mines, in the oil fields, in the sovkhozes and on the construction sites, together they catch fish, saw lumber, manufacture paper and run railroads, together they work at trade and public

catering enterprises, raise their children and concern themselves with the health of the workers. The inhabitants of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands live a friendly and happy life together on this land that has been transformed by labor and completely renovated.

In response to the constant paternal concern displayed by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government for the development of the productive forces of the island oblast and for increasing the welfare of its population, the workers of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands are waging an insistent struggle for the successful implementation of the historic resolutions of the 25th party congress, have begun extensive competition for the advanced fulfillment of plans and social commitments for the second year of the Tenth Five-Year Plan and are preparing to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in a fitting manner. They are full of determination to make their territory even more beautiful, rich and appealing.

But Sakhalinskaya Oblast has not always been like this. If we are to gain a complete understanding of the depth of the changes that have occurred in the economic, political and cultural life here during the years of Soviet rule, we must recall certain historical facts.

Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands have been Russian lands since time immemorial. Irrefutable proof of our motherland's priority in the discovery, annexation, exploration and conquest of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands can be found in many historical documents. Russia began to conquer these lands at a time when other nations knew nothing of their existence or had only the most vague ideas about them, ideas shrouded in mystery and legend. Even the neighboring country of Japan had only isolated, extremely obscure news of Sakhalin, just as, incidentally, of all of the other islands to the north. The rulers of feudal Japan conducted a policy of isolationism, refusing to develop foreign ties, and prohibited the Japanese, under penalty of death or permanent exile, from visiting other nations.

It took centuries for the legends to be dispelled, for the mysteries to be solved and for the world to see the formerly mysterious islands in all of their reality and actual outlines on geographic maps. The credit for this feat of discovery belongs completely to Russia's courageous sons--its land and sea explorers.

Sakhalin was discovered by members of the exploration parties of I. Yu. Moskvitin (1639-1641) and V. D. Poyarkov (1644-1645) who traveled to the lower reaches of the Amur from Yakutsk. It was these men who gave Sakhalin its first Russian name--"the Island of Gilyat" or "Gilyatskiy Island." The members of the Poyarkov party established close ties with the native inhabitants--the Gilyaks, as the Nivkhy were called at that time--and proclaimed them subjects of the Moscow tsar. Documents attesting to the fact that the inhabitants of Sakhalin already considered themselves to be Russian subjects by 1652 have been found in the Central State Archives of Ancient Acts in Moscow.

The Kurile Islands, which were then inhabited by "self-governing" Ainu tribes, were explored at the same time as Sakhalin. Even at the time of I. Yu. Moskvitin's campaign, the Ainus were already calling the Russians "brothers" because of their great physical resemblance. "And the Russians are called brothers by those bearded people," reported N. I. Kolobov, member of the Moskvitin party, in 1646. It was precisely at that time that the Russians began to visit these lands regularly and to settle there permanently.

The courageous Russian explorers' march to the Pacific coast was one of the most important geographic discoveries of the 17th century. It marked the beginning of the extensive and intensive exploration and conquest of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands.

Important stages in the exploration of these lands were marked by the expeditions and campaigns of V. V. Atlasov, who was called "Kamchatka's Yermak" by A. S. Pushkin, D. Ya. Antsiferov, brave sea-farer and land explorer I. P. Kozyrevskiy, who was the first to chart and describe more than 20 Kurile islands, and land-surveyors I. M. Yevreinov and F. F. Luzhin, Peter the I's official emissaries. These were the first naval officers of the Russian State in the Pacific, carrying out the tsar's assignment to "travel to Kamchatka and beyond, as instructed. And survey all of the places there, where America meets Asia. This must be done very carefully, not only south and north, but also east and west. And all of this must be carefully placed on the map."<sup>3</sup> And these men actually did place many islands in the Kurile chain on the map, with the aid of astronomical devices.

The expeditions of M. P. Shpanberg, G. I. Shelekhov, I. F. Kruzenshtern, N. A. Khvostov, G. I. Davydov and V. M. Golovnin made a valuable contribution to the exploration of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. On 8 (20) October 1806, N. A. Khvostov, captain of the brig "Yunon," raised the state flag of Russia on the bank of Anivskiy Bay, thereby confirming the state act executed by previous generations of Russian explorers, declaring the inhabitants of Sakhalin Russian subjects.

A brilliant page in the history of the exploration and conquest of Sakhalin was written by the expedition of prominent Russian sea-farer G. I. Nevel'skiy. In 1849, G. I. Nevel'skiy explored the eastern, northern and northwestern banks of Sakhalin and the channel of the Amur River and discovered the navigable strait between the island and the mainland, thereby proving that Sakhalin was an island. The first Russian military post--the Il'inskiy and Murav'yevskiy--were established on Sakhalin in 1853 according to G. I. Nevel'skiy's instructions. G. I. Nevel'skiy's expedition made an important contribution to the Russian conquest of the Cis-Amur zone, Primorskiy Kray and Sakhalin. This gave Russia access to the sea on its eastern borders.

Securing Russia's rights to Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, the Russian people set up crosses and posts here, inscribed with notifications that this territory belonged to the Russian empire, and taxed the inhabitants. This tribute, however, was negligible and more of a symbolic nature, serving only

as a symbol of Russian citizenship. In 1779, the tsarist government cancelled all taxation of the inhabitants of the Kurile Islands and the Cis-Amur zone. The people inhabiting these lands were supported and protected by the Russian people and considered themselves to be subjects of the Russian State without any kind of coercion.

Ya. Reytenfel's made an interesting declaration in his work entitled "A Tale of Russia in the Time of Tsar Alexis": "It is truly amazing that this handful of people took control over such a vast area of land. And what is even more amazing, the tribes living there submitted to the tsar not because they were subdued by force but because they were won over by the persuasion of merchants and only because they hoped for future benefits from trade relations with the Muscovites."<sup>4</sup>

The founders of Marxism felt that Russia's policy in the Far East was extremely flexible and successful. F. Engels recognized the positive influence of the Russian State on the Asian lands annexed to it and wrote that "Russia is truly playing a progressive role in relation to the East."<sup>5</sup>

By the middle of the last century, the international situation in the Pacific had changed dramatically. The rapid development of capitalism intensified the struggle between the Western powers and the United States for dominion in the nations of East Asia and for the seizure of political and strategic positions in these nations, including territorial bases for further expansion. Foreign powers made increasingly persistent attempts to penetrate Russia's possessions in the Far East.

In order to guard its Far Eastern borders against all types of encroachment, Russia began to conduct a more active policy in this region, aimed at the establishment and development of friendly relations with Japan. But Japan took advantage of Russia's difficult position during the period of the Crimean War and, relying on the support of England and France, which wished to weaken Russia's position in the Pacific, made unsubstantiated claims to the southern half of Sakhalin, even though "no one had ever claimed to own this island"<sup>6</sup> previously.

The aggressive tendencies of the reactionary Samurai leadership, incited by the Western countries, became particularly strong in 1868. Increasingly loud voices were heard in Japan, calling for the seizure of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. The Japanese military leaders simultaneously exerted diplomatic pressure on the government of tsarist Russia in an attempt to obtain territorial concessions. This entire campaign resulted in the coercive Petersburg Treaty in 1875, in accordance with which Japan recognized Russia's already indisputable rights to Sakhalin and was able to seize the Kurile Islands with the support of the Western powers. Tsarism's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) made it possible for Japan to carry out its latest expansionist plans to seize exceptionally important strategic and economic positions in the Far East. Among other important concessions, the tsarist government was forced to cede half of Sakhalin to Japan (south of the 50th parallel).



But even this was not enough for imperialist circles in Japan. Taking advantage of the complexity of the situation in the Soviet Far East during the years of civil war, Japan flagrantly went against all norms of inter-governmental relations in April 1920 by occupying vast territories of the Soviet Far East, including Sakhalin. A rigid occupation regime was established everywhere. The predatory exploitation of natural resources began. The island was turned into a colony, a strategic base used by the Japanese militarists in their struggle against Soviet Russia.

As a result of the wise and far-sighted policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Government, directed toward the normalization and establishment of friendly relations between the governments and populations of the two countries, and a consistent and persistent diplomatic struggle, the "Convention on the Basic Principles of Interrelations Between the USSR and Japan" was signed in Peking on 20 January 1925. In accordance with this document, the Japanese troops were evacuated from North Sakhalin by 15 May 1925.

But the complete and final liberation of these Far Eastern lands which had belonged to Russia since time immemorial came later. It was only in 1945, as a result of the defeat of militaristic Japan, that South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands were forever reunited with their mother country--with Russia.

In recent years, certain Japanese reactionary groups have simulated revanchist sentiments by means of purposefully organized and financed campaigns "for the return of the northern territories" and have babbled about some kind of "Japanese rights to the Kurile Islands." In this connection, we should recall a statement made by the prominent historian, Professor Kuno Yoshi. In his book "Japanese Expansion on the Asian Continent," published in 1949, he wrote that, until the mid-19th century, not only Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, but even the island of Yezo (Hokkaido), were not considered to be Japanese possessions. "In the 18th century and even in the first half of the 19th, the professor writes, "Yezo was not part of the Japanese empire.... The majority of historians, scientists and statesmen regard Yezo as a foreign state."

We should also recall that, in 1951, when the San Francisco Treaty was signed after Japan's defeat in World War II and its unconditional surrender, the Japanese unconditionally gave up all of their rights, legal titles and claims to the Kurile Islands.

Former Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida said at the signing of the treaty: "As an authorized representative of Japan, I am happy to accept this just and generous treaty." Therefore, all of the Japanese revanchists' claims to the Kurile Islands are unfounded and absolutely without any historical basis. These lands, watered by the sweat and blood of many generations of Russian people, have belonged and do belong to our motherland by virtue of the fact that it was the first to discover, annex, settle and explore them.

In response to the questions put to him by S. Hata, editor-in-chief of the ASAHI newspaper, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev quite definitely stated: "To say that there is some kind of 'unsolved territorial problem' in the relations between our countries would be a one-sided and false interpretation. Our position has repeatedly been expounded in talks with Japanese leaders and is well known." In describing the unfriendly campaigns waged in Japan against the Soviet Union and the illegal territorial claims made by Japan on the USSR, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed that "such actions can only harm Soviet-Japanese relations. They can only benefit those who do not want the Soviet and Japanese people to be true friends and good neighbors."<sup>8</sup>

As we know, a new, free life began to be built on Sakhalin after the establishment of Soviet rule in 1925.

During the dark years of tsarism, Sakhalin served for a long time as a place of hard labor and exile. It was not only criminals who were banished here for "crimes against the state," but also many active fighters against tsarist autocracy, including the members of the "Proletariat," the first revolutionary party of the Polish working class, revolutionaries from Aleksander Ul'yanov's group who took part in the preparations for the assassination of Tsar Aleksander III, the notorious members of the People's Will Party and the leaders of the "Obukhov Defense." For many decades, Sakhalin held the title as the most gloomy and terrible place in Russia. After the great Russian writer A. P. Chekhov visited Sakhalin in 1890, he called it "hell on earth," and prominent journalist of that time V. M. Doroshevich wrote that, in his opinion, no crime had yet been committed on earth that warranted penal servitude on Sakhalin.

The tsarist government's many attempts to organize the voluntary resettlement of peasants on Sakhalin and to begin the broad-scale development of planned and natural resources in this territory were not successful. Political lawlessness, unrestricted arbitrary rule by bureaucrats, entrepreneurs and merchants, a difficult economic situation and harsh exploitation of the workers, unrelieved backwardness and prevailing darkness and poverty—this was the life in pre-revolutionary Sakhalin.

The Japanese imperialists' 5 years of rule on North Sakhalin and 40 years on South Sakhalin brought the economy of the island to the brink of complete collapse and ruin.

In 1925, North Sakhalin had only nine small primitive enterprises which employed 604 persons. There were no transportation or communication systems. Agriculture was in a neglected state. There were essentially no hospitals, schools or cultural educational establishments. There was a lack of specialist personnel. This was the legacy inherited by Sakhalin's workers from the old world.



The communist party and Soviet Government, displaying concern for the development of productive forces, improving the well-being of the workers and raising the cultural standards on the island, immediately gave the new Sakhalin district financial, material and technical aid and other necessary assistance. A committee to oversee affairs in Kamchatka and Sakhalin was set up as part of the Council of Labor and Defense in 1929 to ensure that the Far Eastern zone would be developed as rapidly as possible and to coordinate the efforts of various organizations and departments to this end. Special benefits were established for persons who moved to Sakhalin. In response to the party's appeals, oilmen from Baku, Groznyy and Maykop, miners from the Donbass and Kuzbass and workers, peasants and employees from Primorskiy Kray, the Cis-Amur zone and the Transbaykal came to this territory and became actively involved in the nationwide struggle for socialism. Hundreds of Komsomol members and young enthusiasts traveled to Sakhalin with the authorization of the Komsomol Central Committee and the Komsomol Far Eastern Kraykom.

Many thousands of Soviet people matured and were tempered and passed the test of bravery in the severe conditions of the uninhabitable territory. They wrested each meter of land from the taiga and swamps, built settlements, oil fields, mines, timber sovkhoses and fish combines, laid pipelines and built a railroad. One of the neighborhoods in the city of Okha still has an extraordinary name in memory of the young builders of those years--"Damir," which stands for "Give us a peaceful revolution!" Genuine fighters for the party were forged and tempered in the intensive labor and heroes were born.

In reference to that difficult but heroic time of full-scale socialist advance on all fronts, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev said: "At that time, the Soviet State did not have enough capital, technical equipment or experienced personnel to build an industrial basis for socialism. It could not hope for help from abroad either. But we did have the world's most progressive social system. We had an enormous supply of revolutionary enthusiasm on the part of the masses, and this made it possible for the Soviet people to accomplish what seemed to be impossible."<sup>9</sup>

During the years of the pre-war five-year plans, the Soviet people, under the guidance of the communist party, set up a progressive industrial-kolkhoz power in place of the backward agrarian nation and totally changed the appearance of the formerly neglected outlying districts. North Sakhalin took a tremendous step forward in economic and cultural development. The population increased by 550 percent during this period. New cities, industrial enterprises, schools, hospitals and clubs sprang up on the site of the former penal colonies and wastelands. Transportation and communication systems were increasingly developed. The kolkhozes and sovkhoses became the unshakeable basis of agricultural production. The natural resources of the island, which had lain idle or been barbarously squandered for centuries, were placed at the service of the people. The material status of the workers improved and their cultural level rose.

On 15 May 1940, the working people of Sakhalinskaya Oblast, in an atmosphere of great political and labor enthusiasm, commemorated the 15th anniversary of the liberation of the northern part of the island from Japanese occupation and the establishment of Soviet rule in this territory. The Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet heartily congratulated the workers, kolkhoz members and intelligentsia of Sakhalinskaya Oblast on this important date. "The working people of Soviet Sakhalin," the congratulatory message reads, "who were formerly mercilessly exploited by the tsar's bureaucrats, merchants, shamans and Japanese interventionists and were doomed to extinction, were able during the years of Soviet rule, under the guidance of Lenin's party, to turn tsarist Russia's former island of exile and penal servitude into a progressive area which has been quite successful in all fields of socialist economic management and is justifiably called the pearl of the Soviet Far East."

The life-giving rays of socialism, like a mother's caresses, warmed this severe and recently neglected territory and gave the workers of Sakhalin a huge burst of strength and energy for new victories and heroic feats.

But Sakhalinskaya Oblast did not begin to develop as an integral national economic entity until after the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War and the liberation of South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands from the Japanese militarists. The difficult historical conditions in which these lands had existed for many decades made a definite mark on their economic development. It took a great deal of time and effort by the Soviet people to eliminate all of the negative consequences of Japanese colonial domination, to establish and reinforce transportation and economic links between the northern and southern regions and to turn this oblast, located on 59 islands, into a viable and strong national economic organism.

The accelerated rates of development in oblast productive forces were largely due to the scientific and well-conceived solutions found for the most important problems connected with economic and cultural construction.

In April 1962, a regional convention of the Conference for the Development of Productive Forces in the Far East was held in South Sakhalin to determine scientifically substantiated guidelines for the development of the oblast economy up to 1980.

A resolution adopted at the regional convention noted that the gross industrial product of the oblast was 250 percent greater in 1960 than in 1946. State purchases of agricultural products had increased considerably. During these years, more than 2.6 million square meters of living area had been created. At the same time, the convention ascertained that "oblast economic development has not been comprehensive enough and there have been several substantial inconsistencies. Local raw material resources are not always used efficiently, the level of industrial production concentration does not correspond to the requirements of economical management and labor productivity in a comparable group of branches is approximately 40 percent lower than the RSFSR average."<sup>10</sup>

The regional convention determined the major guidelines for the further development of productive forces in Sakhalinskaya Oblast, disclosed unutilized reserves and planned the means for their mobilization for the purpose of further economic growth and an all-round increase in the contribution made by the oblast's workers to the work being done by the entire population to establish a material and technical basis for communism. On the basis of the conclusions of the regional convention, the oblast party committee and the executive committee of the oblast soviet of workers' deputies drew up concrete proposals on the accelerated development of productive forces in Sakhalinskaya Oblast and submitted them to the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government for approval. On 3 September 1964, a decree "On Measures to Accelerate the Development of Productive Forces in Sakhalinskaya Oblast" was adopted at a session of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers chaired by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. A new stage began in the history of oblast economic development.

The last few years have completely confirmed the fact that the conclusions and recommendations of the regional convention were realistic and scientifically substantiated. Virtually all of the measures planned for this period have already been carried out. This has contributed a great deal to the accelerated development of the productive forces of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, the improvement in the living conditions of the workers and the rise in their material and cultural well-being.

Many facts provide convincing evidence of the enormous socioeconomic changes that have taken place on Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands since 1947--since the time when Sakhalinskaya Oblast gained its present territorial and administrative boundaries.

In 1976, the value of fixed productive capital in industry was almost 18 times higher than in 1947 and the gross product was almost 8 times greater. Paper production is 2.5 times greater, cardboard production is 18.4 times greater and cellulose production is 3.7 times greater. All branches of industry have developed and are developing rapidly: the fish, coal, petroleum, timber, pulp and paper and construction materials industries and industries of local jurisdiction.

In essence, all types of transport were created anew: railway, sea, air, motor vehicle and pipeline. All sections of the Sakhalin division of the Far Eastern Railway were completely technically re-equipped and all railroad lines and many tunnels were renovated. Because this is an island oblast, it would be difficult to overestimate the national economic significance of maritime transport. Prior to the war, Sakhalin did not have its own maritime transport organization. The Sakhalin shipping lines founded in October 1945 had a worn-out and obsolete fleet and a partially destroyed system of ports. Now the shipping lines has dozens of modern, reliable high-speed ships. The cargo capacity of the fleet has increased by several times and the volume of coastal and overseas shipments has increased by dozens of times. Sakhalin's sailors travel between the ports of many nations, particularly the Pacific ports.

The Vanino-Kholmsk ferry crossing, the first section of which was opened in 1973, has played an important role in the development of maritime and railway transport and in the development of the entire oblast economy. The construction of this unique transport artery, which operates year-round, in virtually any kind of weather and even in heavy ice conditions, has provided Sakhalin with a reliable and constant link with the mainland. The significance of the crossing was cogently pointed out in the message sent by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers to the workers, engineers, technicians and all collectives and organizations taking part in the construction of this transport artery, congratulating them on its early completion: "Your labor victory represents a substantial contribution to the accelerated development of productive forces in the Far East and clear evidence of the successful implementation of the 24th CPSU Congress' program for communist construction in our nation." Five ice-cutters of the "Sakhalin" model are now operating on the Vanino-Kholmsk line. Since the first days of ferry navigation here (June 1973), the crossing has been used according to a precise daily schedule. This has made it possible to control ferry traffic according to a firm schedule. The opening of the ferry crossing significantly reduced the shipping time of cargo and improved cargo safety conditions. The state has achieved a considerable savings in packaging materials and operations, particularly since it is no longer necessary to reload cargo at railway stations and in ports. In addition to the traditional types of cargo shipped between Sakhalin and the mainland, new goods can now be shipped as a result of the opening of this crossing. In particular, most of our fruit is now shipped to us from the mainland in refrigerated cars. On Sakhalin, these cars are reloaded with fresh fish. The ferry crossing has had a positive effect on the development of our oblast economy as well as the economy of the entire Far East. For example, the capacities made available at the Kholmsk Port by the opening of the ferry crossing has considerably eased the workload of the ports of Vladivostok, Nakhodka and several others. And the capacities made available at Vanino Port are now being used more efficiently for the handling of shipments to Magadanskaya Oblast.

Motor vehicle transport capacities have grown immeasurably. The fleet of trucks and the total carrying capacities of these vehicles have increased by hundreds of times.

Air transport has become an important means of ensuring oblast economic development. In 1947, the South Sakhalin air subdivision had only two LI-2 transport aircraft. Now the South Sakhalin Airport handles freight and passenger flights to Moscow, Khabarovsk, Krasnoyarsk, Vladivostok, Sovetskaya Gavan', Komsomol'sk-on-Amur and Blagoveshchensk. Regular air connections have been scheduled between South Sakhalinsk and the airports in Okha, Nogliki, Zonal'nyy, Shakhtersk and Poronaysk on Sakhalin Island and the airports of Burevestnik and Mendeleyev on Iturup and Kunashir. Aviation is being used more extensively in the fish and petroleum industries and in agriculture. Aviators have rendered indispensable assistance in the prevention of forest fires.



Our oblast has every type of modern communications--postal, telegraph, telephone, television and radio. Quite recently, the major means of communication in the oblast were boats, horses, reindeer and dog sleds. Now hundreds of communication centers and divisions with modern equipment, machinery, electronic devices and automatic units have been established to serve enterprises, organizations and the public.

Workers in the field of communications now process more than 225,000 pieces of mail each day and make daily deliveries of hundreds of thousands of newspapers and magazines to the inhabitants of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. The multichannel communications system is being used on a broad scale. The oblast has several radio stations and television broadcasting centers. The radio network broadcasts to all parts of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. "Orbit" receiving centers of space communications are operating in South Sakhalinsk, Okha, Aleksandrovsk, South Kuril'sk, Poronaysk, Tomar' and North Kuril'sk and will soon be opened in Kuril'sk and Nogliki. The inhabitants of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands watch programs broadcasted by central and international television networks, including color programs.

Proceeding from the party's premise that power engineering represents a "focal point of economic construction in the communist society,"<sup>11</sup> the oblast party organization has mobilized all efforts for the creation of a reliable power engineering base in the oblast. This is vitally necessary. In 1955, the oblast had more than 800 small low-power electric power stations; these did not satisfy the national economic demand for electric energy and operated in isolation from one another with many interruptions and at a great loss. The construction of the Sakhalinskaya GRES represented the most important stage in the establishment of the oblast power engineering base. This construction project began in 1964. The structure of the power station grew taller and taller each day on the age-old wasteland near the freezing Gulf of Terpeniye. A new settlement, populated by the power engineers of the East, grew and changed. By the end of 1965, the first turbo-generator of the GRES was turned on. The operation of the electric power station at full capacity and the installation of the necessary power transmission lines removed the restrictions on the supply of electric energy in the southern regions of the island, made it possible to close down many small electric power stations and created the necessary conditions for a sharp rise in the power-labor ratio and in labor productivity levels. The Sakhalinskaya GRES truly became the power engineering heart of the island. In 1976, the first power bloc of the South Sakhalinsk TETs-1 began operating. The completion of the construction work on the second section of this central thermoelectric power station caused a substantial rise in the power-labor ratio in the oblast economy and solved the problem of providing enterprises and the public in the oblast center with a reliable source of heat.

Particularly impressive changes have taken place in agriculture. Many inhabitants of the oblast remember quite well that, just 15-20 years ago, almost all food products, including such perishable goods as potatoes and vegetables, were shipped to Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands from other regions of the nation, mainly in canned and dried form. Due to the tremendous assistance and constant concern of the CPSU Central Committee and the

personal concern of general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, for the constant elevation of the material and cultural welfare of the Soviet people, including the working people of our oblast, and due to the selfless labor of the inhabitants of Sakhalin and a great amount of work done by the oblast party organization, Sakhalin now has a highly developed agricultural sector. The energy capacities of agricultural enterprises were 52.2 times greater in 1976 than in 1947. This made it possible to mechanize many production processes in farming as well as in animal husbandry. We have come a long way from cart traffic, mainly horse-drawn, and from the dilapidated wooden sheds which served us as livestock barns to our modern, highly mechanized agricultural enterprises, including specialized facilities. During the last 30 years, state purchases of livestock and poultry have increased by 183 times, milk--by 91 times, eggs--by 21,000 times, potatoes--by 9.1 times, and vegetables--by 13.1 times. Sales of food products to the public have increased dramatically: by 8.4 times for meat products, by 54 times for dairy products, by 180 times for eggs, by 7.1 times for potatoes, and by 14.6 times for vegetables. Sales of fruit, berries and melons are 36 times as great.

For many years in succession now, the demands of the Sakhalin and Kurile island public for potatoes, cabbage, table root crops and eggs has been completely satisfied by means of local production, in our difficult natural and climatic conditions, and the public demand for milk has been almost completely satisfied locally.

Oblast construction workers have performed a genuine labor feat. All of the cities, villages and settlements here have been rebuilt since the time when South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands were liberated from the Japanese militarists. During this time, oblast construction workers have made use of more than 9 billion rubles in capital investments, have built around 300 industrial enterprises and have made around 9 million square meters of general (usable) living area available to the public. The important construction projects which have been completed on schedule or ahead of schedule have included the Sakhalinskaya GRES and the South Sakhalinsk TETs-1, the Vanino-Kholmsk Railway ferry crossing, the airport in South Sakhalinsk, Okha, Shakhtersk, Zonal'nyy and other cities, the Arsent'yevka-Il'insk Railway, which connects the west coast of Sakhalin with the east coast, several high-voltage power transmission lines and the Lermontovskiy and Novikovskiy coal pits.

An extensive program is being carried out for the construction of buildings for public education and public health care and cultural establishments. A center for political education has been built in South Sakhalinsk, as well as the oblast Legitimate Theater imeni A. P. Chekhov and the Pioneer Palace. Modern movie theaters have been constructed in South Sakhalinsk, Korsakov, Kholmsk and several other cities and workers settlements.



For the sake of comparison, we should recall that there were only two large buildings on all of South Sakhalin in 1947. The rest of the buildings used for production and civil purposes were wooden structures with a fill framework. Residential structures had a wood-block framework. The spaces between the blocks were packed with pressboard and faced with thin boards. Now villages as well as cities and workers settlements are usually filled with four- and five-story buildings. At present, the first residences of from 9 to 12 stories in Sakhalin's history are being built in South Sakhalinsk and Kholmsk. The large scale of residential construction is cogently attested to by the following statistics: The amount of residential space made available to the public in our oblast in 1976 was 22.1 times greater than in 1947.

Inspired by the historic resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress and the May and October (1977) plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, the workers of Sakhalinskaya Oblast are waging a selfless struggle for the successful implementation of the grand socioeconomic program of the Tenth Five-Year Plan and for the proper commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and are striving to ensure that 1977--the year of the new Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics--becomes known as a year of outstanding labor feats. The workers of our island territory have set specific frontiers in socialist competition and are waging a persistent struggle for their attainment. Today this competition is increasingly marked by greater mass participation, creative initiative and labor enthusiasm. It is inseparable from the scientific and technical revolution and is acquiring an increasingly comprehensive nature, focusing on problems connected with production efficiency and the quality of labor.

The first year of the Tenth Five-Year Plan, 1976, was successfully completed by all branches of the national economy. The collectives of industrial enterprises fulfilled their annual plan for product sales ahead of schedule. Above-plan sales of industrial commodities reached almost 30 million rubles. There has been an increase in the number and volume of commodities awarded the State Mark of Quality. The plan for the first year of the five-year plan was overfulfilled by construction workers and the personnel of maritime, railway, motor vehicle, air and pipeline transport and communications.

Invariably following the course mapped out by the March (1965) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and consistently implementing the party's current agrarian policy, which was elaborated on the initiative and with the direct participation of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, agricultural workers and party, soviet and trade-union organizations in the oblast have achieved uninterrupted and stable growth in agricultural production. In 1976, the yield of potatoes at sovkhozes was 166 quintals per hectare and the yield of vegetables was 234 quintals per hectare. The average milk yield per cow at oblast sovkhozes was 3,545 kilograms. This was the second-highest yield in the RSFSR.

The CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government have given the selfless labor of Sakhalin's inhabitants a high commendation. For its achievements in socialist competition, Sakhalinskaya Oblast has been awarded the Challenge Red Banner of the RSFSR Council of Ministers and the AUCCTU. For its success in the development of potato cultivation in 1976, the oblast was awarded the second monetary prize of the RSFSR Council of Ministers and the AUCCTU. Uglegorskiy and Tomarinskiy rayons, the city of South Sakhalinsk and many industrial and agricultural enterprises were victors in the all-union and all-Russian socialist competitions. Many outstanding workers in the national economy have been awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union. The best of the best--Petr Filippovich Molotok, link leader and potato grower at the Udarnyy Sovkhoz, and Captain-Director Vladimir Ivanovich Barmuta, of the large refrigerated fishing trawler, the "Nysa Senyavina"--were awarded the noble title of Hero of Socialist Labor.

The second year of the Tenth Five-Year Plan was begun with confidence. Many valuable patriotic initiatives were engendered in oblast labor collectives during the nationwide discussion of the draft of the new Soviet Constitution and the objectives set in the speech presented by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Constitutional Commission, at the May (1977) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, in the atmosphere of universal political and creative enthusiasm created by these outstanding documents of the present era and by the preparations for the anniversary of Great October. All of these initiatives had a substantial positive effect on the efficiency and quality of work in all links of the national economy.

Sixty outstanding boat crews in the fish industry took a remarkable initiative this year. They decided to fulfill their plan assignments for 2 years of the five-year plan by the time of the 60th anniversary of October.

The initiators honorably kept their word.

In the coal industry, there has been an extensive campaign for the efficient use of equipment. The initiators of the competition in this field were the comprehensive mining and transport brigades of the Lermontovskoye Mining Administration and the Vakhrushevskaya Motor Vehicle Base, headed by Nikolay Fedorovich Goncharov and Vladimir Ivanovich Klinkov. These brigades promised to raise the productivity of the EKG-4.6 excavators used in stripping operations this year to at least 1.8 million cubic meters of rock annually and to fulfill the plan for 2 years of the five-year plan by the anniversary of October.

Sakhalin mines now have their own leading brigades, headed by Petr Pavlovich Obukhov from the Dolinskaya Mine and Nikolay Aleksandrovich Dmitriyev from the Udarnovskaya Mine. Within a short period of time, these brigades have mastered the use of mechanized units and are now mining more than a thousand tons of coal a day in difficult geological mining conditions.

It would be difficult to imagine our island territory today without new construction projects. New enterprises are being built and existing enterprises are being remodeled in the petroleum, coal, timber, pulp and paper, fish, food and other industries on Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. Work is now being done to develop Sakhalin's offshore oil and gas resources. Each year, more residences and cultural and consumer facilities are built. The brigade contract is being used on the broad scale by construction organizations. At the initiative of Mikhail Andreyevich Tityakov, honored construction worker of the RSFSR, Hero of Socialist Labor, deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, member of the bureau of the party obkom and leader of a comprehensive brigade at the Sakhalinpromstroy Trust, an extensive campaign is being waged to ensure the higher quality of each technological operation involved in construction work. All of this will contribute to the better resolution of problems facing the construction workers. For many years now, the oblast has successfully fulfilled its plan for capital construction in terms of all indicators.

The brigade contract is also being used in maritime transport. Sakhalin's dockworkers were the first in the nation to use the economic-accountability contract in shipping operations. This important initiative was taken by the brigade of dockworker-machine operators of Korsakov Port, headed by Georgiy Valerianovich Batyunya. During the last 3 years, using the contract method, this brigade has reduced the standing time of vessels by 2,500 ship-hours and has achieved an economic savings of more than 500,000 rubles. At present, the work experience of Comrade Batyunya's brigade is being demonstrated at the Exhibition of Achievements of the USSR National Economy. The brigade contracting procedure is now being successfully used by almost 40 percent of the oblast's dockworker-machine operator brigades.

Workers in the lumber industry have also armed themselves with this method. Here the pioneers were the members of the extended logging brigade of the North Sakhalinsk Timber Sovkhoz, headed by Nikolay Yefimovich Andreychuk. This was one of the first brigades in the nation's lumber industry to use this method and to successfully develop it. The operational experience of this brigade has been adopted on a broad scale by collectives of oblast enterprises. At the beginning of this year, the bureau of the CPSU Obkom commended the initiative taken by 18 extended logging brigades, 12 comprehensive lumber-transport brigades and 15 crosscutting brigades, all of which promised to fulfill their plan assignments for 2 years of the five-year plan by the 60th anniversary of Great October.

The improvement of product quality is a central matter of concern for oblast labor collectives. The oblast pulp and paper industry has done much positive work in this direction. The workers of this industry decided to prepare 16 types of products for certification for the highest quality category, even though the 5-year assignment calls for the certification of four types of commodities for the State Mark of Quality.

A set of organizational and technical measures directed toward better product quality is also being taken at the South Sakhalinsk Sewing Factory, the macaroni and bakery goods combine and several other oblast enterprises.

Agricultural workers heartily supported the appeal made by Heroes of Socialist Labor and renowned farmworkers Antonina Yakovlevna Mezhevaya, Petr Filippovich Molotok, Ivan Fedorovich Timofeyev and Semen Matveyevich Ponomarev. These link leaders requested all rural workers in the oblast to commemorate the 60th anniversary of Great October with the highest possible yield of potatoes and vegetables.

The oblast party organization is paying a great deal of attention to the creativity of workers and to their patriotic initiatives. It is precisely the creative activities of the workers that give rise to progressive experience—one of the important ways of increasing efficiency and improving quality.

The CPSU Obkom, gorkoms and raykoms and primary party organizations are doing their utmost to ensure that no valuable initiative goes unnoticed. The party organizations and all communists in the oblast regard the incorporation of all progressive and advanced experience in practice as their vital cause. This is all the more important since the workers in all branches of the oblast economy must perform important and responsible tasks to ensure the successful fulfillment of the plan for the anniversary year of 1977 and the Tenth Five-Year Plan as a whole.

"An anniversary year," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 16th Trade-Union Congress, "is always a year of remembrances and summation. But we communists do not only look back to the past for the purpose of noting the great scales and historic significance of our accomplishments with justifiable pride, we regard the past as a rich reservoir of experience, as food for thought and for the critical analysis of our own decisions and actions. We gain inspiration for the present and future from the past."<sup>12</sup>

Power engineering is developing at accelerated rates in the oblast. During the Tenth Five-Year Plan, the production of electric energy will increase by 50 percent. This will largely be due to the completion of construction work on the South Sakhalinsk TETs-1 and a further rise in the technical and economic operational indicators of power engineering equipment.

In 1980, coal production is to reach 5.5-6 million tons. This will require the completion of remodeling work on several mines and enriching factories and the accelerated technical re-equipping of all coal enterprises in the oblast.

In the pulp and paper industry, the production of cellulose is to increase by 11.4 percent, that of paper by 12.1 percent and that of cardboard by 8.3 percent during the 5 years. Several important measures must also be taken in this industry to modernize technological processes and remodel enterprises.



The "Basic Guidelines for National Economic Development in the USSR During 1976-1980" approved by the 25th CPSU Congress envisage the further development of the fish industry. Oblast fishermen and fish processing workers will have the great responsibility of increasing the production of high-quality goods made of fish and marine products and producing these goods in a broader assortment with consideration for public demand. This objective is to be attained through a substantial increase in the catch of fish and sea products in the coastal waters of the Sakhalin-Kurile basin and in internal bodies of water. In this connection, we should note that, as world practice has shown, sea and ocean fish reserves are not unlimited. This is why our fishermen are conducting their trade on a strictly scientific basis and are observing all recommendations made by scientists. The efficient and careful treatment of the living resources of the sea presupposes mandatory consideration for the reproductive capacity of specific resources and the artificial breeding of the most valuable resources. In Sakhalinskaya Oblast, as well as in the rest of the nation, fish farming is a matter of growing concern. For example, there are 20 fish-breeding plants in the most important spawning grounds of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. Each year, these enterprises add around 800 million young fish of the valuable species of salmon to the sea--Siberian salmon, humpback salmon, coho, silver salmon, king salmon and red salmon. This is greater than the output of all fish-breeding plants in Japan.

A great deal of work is being done in agriculture. During the 5 years, average annual agricultural production is to be increased by 15 percent. The cardinal problems being worked on by agricultural agencies and all agricultural workers in the oblast are production growth, improved quality, the increased marketability of farming and animal husbandry products and reduced production costs. The specialization and concentration of production by means of interfarm cooperation and agroindustrial integration present excellent opportunities for production growth, improvements in quality and reductions in production costs. During the current 5-year period, animal husbandry complexes for the production of milk are to be built at the Komsomolets, Kostromskoy and Zarya sovkhoses and complexes for beef production are to be constructed at the Yuzhno-Sakhalinskiy and Krasnorechenskiy sovkhoses. The hog-breeding complex at the Leninskoye znamey Sovkhoz will be enlarged to accommodate 36,000 hogs a year and the Poultry Factory imeni 50-letiya SSSR will be enlarged to accommodate 600,000 laying hens. Construction work will be completed on the first section of the Pervomayskaya Poultry Factory and work will begin on the second section in 1979 for the purpose of enlarging this enterprise to accommodate 6 million broilers a year instead of the present 3 million.

In our oblast, land reclamation is of enormous significance as the basic way of augmenting our agricultural land. At present, there is only 0.05 hectares of plowland per oblast inhabitant. This is approximately one-seventeenth of the national average. For this reason, the chief objective of agricultural workers is to develop and use the most efficient technology for the production of farming and animal husbandry products under the conditions of Sakhalinskaya

Oblast. A considerable amount of work has been done in this field and excellent results have been achieved, on the basis of which we can successfully solve even such crucial problems as the need to expand the assortment of vegetable crops and to make earlier deliveries of potatoes and vegetables to the population.

The oblast's animal husbandry workers have set themselves the task of raising the average milk yield to 3,700 kilograms a year per cow by the end of the five-year plan. At the same time, the livestock herd will grow, which will permit an increase of 27 percent in the production and purchase of milk by the state at sovkhozes. During the years of the current five-year plan, the production of livestock and poultry will rise by 42 percent and egg production will increase by 29 percent. This will largely be achieved through the establishment of animal husbandry complexes, as well as poultry factories for the production of eggs and meat.

We feel that the major way of increasing the economic impact of agricultural production and ensuring the continued growth of this production lies in the establishment of specialized enterprises and associations for the production of animal husbandry goods and in the specialization and concentration of the production of farming commodities.

The tremendous growth in the economic potential of the national economy has made it possible to considerably increase the oblast's contribution to the constant development of foreign commercial ties and economic cooperation between our motherland and foreign states. Sakhalinskaya Oblast has good export potential, a modern maritime fleet and non-freezing ports in the south of Sakhalin.

In accordance with contracts concluded by Soviet foreign trade associations with foreign firms, the oblast supplies the foreign market with oil, coal, timber and lumber, cellulose, newsprint, paper bags, fur, fish and marine products. The products of Sakhalin enterprises are well known in Poland, the GDR, the DPRK, Mongolia, Czechoslovakia and Cuba. India, Thailand and Japan have traditionally imported their newsprint from our pulp and paper plants. Many of the fish products of our fish industry have made a name for themselves in the markets of France, Belgium, Singapore and Japan.

We know that the Soviet Union has invariably based its relations with the capitalist nations on the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems. The establishment and reinforcement of friendly relations and the development of mutually beneficial commercial ties represent one of the major areas of the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State.

This also characterizes Soviet relations with Japan, which is one of the main importers of Soviet goods produced in Sakhalinskaya Oblast. With Soviet foreign trade organizations and associations acting as middlemen, Sakhalin supplies this nation with coal, petroleum, timber, paper and fish products. Each year, Japanese purchases of valuable wild food crops, such



as brake fern, increase. Several types of consumer goods, timber carriers, bulldozers, excavators and other types of equipment are imported from Japan to our oblast. The geographic location of Sakhalinskaya Oblast and its remoteness from the machine-building centers of our nation makes commodity exchange with Japan mutually beneficial.

Sakhalinskaya Oblast has great energy resources which, in conjunction with the further development of the fuel industry, will make it possible to establish heat and electric power stations here with a total capacity of up to 100 billion kilowatt-hours of electric energy per year. This will make it possible to export electric power to Japan instead of coal and petroleum.

All of this provides opportunities for the further intensification and expansion of mutually beneficial economic cooperation between the USSR and Japan.

In his speech on Japanese television on 7 November 1977, L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, said that "the USSR has the raw materials needed by Japanese industry and other goods which might be of interest to Japan. Japanese goods, in turn, have already gained a good reputation in the USSR.

"Positive experience has also been accumulated in the organization of large-scale economic cooperation.

"Does this not create all of the necessary conditions for placing the business ties between our nations on a solid long-term basis? I feel that both sides could only benefit from this kind of approach. And here is something of great importance—this would also benefit the cause of the consolidation of peace and security on the great Asian continent."

The Far East, including Sakhalinskaya Oblast, has a great future. The successful implementation of the party's plans for the accelerated development of productive forces in the Far Eastern regions will have a positive effect on all aspects of economics and culture in our oblast. The completion of the Baykalo-Amur Trunk Line will bring Sakhalin closer to the nation's center. By that time, construction work will be completed on the trans-Sakhalin Railway, which will connect the island's north with the non-freezing ports in the south and will become a natural continuation of the Baykalo-Amur Trunk Line.

These bright prospects and their confidence in the future are inspiring the workers of Sakhalinskaya Oblast to perform more and more new feats of labor. Heartily approving and unanimously supporting the wise Leninist policy of their beloved party and the Soviet State, headed by the leading politician and statesman of our day, ardent fighter for peace and social progress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, communists and all workers in the Order of Lenin Sakhalinskaya Oblast are filled with determination to consolidate their past achievements, fulfill the grand assignments of the Tenth Five-Year Plan and make a fitting contribution to the nationwide cause of communist construction.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, PRAVDA, 31 December 1976.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 43, p 228.
3. See A. I. Alekseyev, "Syny otvazhnyye Rossii" [Russia's Brave Sons], Magadan, 1970, p 33.
4. See N. I. Ryabov and M. G. Shteyn, "Ocherki istorii russkogo Dal'nego Vostoka, XVII-nachalo XX veka" [Notes on the History of the Russian Far East, from the 17th Century to the Beginning of the 20th], Khabarovsk, 1958, pp 25-26.
5. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 27, p 241.
6. "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya na Dal'nem Vostoke. Kniga pervaya" [International Relations in the Far East. Book One], Moscow, 1973, p 112.
7. See E. Ya. Feynberg, "Russko-yaponskiye otnosheniya v 1697-1875 gg." [Russo-Japanese Relations in 1697-1875], Moscow, 1960, p 44.
8. PRAVDA, 7 June 1977.
9. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [Following the Leninist Course], vol 2, Moscow, 1970, p 85.
10. "Party Archives of the Sakhalinskaya CPSU Obkom," file 4, case 80, ledger 40, sheet 146.
11. "The 22d Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 17-31 October 1961. Stenographic Record," vol 3, Moscow, 1962, p 279.
12. PRAVDA, 22 March 1977.

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**NEW STAGE IN EVOLUTION OF PEKING'S ANTISOCIALIST POLICY AND OBJECTIVES OF STRUGGLE AGAINST MAOISM**

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[Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Just as it has in the past, the progressive international public is observing the development of events in China and the evolution of the Peking leaders' foreign policy with alarm and concern.

At a time when Maoism is openly forming alliances with the most aggressive circles of imperialism and acting as the main champion and unique "stronghold" of reactionary forms of nationalism and all varieties of opportunism, the Chinese problem is becoming more acute. The struggle against Maoism is not only becoming an important factor in consolidating the unity of all revolutionary forces, but is also an integral element of the struggle for peace and national liberation.

As we know, the 25th CPSU Congress devoted a great deal of time to the analysis of events in China. The Accountability Report delivered by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and the speeches of congress delegates and many foreign guests gave a detailed description of the anti-Marxist essence of Maoism, the dangerous role inherent in the PRC's actions in the international arena and the antihumanitarian essence of the Peking leaders' domestic policy. Carefully and objectively analyzing the results of the past 5-year period and defining the principled political course of our party and nation for the years to come, the forum of Soviet communists confirmed the accuracy of the course elaborated by the 24th congress in respect to China. The instructions issued by the 25th congress and its assessment of the Maoist ideology and policy are of policy-making significance for Marxist researchers of the Chinese problem.

The Maoist leaders' feverish attempts to subvert detente, to prevent disarmament, to sow enmity among states and to provoke a new world war are particularly dangerous to the cause of peace and socialism and to all mankind.

All of this provides us with grounds for concluding that Maoist ideology and policy are incompatible with Marxist-Leninist doctrine and are overtly hostile to it.

Proceeding from these fundamental judgments, the communist parties of the socialist countries have defined their objectives in the struggle against the theory and practice of Maoism:

To deal a resolute rebuff to Peking's inflammatory policy;

To defend the international interests of the socialist community as a whole and the national interests of each of its members;

To strengthen the unity and solidarity of the world communist movement on the basis of loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism;

To continue to wage a principled, implacable struggle against Maoism.

In their speeches at the communist party congresses of the fraternal countries, the representatives of many communist and workers parties and detachments of the national liberation movement voiced their full support for this coordinated course, which is becoming one of the general areas of activity of the international communist movement and all progressive forces of the present day.

The congresses of the fraternal parties detailed their approach to the development of intergovernmental relations with China under the conditions of the Maoist dominion there. Although the PRC maintains diplomatic, trade and several other kinds of ties with the socialist countries, these ties are of a limited nature and are frequently used by the Peking leaders for hostile purposes. Therefore, the fraternal countries are faced with the need to strive for the immediate normalization of relations with the PRC on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, which, as we know, regulate the relations between states with different social systems. This is completely consistent with present realities, for relations cannot be built on any other basis with a country in which the leaders pursue a policy aimed against the majority of the socialist states, form alliances with the most reactionary forces and present a threat to all peace-loving states. In this connection, it is important to stress the fact that peaceful coexistence not only does not exclude, but, on the contrary, predetermines the intensification of the ideological and political struggle against views that are hostile to socialism and communism.

At the same time, the congresses of the fraternal parties also defined the prospects for the establishment of relations with the PRC /on the basis of the principles of socialist internationalism./ This will only be possible when China returns to a policy which is truly based on Marxism-Leninism, abandons its course of hostility toward the socialist countries and embarks on a path of cooperation and solidarity with the socialist world.



But this turn of events, judging by the present situation, will only be made possible by the total collapse of Maoist ideology and policy. The struggle against Maoism is of enormous significance both for the destiny of the Chinese people themselves and for the successful development of the world revolutionary process.

Maoism is historically doomed. But great efforts are needed to accelerate its collapse. Undoubtedly, the final decision here must be made by the Chinese people and, above all, by the working class in the PRC. At the same time, by exposing the reactionary essence of Maoism, the Marxist-Leninists are rendering important assistance to the Chinese revolution in one of its darkest hours. Conditions are now favorable for a more intense campaign against Maoism: On the one hand, the strength and prestige of the socialist community are increasing and the unity of the world revolutionary movement is growing stronger; on the other, Maoism is suffering failures and the crisis in Peking's ruling clique is growing more acute. All of this provides new opportunities for a successful struggle against Maoism.

The 11th CCP Congress, which was held in camera this August in Peking, marked a definite frontier in this evolution to the right in the entire policy of the Peking leadership.

The 11th CCP Congress was the most important event of recent years in China. Although the congress, in the words of Hua Kuo-feng, was "convened earlier than scheduled," the fraternal parties met it fully armed. Their latest congresses had fundamentally assessed the current situation in the PRC and its developmental prospects.

The proceedings and results of the 11th CCP Congress confirmed the basic conclusions previously drawn by our party that the death of Mao Tse-tung would not lead automatically to the death of Maoism as an ideology hostile to Marxism-Leninism, that the CCP leaders who have succeeded Mao show no intention of casting off the fetters of Maoism and returning the PRC to the role of scientific socialism and that they continue to stand behind a nationalist, great-power, expansionist and hegemonist platform.

/The Third CCP Central Committee Plenum/ of the Tenth Convocation was an important part of the preparations for the 11th CCP Congress. As we know, the plenum was held from 16 through 21 July 1977. It confirmed Hua Kuo-feng in his post as chairman of the party Central Committee, rehabilitated Teng Tsiao-p'ing and "restored him to all his posts," and dismissed the members of the "gang of four" from all their posts and "permanently expelled them from the party."

The plenum resolved to convene the 11th CCP Congress and predetermined its nature and content--it "basically" approved the political report of the Central Committee, the report on changes in the party charter and the draft of the new CCP Charter.

The results of the plenum indicated that the 11th congress would be held under the banner of loyalty to Maoism, including its anti-Soviet, anti-socialist principles.

The plenum reinforced the /comparative stabilization in the top echelon/ of the Peking leadership. Although, according to some reports, it sharply criticized Wu Te, Chi Teng-K'uei and others who had risen to positions of power at the time of the "Cultural Revolution," Hua Kuo-feng succeeded in retaining the personnel of the Politburo formed after the removal of the "four."

At the same time, the /purge in the lower links/ continued right up to the beginning of the congress. According to various reports, about 70 members and candidates for membership in the Central Committee were severely criticized for their links with the "four," 14 first secretaries of provincial party committees were removed or transferred and about 50 leading workers in the provinces were severely criticized and dismissed. In a number of places where the leaders retained their posts, new appointments were made to the posts of party committee secretaries (mainly representatives of the "old cadres," including those against whom repressive action had been taken in the past).

The pre-congress materials devoted to questions of party construction set the important objective of "totally and definitively destroying the system of party groups and factions engendered by the 'four.'" The press noted that not all supporters of the "four" had capitulated and that they "still possess considerable power." It was admitted that factionalism continued to "threaten the revolution and the masses" and, unless it was definitively liquidated, "the ground under our feet could fall through at any moment." Reports in the Chinese press have stated that the present CCP leadership feels that the best solution lies in resolutely purging the party of all objectionable people.

According to available information, "task forces" were already checking all cadre workers before the congress. Evidently, some top-level CCP leaders still believe that the campaign against the "leftists" in the lower ranks would weaken their own basis of support and cause them to lose their real power even if they retained their high-ranking posts. This, in particular, was one of the reasons why the purge of supporters of the "four" met with resistance.

On the eve of the congress, the most urgent issues were the need to impose elementary order on production and to overcome all sorts of dissatisfaction and resistance to the introduction of the "spirit of Ta-ch'ing." A joint editorial in JEN-MIN JIH-PAO, HUNG-CH'I and CHIEH-FANG CHUN-PAO devoted to the results of the plenum stressed that "we can only speak of a complete victory when victory is achieved in both the organizational and the ideological-political respects."

The plenum made absolutely no reference to the country's socioeconomic development and also declined to analyze the real state of affairs in this field—both of these facts indicated that the present PRC leadership is still not ready to solve existing problems and, in particular, to determine specific indicators and guidelines of a socioeconomic nature or to advance an integral and substantiated program for the development of the PRC's national economy.

The Maoist /line toward militarization and the further enhancement of the role of the army in the life of Chinese society/ became particularly apparent before the congress. In the summer of 1977, a political campaign was launched in the PRC Armed Forces under the slogan "criticize the 'four' in depth and carry out education in the spirit of the '10 do's and the 10 don't's.'" This was done on "special instructions" from Hua Kuo-feng and Yeh Chien-ying. The aims of the campaign can be summarized as the following: the total overcoming of the influence of Lin Biao and the "four" in the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the elimination of their followers from the army; the total subordination of the army to the CCP leadership, "headed by Hua Kuo-feng"; the consolidation of the unity of the army and the eradication of cliquism, factionalism and localistic tendencies; absolute centralism in the structure of army administration; the maintenance of high military discipline; the heightened combat readiness and combat capability of the Chinese People's Liberation Army; modernization through technical re-equipping; and more intensive "preparations for war."

On the whole, the situation in China on the eve of the 11th CCP Congress was extremely contradictory.

Under these conditions, the struggle against the "four" is increasingly becoming not only a means of liquidating the political rivals of the present Peking leaders, but also /an instrument for further reinforcing the positions of Maoism in Chinese society with the aid of coercion as a way of suppressing the working people's resistance to Maoist policy./

All of this, naturally, also left its mark on the progress and results of the congress.

The central topic of discussion at the 11th CCP Congress was the struggle against the /"four."/ It may frankly be said that the arguments and accusations in reference to the "crimes of the gang of four" which Hua Kuo-feng cites in his report are largely contradictory and frequently unfounded. Undoubtedly, the main difficulty encountered by those who compiled the report was the fact that they had to depict Mao Tse-tung's most orthodox followers and retainers as his enemies.

The sections of the reports of both Hua Kuo-feng and Yeh Chien-ying which speak of the defeat of the "four" essentially cite no hard facts concerning their "conspiratorial" activity. Nor do the documents about the "four's" activity distributed in the party before the congress contain any telling evidence of this.

In other words, the struggle against the "four" was actually and essentially a /struggle for power./

The congress stressed the Maoists' claims to ideological and political hegemony. Mao was proclaimed "the greatest Marxist of our time" and his "thought" was called "the latest addition to the theoretical treasury of Marxism-Leninism" and "the victory banner of the revolutionary people of the world."

As one of the PRC's most important objectives, the congress stated the need to implement Mao Tse-tung's "main behest"—/"continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship."/ This can be assessed as follows: Although Hua Kuo-feng announced that the first "Cultural Revolution" had been completed and that China has entered "a new period in its development," Mao Tse-tung's general policy will be fundamentally continued in every sphere of China's political, economic, social and cultural life. This conclusion can be drawn from the content of the 11th congress materials and the present CCP leadership's actions before and after the congress.

The congress demonstrated that the /issue of the party is becoming one of the main issues of the present period./ This is also attested to by the objectives set at the congress. The first of the "eight main combat objectives" is an extensive purge in the party. Although the congress did say that the purge is aimed at eliminating the influence of the "four," it is absolutely clear--and the CCP's experience of the last 20 years testify to this--that it is primarily those who oppose "Mao Tse-tung's line" in one way or another who will be purged. The Chinese leadership does not conceal the fact that the fulfillment of this task will be a protracted and difficult job, since there is confusion and disorder in the sphere of ideology, theory and policy throughout the party.

A purge is also planned for "party administrative personnel on all levels." It is noteworthy that Yeh Chien-ying's report particularly stresses that, if forces hostile to Maoism (he still calls them "capitalist sympathizers") appear in China, a struggle using the methods of the "Cultural Revolution" will be mounted against them. It is not difficult to see this as a veiled threat aimed precisely at administrative cadres. At the same time, Yeh Chien-ying provides a new interpretation of the leftist slogan "boldly go against the current," which was advanced at the 10th congress and was enshrined in the former charter. From now on, only the possibility of "going against the current of revisionism, schism and intrigue" will be tolerated.

It should be particularly stressed that the questions of party construction raised at the congress ultimately boil down to /intensifying the Maoist nature of the CCP./ The changes made in the charter (concerning the character of the party, its organizational principles, party construction, cadre policy and the rights and duties of party members and primary organizations) testify to the new Peking leaders' intention to elevate the CCP's leading role and turn the party into a more organized force capable of reinforcing the status quo in the nation and "imposing order."



There is no doubt that the purges being planned by the new leadership, which are actually already being carried out throughout China, will aggravate the political situation even more. It must be remembered, however, that the elimination of cliquism, sectarianism, factionalism and anarchist sentiments—the aim of these purges—could ultimately /strengthen the Maoist regime./

Once again, the measures to "reinforce the machinery of state" are aimed at strengthening the regime and at making it more rigid. Within the framework of these measures, a purge is also planned for the /army,/ along with the reinforcement of its structure through "revolutionization and modernization" and the extension of the military's influence to every sphere of China's economic and social life. A major step in this direction was taken at the congress itself: The proportion accounted for by army men in the new CCP Central Committee increased to 45 percent, and they now hold 15 seats (out of 26) in the Politburo.

As the congress documents testify, great importance is attached to the development and reinforcement of such levers of the military-bureaucratic regime as the militia and the internal security organs.

Therefore, /repressive methods will play the main role in "imposing universal order."/ The very objective of "imposing order" attests not to the firmness of Maoism's positions, but to its continuing crisis.

/The principles of Chinese foreign policy and the PRC's objectives/ in the international arena, formulated in Hua Kuo-feng's report at the 11th CCP Congress, attest that the new Chinese leadership will continue its former hegemonistic policy which is hostile to the interests of the socialist countries, the international workers and national liberation movements and all progressive forces and to the interests of peace throughout the world. Since the accession to power of the new leadership, Peking's policy /has become increasingly reactionary/ and its anti-Marxist essence has become even more obvious. This is particularly graphically revealed by a comparison of the approaches taken by the Chinese leadership to a number of most important international issues at the 10th congress and at the latest, 11th CCP Congress.

The Peking elite is exacerbating its /overtly inflammatory policy of provoking war./ While the report to the 10th CCP Congress (August 1973) noted, citing Mao Tse-tung, that "the danger of war still exists...but revolution is the main trend in the world" and that, given certain conditions, "it will be possible to avert war," the 11th congress said that "factors of war are building up" and that the "clash between the superpowers" will "sooner or later lead to war"—that is, it openly stated that world war is /inevitable./

A similar shift can also be seen in the Chinese leadership's approach to the detente policy pursued by the socialist countries. The 10th congress at least acknowledged, to some extent, the very fact of the existence of detente: "Detente is a temporary and superficial phenomenon" (Chou En-lai's report). At the 11th congress, however, the word detente is enclosed in quotation marks to stress that it does not exist as far as the Chinese leaders are concerned.

Evidently, it is due to the inevitability of war that Hua Kuo-feng assesses the present situation as "exceptionally favorable" and not as merely "favorable," as Chou En-lai said at the 10th congress.

In an obvious attempt to shield the Chinese leadership, Hua Kuo-feng hastens to assure everyone of Peking's "love of peace," to assure them that "the Chinese people also want a peaceful international situation" and that "it is not the people of different countries and not the Chinese people who want war, but the superpowers." While reiterating that it is only the "superpowers" which want war and which are supposedly moving steadily toward it, Hua betrays the real intention behind the Chinese leadership's provocative policy--to drive the Soviet Union and the United States into direct confrontation and derive profit from this.

The 11th congress materials mention the "two superpowers" but openly state that the Soviet Union is the "main enemy." This assertion--made, moreover, at the highest party levels--is designed to make it even easier for Peking to ally itself with the American imperialists and other imperialists for struggle against the USSR and the socialist world.

At the 10th congress, the United States was already being depicted as a weaker opponent than the USSR and as an opponent which is supposedly "going downhill toward still greater decline." The 11th congress did this in an even more precise formula: "Soviet social-imperialism attacks, but American imperialism defends itself." By outlining the Soviet Union's "offensive strategy," the Chinese leaders are obviously inciting the United States to more intense confrontation with the USSR. And Washington is responding to these signals from Peking. According to American press reports, Admiral Zumwalt, who visited the PRC in June-July 1977, told the Chinese leaders on Brzezinski's instructions that the present American administration is prepared, if necessary, to "compete" with the USSR. He also let it be known that no final decision had been made to prohibit deliveries of weapons to China.

By depicting the United States as a target of "Soviet expansionism," the Peking leadership is effectively making a substantial /adjustment in the model of the "three worlds."/ It is, as it were, laying a basis for including American imperialism in the "extremely broad united front for the struggle against the main enemies."

In addition to all other reasons, the anti-Soviet statements made at the 11th CCP Congress were certainly also aimed at /exerting pressure on the United States/ and prompting it to normalize relations with China as soon as possible--and all the more so since Vance's visit began immediately after the end of the congress. Although this visit did not lead to the official establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States, the two sides reaffirmed their mutual desire for further rapprochement.

Hua Kuo-feng's report reaffirms the Chinese position on the Taiwan issue. Peking evidently hoped that this action, along with assurances of the invariability of its anti-Soviet course, would prompt the Americans to compromise on the Taiwan issue. Although the Americans are openly talking about their interest in China's anti-Soviet policy, an entire set of other circumstances (in particular, the complexity of the Taiwan problem, the instability of the domestic political situation in China, etc.) makes it impossible for them to take the decisive step now. Nevertheless, in practice, the manifest rightward shift which has been evident in the policy of the new U.S. administration was supported by the further move to the right in Peking's foreign policy.

While avoiding a final decision on the question of normalizing relations with the PRC, the United States and its imperialist allies are intensifying the /line of strengthening China's military potential./ According to some data, the Common Market is holding talks with the PRC on the extension of a loan of about 700 million dollars for the acquisition of modern equipment for airfields (including equipment for ensuring the automatic control of aircraft takeoff and landing operations. The talks are being held in the strictest secrecy, since this is essentially a covert form of military aid to China.

The West feels undisguised satisfaction at Peking's intention—expressed at the 11th congress—to develop modern armed forces. "Relief at this decision by China is felt in the corridors of NATO headquarters," THE DAILY TELEGRAPH wrote on 24 August. "Although there are still difficulties about selling weapons to China, many military experts refer to Peking in private conversation as an unofficial ally of NATO."

The 11th Congress materials officially confirmed the Maoist model of the "three worlds" which was advanced in 1974 and which provides the theoretical grounds for the Chinese leadership's alliance with imperialism and reaction. Evidently, one of the chief reasons for this latest fairly detailed exposition of the theory is the overt and sharp criticism of Peking by the Albanian leadership—something which has intensified the differences of opinion in pro-Maoist organizations overseas.

By confirming its loyalty to the concept of the "three worlds," Peking is once again announcing its determination to /continue to fight against the unity of the socialist countries./ Sorting the socialist countries into the different regiments of its anti-Marxist scheme, Peking depicts one of them as a "superpower," classifies others as "oppressors" and "exploiters of Third World countries" and assigns others to the category of the developing states. These manipulations by the Chinese leadership are essentially a provocative attempt to disunite the socialist countries, to bring them into conflict with each other and to then subject them to its own influence according to the old tactic of "divide and rule." The depths to which the current Chinese leaders are prepared to sink are indicated by a cartoon published in JEN-MIN JIH-PAO the day after the end of the 11th CCP Congress which contains slander against the Soviet people and their army. This is

the "three worlds" concept in action. At the congress, Hua Kuo-feng said that "this is the correct strategic and tactical principle of the international proletariat in the modern era. This is the class line of the proletariat in the international struggle.... In time it will demonstrate even greater force."

Therefore, the position of the new Chinese leadership, expounded at the 11th CCP Congress, indicates that /Peking is not only continuing the former Maoist course in international affairs but, in some aspects, is moving even further to the right than when Mao Tse-tung was alive./

An analysis of the congress materials confirms the accuracy of the fundamental assessments of the Chinese question made by the 25th CPSU Congress and the congresses of the fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties in the socialist countries. The dangerous trends which have been pointed out in the past by our parties continue to develop in the PRC.

The contradictory nature of the processes taking place in China, however, is causing a certain amount of debate among specialists.

The question arises, for example: Does the confirmation of the fundamental assessments of the political course of the current Peking leadership mean that we are reluctant to see the "new ground broken in August" and that we are closing our eyes to the truth and failing to notice that /Hua Kuo-feng's report and other congress materials contain a certain amount of self-criticism,/ even if it took the form of exposure of the "gang of four"? To the accompaniment of thunderous declarations about China's "exceptionally favorable" internal and external position, Hua admitted the existence of great difficulties in the country, a low standard of living, anarchy and confusion in the party and serious economic decline. He had said in the past that China was threatened with the establishment of a fascist dictatorship and the evolution of the CCP into a fascist party. Hua Kuo-feng admitted that the CCP was affected by factional activity, that deceit, unscrupulous maneuvering and political speculation are widespread in the party and the machinery of state, that a serious schism exists in the party and the army, that "sectarianism" is rife and that "there is no unity."

Hua, Yeh Chien-ying and Teng Hsiao-p'ing have not been sparing in their appeals for "criticism and self-criticism." They have condemned "bragging," have proclaimed the need for a "realistic approach" to the current situation, and so forth. In the congress materials, the glorification of Mao and the Maoist slogans were masked by Marxist-Leninist phrases, arguments about planning and the proportional development of the economy, about "service to the people," about the "line of the masses," about the need to "study Marxism-Leninism" (in conjunction with the "thoughts of Mao," of course) and about the "struggle against great-power chauvinism." oaths of "loyalty to proletarian internationalism" and statements about support for the national liberation movement and the just struggle of the masses. While proclaiming an overtly militaristic course and preaching the inevitability of a world war,



Hua Kuo-feng tried, at the same time, to depict himself as a lover of peace. While proclaiming an essentially hegemonistic foreign policy course, he talks, at the same time, about the struggle against hegemonism. While undermining the international communist movement, conducting a violent anti-Soviet campaign and totally rejecting all of the Soviet Union's constructive initiatives in regard to the development and normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations, Hua Kuo-feng tried, at the same time, to portray himself as a supporter of "unity with the socialist countries" and Marxist-Leninist parties.

If the verbal displays of self-criticism and realism in the materials of the 11th congress had led to an improvement in the position of the Chinese working class, to the restoration of the CCP as a Marxist-Leninist party, to the improvement of China's relations with the socialist states and to the PRC's return to an anti-imperialist foreign policy, then the Soviet Union and the fraternal countries would definitely welcome this. Unfortunately, there is now more reason to believe that all of this is merely the embellishment of Maoism.

The cosmetics applied to the face of Maoism by the materials of the 11th CCP Congress are intended for the domestic and foreign consumer. /Inside the country,/ their purpose is to gain the support of broad strata of the Chinese population, to strengthen the authority of the new leadership and to use splendid words and promises in order to distract the population's attention from current and future difficulties, the need for improvement in the people's well-being and the privations which will result from a continuation of the policy of national militarization. /Abroad,/ the attractive phrases are intended to achieve even greater mutual understanding with imperialist circles in the West and, at the same time, to blunt the vigilance of the international public regarding Peking's militarist, expansionist course, a course aimed at the subversion of international detente and the provocation of world war.

Peking's efforts are meeting with an appropriate response. In the United States, those who insist on the even more energetic use of the "Chinese trump card" in the struggle against the USSR and the socialist world have become busier. They argue that the new leadership in the PRC has become stable and that the situation in China has been "normalized" since the 11th congress. It was significant that Secretary of State Vance's visit to Peking began immediately after the announcement that the 11th congress had been held and that Vance was the first foreign statesman to meet with the top PRC party and state leadership which was formed after the 11th CCP Congress.

There is a prevailing desire in the Western press to portray the 11th CCP Congress as "a turning-point in Chinese domestic policy, whereas the 9th and 10th congresses were no more than truces in the course of the struggle." Imperialist propaganda is blaring announcements that "Peking has openly signaled that it has departed from the path outlined by Mao Tse-tung," that there is "liberalization" in China and that "China is departing from the voluntarist policy in order to get back to realism." LE MONDE, for example, maintained that "Mao Tse-tung thought," while remaining a "cementing element," will henceforth be "stripped of its most explosive content."

Some Western papers, which are usually quite enthusiastic in proclaiming the thesis about nonintervention and independence--which, however, does not prevent them from interfering with even greater zeal in the internal affairs of other countries and parties--demonstrated, nevertheless, an unprecedented indulgence and absent-mindedness with regard to Peking's actions.

In order to please the Chinese authorities, these papers and journals went into veritable raptures about the "peace-loving" 11th CCP Congress, even when odds to the inevitability of war were being declaimed at the congress. Some of them headed their accounts of the foreign policy section of Hua Kuo-feng's report with the words: "China Wants Peace" and so forth, and described Hua Kuo-feng's militaristic arguments on questions of war and peace as "interesting."

What is the correct attitude to take toward this embellishment of Maoism?

Without a doubt, it is necessary to attentively follow the development of the situation in China and to take all of the positive changes which could take place in that country into account. /The materials of the 11th CCP Congress and Peking's practical course, however, provide no grounds for drawing conclusions about any kind of "de-Maoization" in the PRC or "dismantling" of Maoism./ More accurately, a /restructuring/ of Maoism is in progress; its most odious and completely discredited parts are being expunged, and conditions are being created for a more efficient implementation of the former antisocialist great-power course. And this makes it even more dangerous. Indeed, it was one thing when the Maoist course was implemented by such incompetent people as Chian Ch'ing and Wang Hung-wen, but quite another when the same policy is to be pursued by such experienced figures as Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Ken Piao and Huang Hua in the field of international relations, and by the same Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Li Hsien-nien, Yu Ch'iu-li, Fang I and others in the field of internal Chinese development.

As for the program of economic development for the PRC, it has still not been formulated. Only some of its elements are known. It is possible that something will be added by the forthcoming National People's Congress session, where economic questions are to be treated more extensively than at the CCP Congress. Those elements include maximum utilization of political controls to step up economic development.

Therefore, the 11th CCP Congress established a new leadership for the party and the country, approved organizational decisions relating to the "gang of four" and enshrined Maoism as the ideological and political platform of this leadership by the authority of the supreme party forum.

It approved Peking's former course toward stepping up the struggle against world socialism, splitting up the international communist movement and undermining the national liberation movement. The documents adopted by the congress show that the Chinese leadership, while taking refuge behind revolutionary phraseology and claims of allegiance to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, is actually still taking an antirevolutionary and anti-communist stand, is forming an alliance with the most reactionary forces and

is waging a struggle against peace and socialism. This is why the objectives set by the 25th CPSU Congress of continued principled and relentless struggle against Maoism has not only retained its topical importance but is also acquiring even more vital significance.

This objective is becoming even more crucial in connection with the publication of the fifth volume of "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung" and the 11th CCP Congress. Any critical analysis of the anti-Marxist and antisocialist nature of the policy of the Maoists, which was confirmed by the 11th CCP Congress, should focus on the following points:

Exposure of the dangerous nature of Maoist preachings in regard to questions of war and peace, the inevitability of a new world war and the militarization of China;

Criticism of the anti-Marxist and nationalist character of the Maoist "three worlds" theory and the idea of struggle against the "hegemony of the two superpowers";

Critical analysis of the Maoist course, which was confirmed by the 11th CCP Congress, within the PRC and in the international arena;

Exposure of the inconsistency of Maoist claims concerning ideological hegemony within the communist movement, the attempts to portray Mao Tse-tung as "the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era," the anti-Marxist nature of Maoist views on socialism and the antiscientific nature of Maoist philosophy;

Condemnation of Maoist falsifications of the history of Soviet-Chinese relations.

At the same time, Soviet Sinology, loyal to the CPSU's unchanged, principled line of /friendship with the Chinese people,/ will continue to do its utmost to study and publicize China's greatest cultural and scientific achievements. This is reflected in the publication of literature on China in the USSR and Soviet editions of the Chinese classics and in the measures taken by the Soviet public to commemorate the revolutionary anniversaries of the Chinese people and to honor the prominent figures in Chinese culture and Russian and Soviet Sinology who have aided in strengthening friendship and mutual understanding between our countries and peoples.

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## **CHINA AFTER MAO TSE-TUNG**

**Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1977 pp 45-72**

**[Round table discussion organized by editors of PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA]**

[Text] The political instability in the PRC, which has lasted for more than 15 years, became particularly acute after the death of Mao Tse-tung.

As we know, Mao Tse-tung's adventuristic foreign and domestic policy, which contradicted sharply with the vital interests of the Chinese people, brought the nation to a state of crisis.

The new outburst of political struggle against the "gang of four" made the crisis in the Maoist regime even more acute by intensifying the fatal consequences of the fundamentally defective line of Maoist policy.

The new Chinese leadership is trying to blame the "four" for all of the failures of Maoist policy and practice inside and outside the nation, criticizing the "four" in the name of Mao Tse-tung and maintaining his strategic line, but simultaneously making corrections in some of the more compromising Maoist principles.

The import of the processes now occurring in China and future trends in the development of the domestic political situation in China and in Chinese foreign policy were the topic of a discussion organized by the editors of PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA and participated in by Sinologists from the Soviet Union and several other socialist countries.

Below, we are printing a brief summarization of the more significant issues examined by the participants in the round table discussion, reflecting the concerted views of its participants on these matters.



**Question:** How do you evaluate the legacy inherited by the Chinese people from Mao Tse-tung as a result of his term in power?

**Answer:** Mao Tse-tung's actions and his domestic and foreign policy greatly harmed the interests of China and the Chinese people. The "Three Red Flag" policies (the "Great Leap Forward," the "People's Communes" and the "General Line"), advanced by Mao Tse-tung in 1958 slowed down China's socioeconomic development and gave rise to a prolonged crisis in the party and the nation. The "Cultural Revolution" undermined the popular-democratic order and the socialist conquests of the Chinese workers. During the years of the "Cultural Revolution," millions of communists, progressive workers and members of the intelligentsia were executed or subjected to repressive actions, the party's internationalist forces were emasculated, the Maoist regime was established in the nation, an unrestricted cult of personality was fostered and all areas of social and economic life in the nation were permeated with great-power chauvinism and militarism. Mao also left a heavy legacy in the field of international relations. The foreign policy conducted by his will for the last 15 years had fundamentally discredited China in the eyes of peace-loving progressive forces. A reversal was made from friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance with the socialist countries to a policy of hostility and struggle against them and the formation of alliances with the forces of imperialism and reaction.

**Question:** Have the new Peking leaders displayed any tendency toward a rejection of extremist Maoist principles?

**Answer:** Judging by the statements made by Peking officials, particularly Hua Kuo-feng, in regard to major issues of PRC policy and by the materials of the 11th CCP Congress,<sup>1</sup> the new Chinese leadership has completely taken over the Maoist regalia. Furthermore, the Peking leaders obviously intend to continue taking advantage of the great authority of Marxism-Leninism and socialist ideals in the eyes of the Chinese workers.

Statements by Chinese leaders and propaganda agencies have reaffirmed all of the old hegemonistic goals of Peking policy and the total set of Maoist strategies and tactics directed toward struggle against the communist movement and the world socialist system and have expounded the chief Maoist postulates of petty bourgeois barracks socialism.

Even under the leadership headed by Hua Kuo-feng, Maoism is still a variety of anticommunism. It interacts closely with the anticommunism of the imperialist bourgeoisie and other reactionary and extremist forces. Maoist anticommunism is distinguished from these by its chauvinism and aggressive hegemonism. It uses state and cooperative ownership for antihumanitarian, antisocialist goals, camouflaging this by means of Marxist-Leninist phraseology, and makes use of the authority of Marxism-Leninism and socialism.

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1. For more on the 11th CCP Congress, see the article entitled "New Stage in Evolution of Peking's Antisocialist Policy and Objectives of Struggle Against Maoism" in this issue.

Mao Tse-tung's domestic and foreign policy met with growing resistance from the general Chinese public. Dissatisfaction grew among party, state and military personnel and the working masses. Implementation of the course asserted and defended by Mao Tse-tung will harm the material and political interests of the overwhelming majority of the population in the PRC and will constantly engender the conditions giving rise to the crisis in the Maoist regime and its policies. This is forcing the Chinese leaders to adapt their policies, which are currently being conducted for the attainment of great-power chauvinistic goals, to actual conditions. This kind of maneuver is made simpler by the fact that Maoism is not an integral, consistent doctrine; rather, it represents an eclectic mixture of contradictory premises which are employed in a utilitarian fashion for the attainment of specific political goals.

It has now been more than a year since the death of Mao Tse-tung. During this time, the positions and political course of the Chinese leaders who succeeded Mao Tse-tung have been displayed to a certain degree. Peking's present policy in regard to the most important issues has largely been made clear. It must be said that the CCP leaders have not displayed any intention to cast off the fetters of Maoism, subject the defective Maoist principles to critical analysis or direct the nation into the channel of socialist construction.

After Mao Tse-tung's death, Western bourgeois politicians and Sinologists advanced the thesis of a process of gradual "de-Maoization" which was allegedly taking place in China. It must be said, however, that the term itself suffers from a certain degree of ambiguity. If we are referring to the Chinese people, then it is completely obvious that it would be incorrect to use this term, since the Chinese people never accepted Maoism. It was forced upon them by the authorities and was profoundly alien to them. As for the Chinese leadership, the facts show that it does not intend any kind of "de-Maoization"--that is, it does not intend to reject the defective Maoist principles and practices.

It has already become evident that Mao Tse-tung's death has not led and will not lead automatically to the death of Maoism as an ideology hostile to Marxism.

Question: In general terms, how should we assess the domestic situation and the course of events in China during the last year?

Answer: An analysis of the domestic state of affairs in the PRC during the period after Mao Tse-tung's death indicates that the events which took place in Peking last September and October resemble a top-level coup which did not lead to any cardinal changes in policy. The nature of the regime established as a result of the "Cultural Revolution" remains unchanged and the communist party did not regain its leading and guiding role as the vanguard of the working class. The elementary principles of democracy and state legality are still being violated.

The present Peking leadership is preserving the "banner of Mao Tse-tung" and has vowed to preserve it in the future. It has not renounced the great-Han militaristic plots of Maoism. The 11th CCP Congress, which was held in August, showed once again that the new Chinese leaders have directly associated themselves with the course inherited from Mao Tse-tung and have taken on the responsibility of keeping China on the Maoist course. The present leaders are occupying the same old nationalist, great-power, expansionist and hegemonistic platform.

The news arriving from China attests to the fact that the Chinese leaders are encountering substantial difficulties in their attempts to normalize the political situation in the nation and to stabilize the economy. The lack of organization in all spheres of national life as a result of the "Cultural Revolution" is still having its effect. Due to its adherence to the defective course of Mao Tse-tung, the present Peking leadership has been unable to provide the Chinese people with an effective program of political and socioeconomic development or to improve the living conditions of the population. The present leaders are requesting the people to tighten their belts even more. The plans for national economic development for the next 5 years, and even for 1977, have not been compiled as yet. All-Chinese sectorial conventions have pointed out the severity of economic problems. There have been interruptions in the operations of railway transport and in deliveries of raw materials to industrial enterprises and there are shortages of coal, petroleum and electric power. In the midst of the stormiest upheavals and crises, however, the Peking leadership has done everything possible to protect the defense industry and ensure its all-round growth. The capitalist nations, especially the United States, the FRG, Japan and France, have given China substantial assistance in the development of its defense industry (within limits that do not threaten these nations), with a view to reinforcing this nation as an opponent of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community.

Under the conditions of continuous political instability and economic difficulties, the new Chinese leaders have determined that the imposition of "great order" in the nation should be their central task. Just as in the past, political campaigns and coercive administrative measures will play the chief role in this "imposition of order."

Due to the political and economic difficulties encountered by the present CCP leadership, it has been forced to resort to certain maneuvers and to make certain adjustments in Maoist principles in the field of domestic and foreign policy, in issues connected with economic, cultural and scientific development, the system of education, the adaptation of foreign experience, etc. The Peking leaders have also announced the importance of a "correct attitude" toward various strata of Chinese society and are placing special emphasis on the need to conduct the "correct policy" in regard to cadres (including the older generation), the intelligentsia and ethnic minorities. They have admitted that the "Cultural Revolution" had its "negative side"

as well. In several statements, the "distortions" permitted in mass political campaigns of the past have been criticized.

Question: What should our general assessment of PRC foreign policy after the death of Mao Tse-tung be?

Answer: No positive changes have been made in Peking's foreign policy since the death of Mao Tse-tung. At the 11th CCP Congress, Hua Kuo-feng set the objective of "continued implementation of the revolutionary foreign policy line elaborated by Chairman Mao Tse-tung."

Peking's foreign policy cannot be examined without consideration for the plans to turn China into a strong world power by the year 2000, plans which were officially formulated in the PRC Constitution of 1975 and have been repeatedly affirmed by new leaders, including their reaffirmation at the 11th CCP Congress. The realization of these plans will depend on the establishment of the necessary material conditions for the conduct of Mao Tse-tung's foreign policy strategy with its ambitious, great-power aims and territorial claims.

The present leaders have expressed their intention to make China even more powerful and to make "an even greater contribution to the affairs of mankind." Judging by their statements, they, just as Mao, are preparing to make this "contribution" not to the cause of peace, but to the provocation of a new world war. For example, on 9 May 1977, PRC Minister of National Defense Yeh Chien-ying contrasted the course of the socialist nations toward the consolidation of peace and continued detente to Peking's course toward war: "We," he announced, "must place special emphasis on the fact that a large-scale war will soon begin." In accordance with this premise, the Chinese leaders are stipulating the need to develop and modernize their defense industry. The Chinese leaders are taking the most active measures to augment their nuclear missile potential by spending almost half of the entire centralized state budget of the nation for military purposes.

All of Peking's foreign policy strategy is aimed at the intensification of conflicts between the socialist and the imperialist nations, particularly between the USSR and the United States, at the utilization of conflicts for the exacerbation of international tension and at the realization of the thesis referring to the inevitability of a new world war.

Just as in the past, the Peking leaders are opposing all proposals made by the socialist countries in regard to the nonutilization of force in international relations, disarmament, the banning of nuclear tests, etc. Energetically making preparations for war, China is stubbornly opposing any measures in the field of disarmament. The PRC is one of the few nations to decline to take on any obligations to prohibit or restrict the development and utilization of means of mass destruction. The Chinese press has attacked the latest initiatives of the socialist countries in connection with the Vienna talks on the limitation of armed forces and weapons in central Europe. Peking has justified and encouraged the intentions of the United States and



the other imperialist nations to continue the arms race and to increase their military strength.

There is an increasing tendency in Chinese foreign policy toward further rapprochement with the United States, toward expansion of the sphere of "common" or "parallel" interests of Peking and Washington and toward the alliance of the PRC leaders with the most aggressive circles in the United States in an attempt to undermine the positions of the socialist world. The list of "Peking-Washingtonian common interests" extends not only to European issues, but also to problems in Asia, Africa and the Pacific and Indian oceans, where these two nations have displayed mutual interest in the maintenance of U.S. military presence and in the undermining of socialist influence in these regions. The "possibility of exerting pressure on the USSR" by means of joint action is being discussed in Peking and Washington. The actual partnership, mutual understanding and joint statements of Peking and Washington in respect to many international issues are manifested particularly clearly in the United States.

The Chinese leadership is continuing its persistent attempts to involve Japan in this anti-Soviet alliance by including an article on "joint struggle against hegemony," which would actually be directed against the USSR, in the Chinese-Japanese agreement on peace and friendship.

In the struggle against positive tendencies in Europe, Peking is still relying on revanchists from the FRG, on the most reactionary members of the Conservative Party in England, etc. Attacks are still being made on the premises of the Final Act of the conference in Helsinki and on the document of the Berlin Conference of European Communist and Workers Parties. Peking is making more intensive efforts to ally itself with NATO and with the military-industrial complexes in the capitalist nations.

Peking is seeking mutual understanding with reactionary right-wing nationalist regimes in the developing countries, is playing into the hands of imperialist policy in Asia, Africa and Latin America and is displaying a hostile attitude toward progressive forces in these regions. It has allied itself with the imperialists in the struggle against the national liberation movement. As the PRC's behavior in Africa has shown, the Chinese leaders do not wish to settle existing problems in this area in the public interest and are opposing the reinforcement of progressive regimes in Angola and other countries.

Question: Has there been any change in the Peking leadership's attitude toward the socialist community and the world communist movement since Mao Tse-tung left the scene?

Answer: Chinese foreign policy since the death of Mao Tse-tung has been characterized by more intensive subversive action aimed at breaking up the socialist community. Maintaining hostility toward the socialist community, the Chinese leadership has continued to conduct the schismatic policy of

the so-called "differentiated approach," acting even more subtly than before. Peking feels that it is its duty to disunite the fraternal socialist nations and subvert their coordinated foreign policy line by means of the "selective normalization" of relations with some countries and a continuation of hostilities toward others. China has tried to convince some of the socialist countries that there are allegedly "real opportunities for the development of all-round cooperation" with them even if Peking maintains its hostile attitude toward the socialist community in general and the USSR in particular.

At the beginning of 1977, the Chinese leadership began a propagandistic attack, an attack which was essentially coordinated with imperialism, on several socialist states for the purpose of stimulating counterrevolutionary and antisocialist elements. Along with anticommunists in the West, Peking openly supported all types of renegades and rebels. Peking made more and more attacks on the socialist states' joint cooperative agencies--the Warsaw Treaty Organization and CEMA. Some of the difficulties encountered by the socialist states in their economic development are being used to discredit the course taken by these nations toward friendship with the USSR. For this purpose, the Chinese leaders are using their propaganda system to revive nationalist sentiments and certain problems in international relations which have become a thing of the past, eradicated by the course of history. They are trying to present actual events in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland in a distorted light, are doing their utmost to incite the socialist countries to take a course of national isolation and are misusing the slogans of "independence and sovereignty."

Peking's attacks on the socialist community are simultaneously attacks on the national interests of each socialist country. The Chinese leadership has displayed a desire to harm each separate socialist state by slandering its foreign and domestic policy and by attempting to complicate its international position, interfere in its internal affairs and subject it to economic pressure and direct military and political pressure.

Anti-Soviet propaganda within China has reached an even more feverish pitch under the new Chinese leadership and attempts are again being made to convince the Chinese public that the USSR supposedly "never stops thinking about the destruction" of China. The new leaders of the PRC have announced the impossibility of better relations with the Soviet Union, with which "there can be no reconciliation." At the 11th CCP Congress, Hua Kuo-feng declared that Peking's "disputes" with the Soviet Union "will continue for a long time."

The PRC's relations with Albania have recently grown perceptibly worse. Disturbed by this, China has made great efforts to prevent the further widening of the gap that has resulted from a difference in approaches to several problems. At the Seventh Congress of the Albanian Workers Party, no mention was made of the role of the CCP and China or of the current state of affairs in the PRC. At the same time, however, certain aspects of Peking's foreign policy and some of its foreign policy doctrines (particularly the theory of the "three worlds") were criticized indirectly and the fact was stressed

that, "regardless of which way the wind blows, Albania will consistently adhere to its previous stand." Tirana does not agree with Peking's attitudes toward American imperialism, NATO, the Common Market and certain other international issues.

Maoism is allying itself with "leftist" and rightist revisionism. Maoist principles are being used more and more to "justify" all types of nationalist behavior and to deny the general laws of socialism and the principles of proletarian internationalism.

The ideology and policies of Maoism are directed against the fundamental premises of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, against the very essence of socialism and against the bases of the international communist movement. The present Chinese leadership is continuing its previous subversive, schismatic line in regard to the world communist movement. Even after Mao Tse-tung's death, Peking repeatedly reaffirmed its intention to continue its struggle against the genuine Marxist parties and to reinforce the ranks of its allies. The Chinese leaders are encouraging foreign Maoists to concentrate on activities directed against the interests of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

It should be noted that recent events in China, particularly the expulsion of the "gang of four," have given rise, just as many times in the past, to greater mistrust of the Chinese leadership by foreign Maoists, which is intensifying the crisis within Maoist organizations. The chaos within these groups is being aggravated by the Sino-Albanian conflicts, which became noticeably more acute after the expulsion of the "four." Some Maoist organizations have expressed the desire to strengthen their ties with Albania in counterbalance to China. Some supporters of Maoism are displaying an increasingly clear tendency toward ascribing a leading role to Tirana. This, however, does not change the anti-Soviet, antisocialist essence of the political platforms of these groups.

The major methods and forms of Maoist anticommunist activity are slanderous attacks on the domestic and foreign policies of the nations of the socialist community and ideological diversionary actions against the world communist movement.

The stronger anticommunist sentiments of the Maoists primarily represent Peking's reaction to the socialist community's growing influence in the world. The new Chinese leadership is worried about the way in which the growing prestige of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states will affect China. The Maoists are particularly disturbed by the successes of the socialist nations in the struggle for peace and detente, the results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the new achievements of the nations of the socialist community in communist and socialist construction and in the elevation of the material and cultural standard of living of the workers.

A characteristic feature of the anticommunist stand of the Chinese leaders is the fact that they direct their attacks against the basic objectives formulated by the CPSU and the other parties of the socialist countries in the construction of a developed socialist society and the establishment of a material and technical basis for communism. The slanderous statements of the Maoists about some kind of "rebirth of society" in the socialist nations serve the reactionary ideologists and politicians of imperialism as direct support in their attempts to discredit the democratic and humanitarian nature of true socialism and to dispute the fact that the fraternal parties of the socialist countries are mainly concerned with the individual and the satisfaction of his material and spiritual demands.

Question: How were the political line and practical actions of the Maoist leadership of China assessed by the congresses of the fraternal parties in the socialist nations?

Answer: The congresses of the fraternal parties of the socialist nations made fundamental assessments of Maoist ideology and policy which have retained, as time has shown, their topical importance.

The 25th CPSU Congress stressed the fact that the policy of the Peking leaders is overtly directed against the majority of the socialist states. Moreover, it is directly connected with the position of the most extreme reactionary forces in the world and is not only alien to socialist principles and ideals, but has essentially also become one of imperialism's important reserves in its struggle against socialism. It is no longer enough to say that Maoist ideology and policy are incompatible with Marxist-Leninist doctrine—they are directly hostile to it. The CPSU will continue to wage a struggle against Maoism and this struggle will be principled and implacable.

The degradation of Maoism has entered a new phase, speakers at the 11th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party said. It has allied itself with the most aggressive forces of imperialism, fascism and revanchism and with the opponents of peace and social progress. Its actions are becoming an increasingly dangerous threat to peace and security.

The 11th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party decisively repudiated the chauvinistic, nationalistic and anti-Soviet views of Maoism which are so dangerous to the unity of the socialist countries and the international communist movement. The congress of Hungarian communists condemned the views and political practices of the Maoist leadership which distort the true meaning and objectives of the international class struggle and which are intended to undermine the unity and solidarity of the socialist community and the international communist and workers movement and to disunite the national liberation movements and isolate them from the socialist countries.

The plans of the present Peking leaders to form an antisocialist, anti-Soviet front under their hegemony are extremely dangerous to the vital interest of all peoples, speakers at the Ninth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of



Germany noted. They stressed the fact that the success of the struggle against imperialism and for peaceful coexistence and social progress throughout the world calls for a consistent struggle against the theory and practice of Maoism.

Speakers at the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba stated that the unity of the international communist movement, based on the principles of Marx, Engels and Lenin, is an essential condition for the triumph of the masses. The congress repudiated and condemned all attempts to undermine the unity of communist forces in the international arena and to belittle or slander the glorious role played by the CPSU in modern history.

Speakers at the 17th Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party stated that the Maoists, as a force hostile to socialism, have openly allied themselves with racist and fascist cliques, extreme reactionary forces and the aggressive circles of imperialism and are striving to form a united front against world socialism. As a force hostile to the national liberation movement, the Maoists have taken a direct part in suppressing the struggle of the masses for freedom and national independence and in armed intervention against the masses. For this reason, the struggle against Maoism is an integral part of the struggle of the masses against the forces of imperialism and reaction.

Speakers at the Seventh Congress of the Polish United Workers Party said that traditional reactionary and conservative currents in the ideological struggle against socialism are now uniting with revisionism and Maoism and with rightist and "leftist" opportunism. The congress decisively censured the schismatic policy of the Maoist Chinese leadership.

The 15th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party underscored the fact that the schismatic ideology and policy of the Maoist leaders, which are hostile to Marxism-Leninism, are in sharp opposition to the efforts being made to reinforce the socialist community and ensure peace throughout the world.

The congresses of the fraternal parties of the socialist countries reaffirmed the desire of these countries to normalize and develop intergovernmental relations with the PRC and their willingness to establish close friendly relations when the Chinese leaders return to a policy based on Marxism-Leninism.

The basic conclusions drawn from the analysis of the activities of Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese leadership he headed by the fraternal parties of the socialist countries are of topical significance, as they have been confirmed by the entire course of events.

Question: What kind of ideological platform and domestic political program does the new Chinese leadership have?

**Answer:** The Peking leadership has formulated and publicized the basic goals and guidelines of internal development in the PRC. They have been set forth in the materials of the 11th CCP Congress and in statements by leading officials.

Apparently, when the guidelines for internal development in the PRC are being determined by the Chinese leaders, they have differences of opinion about the degree to which the course of previous years should be modified and about the means and methods of attaining their great-power chauvinist goals. The situation is approximately the following. Some of the leaders of China agree only to insignificant amendments in the line of the "Cultural Revolution." The military attaches primary significance to the interests of the army and demands that the army be given a greater role to play and that society be organized on the basis of military discipline and martial order. As the materials of the convention on the introduction of the Ta-ch'ing experience show, the pressure and influence exerted by the military are growing stronger. Other leaders feel that the most important prerequisite for the attainment of their great-power goals is more rapid economic growth and, for this reason, attach great significance to education, science and technology and favor the more efficient development of the national economy.

The part of the leadership headed by Hua Kuo-feng is quickly taking measures to perpetuate the cult of Mao and Maoism. As early as 8 October 1976, two decrees were promulgated by the CCP Central Committee, the Permanent Committee of the National People's Congress, the PRC State Council and the Military Council of the CCP Central Committee: On the erection of a "memorial home" to Mao Tse-tung and on the publication of selected works by Mao and a complete collection of his works.

In April 1977, the fifth volume of "Selected Works by Mao Tse-tung" (1949-1957) was published; this book is ultimately to be published in an edition of 200 million copies. In connection with the publication of this book, the CCP Central Committee promulgated a decree on 7 April 1977 which obligates "the entire party, the entire army and the entire national population" to begin a "mass movement" for the study of this work and, in addition to this, recommends that this be done "in conjunction with the practice of class struggle" and with "the regulation of party ranks and the regulation of style" (that is, with the purge now going on in the Chinese party).

The fifth volume does not include previously published statements by Mao in which he speaks of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and refers to the need to conduct a policy of peace between peoples.

The works included in the fifth volume propagandize the basic Maoist postulates which contradict the principles of scientific socialism, such as the neo-Trotskyist "theory of continuous revolution," "continued revolution under proletarian dictatorship," "class struggle under socialism" and so forth, and statements in regard to socioeconomic development which contrast with the experience of other socialist countries.

Hua Kuo-feng extols the basic premises of the Maoist course in the area of economic development: "Politics is the commanding force" and so forth. The connection between "economic strength" and military construction is particularly emphasized.

Therefore, the ideological and political principles of Mao Tse-tung represent the basis of the new Chinese leadership's program in the internal affairs of the PRC.

Question: What are the basic directions of the practical activities of the Chinese leadership headed by Hua Kuo-feng?

Answer: The main directions are the implementation of the "Three Red Flag" policies advanced by Mao Tse-tung in 1958, including the general line of socialist construction in accordance with the principle of "more, faster, better and more economically," the "Great Leap" and the "people's communes." On 9 May 1977, Hua Kuo-feng frankly stated at the all-Chinese convention on the introduction of the Ta-ch'ing experience that "we...will certainly create new conditions in the national economy--the conditions of an all-round leap forward."

The new leadership has provided the following brief description of Chinese development: "What are our aims? In 1958, Chairman Mao Tse-tung said that our aims were to gradually, according to plan, organize the workers (industry), peasants (agriculture), employees in trade (exchange), the intelligentsia (culture and education) and soldiers (militia men, that is, the general arming of the population) into an enormous commune and to establish it as the basic unit of our society. Ta-ch'ing and Tachai represent these aims" (speech presented by Yeh Chien-ying on 9 May 1977). This "enormous commune" actually represents a vast barracks, since, according to Hua Kuo-feng's definition, "the Ta-ch'ing workers' source of strength" is the fact that they "apply the idea and policy of army construction specifically to industrial construction" and have formed an "industrial army." Quoting Mao Tse-tung, Hua demanded that the people "follow the Ta-ch'ing example by learning from the People's Liberation Army."

The conferences of the heads of the army and the defense industry have resulted in greater emphasis on preparations for war.

The "main combat objectives" for 1977 were formulated in the same vein: 1) To begin in-depth criticism of the "four" (Wang Hung-pen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chiang Ch'ing and Yao Wen-yuan); 2) to intensify party construction (including the "regulation of party organizations and the regulation of style") and the construction of revolutionary committees on different levels; 3) to conduct an in-depth mass movement "to learn from Tachai in agriculture and from Ta-ch'ing in industry" and to work intensively toward national economic growth, guided by the lines of "prepare for war," "agriculture is the basis" and others; 4) to continue the development of the "mass movement for the study of the works of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and his

elevation to new heights," as well as "to improve the work of all party schools," to achieve new successes in the work of the "Schools of 7 May" and so forth.

The fulfillment of these assignments will be closely coordinated with the "imposition of grade order" in the nation, which is in fact China's most urgent problem. The resolution of this problem, however, is being based on the "strategic course" proposed by Hua Kuo-feng—"to take the class struggle as the deciding link," which implies the suppression of all those who do not agree with Maoism and the Maoist regime.

In the absence of a positive program for national development which appeals to the general public, the "imposition of great order" will involve the augmentation of the role played by coercive agencies, purges, repressive actions and the intimidation of the population with public executions. All of this will ultimately make the regime of the Maoist dictatorship even more unyielding.

The basic directions of the practical actions of Hua Kuo-feng's leadership and the objectives it has set for 1977 do not transcend the framework of the previous Maoist line. And this means that the Chinese people will suffer new privations, that national wealth will again be sacrificed to ambitious goals and that the efforts of the Chinese workers to implement the latest "great leap" will actually be wasted in preparations for war.

After Mao Tse-tung's death, new shades of meaning began to be introduced into the statements and actions of the new leaders who had to contend with increasing political and economic difficulties. These provided some hope for the possibility of a change for the better in China and for its gradual departure from Maoism.

The new implications were connected with primarily the following issues:

In Economics--the Peking leadership has announced that "the main objective of proletarian dictatorship is economic development" and that "communism cannot be built on a foundation of underdeveloped productive forces." Demands are being made in the national economy for the sharp acceleration of developmental rates, increased accumulation, improvements in management, production growth, enterprise profitability and the use of economic accountability and other economic methods.

In Social Relations--the Chinese leadership and propaganda have declared the importance of a "correct attitude" toward different strata of Chinese society. Special emphasis is placed on the need to conduct the "correct policy" in regard to cadres (including the older generation), ethnic minorities and the intelligentsia.



In Regard to Mass Political and Ideological Campaigns--the present Chinese leadership admits that the "Cultural Revolution" had its negative side as well and Mao Tse-tung's statement that the "Cultural Revolution" was "70 percent successful and 30 percent erroneous." Several statements in the press have criticized the "distortions" which were permitted in the conduct of such political campaigns as the "study of the theory of proletarian dictatorship," "criticism of the novel 'River Backwater,'" "the struggle against the epidemic of rightist inclinations" and so forth.

In the Area of Public Welfare--the Chinese leadership and press have announced the need for "concern" about the life of the people, apparently under the influence of the insistent demands being made by the workers. Hua Kuo-feng said in his speech of 25 December 1976 that "we must be concerned about the needs of the masses and constantly improve their life through the development of production."

But these new shades of meaning have not been reinforced by any kind of concrete measures. They have the nature of "declarations of intention" and have the purpose of blaming the shortcomings of the Maoist line on the "four" and opening a safety valve to vent off some of the accumulated dissatisfaction in Chinese society. At the same time, they clear a path for the more effective implementation of the Maoist course.

There has been a reiteration of the Maoist directives insisting "on the construction of enterprises of the Ta-ch'ing type everywhere" and districts of the "Ta-ch'ing type," on "the all-round implementation of the constitution of the An-shan Metallurgical Combine," which is contrasted to the "constitution of the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine" and is interpreted as a "summarization of the struggle against the revisionist line in enterprise activities," on the continued fulfillment of instructions "to be red and qualified" which were issued during the period of the "Great Leap Forward" to discredit specialists objecting to voluntaristic experiments, and on the strict implementation of the "system for participation by administrative cadres in physical labor" and the principles of "reliance on one's own strength" (in the Maoist interpretation), "policy is the main thing," "more intensive preparations for war" and so forth.

An analysis of the program, the basic guidelines and the objectives of internal development in the PRC advanced by the group of Hua Kuo-feng indicates that, in general and in essence, they are based on Maoist principles and are frankly Maoist in nature. The isolated provisos and verbal promises used by the Peking leaders as a type of political maneuver cannot change the true state of affairs and cannot guarantee the Chinese workers any kind of improvement in their situation. This is confirmed by the practical measures taken by the present Chinese leadership and by the current state of affairs in the nation.

Question: What are the characteristics of the present situation in the Chinese national economy?

Answer: China is still experiencing serious economic difficulties. At the end of 1976, the Chinese leaders themselves described the situation in the Chinese economy as a "serious crisis in production." JEN-MIN JIH-PAO admitted that industrial and agricultural production was lower in 1976 than during the previous year.

According to estimates, the total volume of industrial production in 1976 was lower than during the previous year. There were considerable reductions in steel smelting, machine building, coal production, etc. In his speech in April 1977 at the All-Chinese Conference on the Introduction of the Ta-ch'ing Experience, Li Hsien-nien, vice premier of the State Council of the PRC, noted that "many plants had no work last year" in China. According to existing data, at the beginning of May 1977, the CCP Central Committee made special mention of the extremely tense situation in the economy, restricted orders for new equipment (both domestic and imported) and announced that previously submitted orders of this kind would not be filled.

The situation in agriculture is still difficult. In 1976, agricultural production was lower than in 1975.

Peking's actual practices in the economic sphere are now aimed at using the campaign to establish "general order in the nation" to normalize conditions at industrial enterprises and in construction and transportation and escape the serious difficulties present in the national economy as a result of the acute shortage of coal, coke, commercial grain, steel and production equipment.

Due to difficult conditions in the nation, the present leadership has been forced to extend the term for the fulfillment of previously assigned tasks: Now the establishment of a "powerful system of industry and economics" is to be completed by 1985 rather than by 1980.

Question: What are the distinctive features of the economic policy worked out by Hua Kuo-feng's group?

Answer: Peking's present leaders have not only failed to display any desire to depart from Maoist economic policy, but have stubbornly reaffirmed the efficacy of Mao Tse-tung's instructions. They attach primary significance to such postulates as "take the class struggle as the deciding link," "continue the revolution with dictatorship by the proletariat," "politics is the commanding force" and so forth. For this reason, cadres and workers have limited opportunities to concentrate on matters concerning economic management.

This is also confirmed by the objectives set by Hua Kuo-feng in 1977, the central one of which was the struggle against the "four," his interpretation of the slogan "learn from Tachai and learn from Ta-ch'ing" and his appeals for the definitive exposure and criticism of the "four," the establishment of a "militant backbone" to resolutely defend Mao's line, to establish "revolutionary ranks" and to "extend all mass movements to a broad scale and strain every nerve."

The second all-Chinese conference on the introduction of the Tachai experience, held in Peking in December 1976 (the first one held in October 1975), directed attention to political issues rather than to the determination of ways of ensuring agricultural development. The all-Chinese conference on the introduction of the Ta-Ch'ing experience, which was held from 20 April through 13 May 1977, was of a similar nature. Political issues prevailed at several other all-Chinese conferences held to discuss the situation in individual branches of the national economy.

Admitting the presence of economic disorder, Hua Kuo-feng's leadership says that it is the result of "sabotage by the four," which is allegedly to blame for the great losses caused by enterprise idle time and local disturbances and conflicts. This maximum emphasis on the guilt of the "gang of four" represents an attempt to conceal the fact that the present severity of the state of the Chinese national economy is primarily the result of the implementation of Mao Tse-tung's instructions. But the facts do show that the new leaders have turned their attention to the practical resolution of economic problems.

The leadership headed by Hua Kuo-feng is using criticism of the "four" primarily to encourage the people to "quickly make up for the time lost through the faults of the 'four,'" that is, they are using this criticism as a pretext for intensifying labor even more and lengthening the working day without any increase in wages. At the conference on the Ta-ch'ing experience, Hua Kuo-feng requested the entire nation to observe the "spirit of the Ta-ch'ing workers"—that is, to "carry loads by hand in the absence of machinery," "begin the revolution with five shovels" and strictly observe the "ten no's": no fear of difficulty, no fear of death, no chasing after personal glory, no chasing after profits, no thought of working conditions, no thought of the duration of work, no expectation of rewards, no concern for professional status, no restricting of work to one's own duties, and no concern for whether this is the "front" or the "rear."

As we know, 1976 was declared the first year of the Fifth Five-Year Plan of the PRC, but no data have been published on the fulfillment of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, on the guidelines for the Fifth Five-Year Plan, or even on the results for 1976 and the plan for 1977. In conversations with foreigners in April 1977, Vice Premiers of the PRC State Council Li Hsien-nien and Ku Mu frankly admitted that the five-year plan had not yet been drawn up in its entirety. Therefore, the planned proportional development of the Chinese economy, which was interrupted by the "Great Leap Forward" of 1958, has still not been restored, and a new "leap" has already been placed on the agenda.

The leadership of Hua Kuo-feng feels that the problem of agricultural modernization will not be solved through the mechanization of farming with the extensive assistance of the state, but through the reliance of districts, communes and productive brigades "on their own forces." These leaders believe that all "regions must thoroughly develop small industrial enterprises through the full use of local resources."

The economic policy of the present leadership is contradictory. It is still aimed at the militarization of the nation and is inconsistent with the basic requirement of socialism—economic development in the interests of a higher public standard of living. The Peking leaders adhere to the old Maoist principles but, in order to attain their great-power chauvinist goals, are simultaneously trying to accelerate economic development with the aid of more realistic methods of economic management. Without radical changes in economic policy, however, China will not be able to achieve any perceptible progress in the national economy.

Question: Have there been any changes in the material status of Chinese workers in recent years?

Answer: The policy of the present Chinese leadership in regard to the material status of the workers has essentially remained a Maoist policy. As we know, Mao Tse-tung announced in April 1956 that he "constantly insisted on concern for the life of the masses," but he then froze the wages of workers and employees for 20 years and subsequently called any demand for a rise in the workers' standard of living a sign of "revisionism" or "evil economism." Hua Kuo-feng has also said from time to time that "there must be concern for the needs of the masses and corresponding improvements in their life through the development of production." Statements of this kind have served as the pretext for allegations by several foreign bourgeois analysts that the "pragmatists" are turning to production with the intention of substantially improving the life of the Chinese people. In actuality, however, nothing has been done in this area, the present leadership has not given the Chinese workers any kind of concrete promises in regard to this matter, and no real measures have been taken.

The material conditions of the Chinese workers are still extremely difficult. The basic food products and industrial goods are still strictly rationed in the nation. At the beginning of May 1977, the CCP Central Committee addressed an open letter to the heads of the party committees of ministries and departments of the PRC State Council, provinces, cities, districts and large enterprises and the commanders of units and regiments of the People's Liberation Army in which reference was made to the extremely tense economic situation and an announcement was made in regard to temporary reductions in the norms for public food supplies and supplies of certain necessities. Local appeals requested the public to "tighten their belts even more and become even more actively involved in work to support our new chairman Hua Kuo-feng in this difficult time for our state." The intensification of the labor of the Chinese workers, which is being achieved with the use of the slogan of "making up for the time lost through the fault of the four," has not been accompanied by any kind of material compensation.

The standard of living of most of the peasantry is extremely low: According to some estimates, approximately 25 percent of all peasant families in the nation do not earn enough to feed themselves. Some idea of the situation in rural areas is provided by the following data on the province of Heilungkiang:



The wage norm for one work day can reach 2 yuan, but the total should not exceed 200 yuan a year. Those who suffer from natural calamities (in some brigades, the earnings per work day were 2 fen) are supposed to receive assistance--their income is to be raised to 100 yuan a year by means of general funds. The wages of cadres in large and small brigades, "barefoot physicians," veterans, machine operators and schoolteachers are determined at meetings on the basis of evaluations of their work, but these wages cannot exceed the average salary of a member of a production brigade. Material incentives are practically not used at all.

The prospects for a rise in the standard of living of workers in the PRC during the near future are not good. Hua Kuo-feng's reaffirmation of the Maoist principle of "restricting bourgeois rights" also restricts the opportunities of the urban and rural populations to improve their material conditions. Observations of recent years have shown that the purpose of the Tachai and Ta-ch'ing "models" consists in insuring production growth and the maximum utilization of resources from industry and agriculture to augment military potential at the cost of maximum strain on the physical strength of the workers and their beggarly standard of living. For this reason, the introduction of these "models" in their previous form throughout the nation does not correspond in any way to the possibility of improvement in the life of the Chinese people. Moreover, the Chinese press is accusing the "four" of "evil economism," "the use of material incentives" and the "expansion of bourgeois rights"--that is, it is making the same accusations which were quite recently used by these individuals in their statements against any improvement in the material status of the workers.

Question: We know that for several years the Maoist leadership of China proclaimed a political course toward the exacerbation of the international situation and preparations for war and took concrete steps in this direction. Have there been any changes in this course since the death of Mao Tse-tung?

Answer: The Chinese leadership headed by Hua Kuo-feng has openly made national economic development in the PRC subordinate to the need for greater military potential. At the conference on the introduction of the Ta-ch'ing experience, Yeh Chien-ying said: "We absolutely must accelerate the development of the main branches of industry with emphasis on the production of steel for the purpose of establishing a strong basis for our defense industry and achieving greater progress in defense." The Peking leaders have set the task of creating large regions which are maximally autonomous in the economic sense and which would be able to "independently conduct battles" in the event of war. Propaganda has stressed that preparations for war "must not only be intensified, but also accelerated" and that this is supposedly a matter of the "life or death of our state and people." The course toward preparations for war has been recorded in the PRC Constitution adopted in January 1975 and in the documents of the 11th CCP Congress.

China's military potential is growing rapidly. The recession in the national economy has had virtually no effect on the operations of enterprises of the defense industry. Primary significance is being attached to the improvement of nuclear missile weapons. During the first 3 months after Mao Tse-tung's

death, China set off three nuclear explosions, launched an artificial satellite and returned it to earth. In all, four nuclear tests were conducted last year, while the previous number was one a year. In 1976, direct military expenditures constituted 41.5 percent of all allocations from the state budget of the PRC, and around half of this sum was spent on nuclear missiles. Work is being completed on the construction and start-up of new production centers of the atomic industry in Szechwan Province. Serious consideration is also being given to the improvement of existing types of conventional weapons and military equipment and to the development of new models.

In January 1977, four conferences were held in Peking to discuss the question of equipping the army with new types of weapons and the problem of modernizing the defense industry. As a result of these conferences, top-level figures in the army and the defense industry are concentrating even more on preparations for war. Radio Peking has announced that expenditures on defense will increase in the future.

Underground shelters and other military structures are still being built throughout the nation. As the members of an Austrian parliamentary delegation who visited China in the beginning of 1977 announced, they "saw underground bomb shelters or partially completed shelters at almost every step in different cities." At the time of the colossal natural disasters of 1976 in the PRC, most of the underground structures which had been built in accordance with Mao's instructions had been destroyed in the earthquake zone, including the structures in Peking. Nonetheless, the slogan about "digging shelters" is still being proclaimed. It is interesting that in May 1977 the Harbin City Committee of the CCP held a conference on "housing construction," but the conclusions of this conference can be summarized in the statement that "the successful completion of construction engineering work will play an important role in...the conduct of battles in the city." In other words, it was the construction of bunkers, and not of houses, that was being discussed.

At the same time, there have been signs attesting to the intention of the Chinese leaders to make changes in the doctrine of the "people's war"—a transition from the defensive strategy to an offensive. Many works written by military men insistently imply that it is precisely the regular army that is the backbone of the nation's armed forces and that the objectives of war can best be attained through skillful action by well-armed and well-trained regular army troops in modern operations (in the past, emphasis was placed on the "masses," on partisan war and on moral qualities, and not on weapons). Peking has announced the need for the more rapid construction of a powerful navy and air force.

China has received substantial aid from the United States, England, the FRG, France and other imperialist countries in the development of its defense industry. These nations have allowed their own inhabitants who are of Chinese origin and who are specialists in nuclear energy and other branches to travel freely to the PRC. Peking has made extensive use of the scientific and technical achievements of the imperialist nations to augment its own military and

economic potential and has imported progressive technology, technical models and licenses for their production. For example, at the end of December 1976, the PRC received multipurpose helicopters from the firm of Messerschmidt-Belkov-Blohm in the FRG. The new Chinese leadership has confirmed its order for Spee aircraft engines from the English Rolls-Royce firm and for the construction of a plant for their manufacture in the PRC. The Chinese leaders have ordered three computer units from the Japanese Hitachi Seisakujo Company and so forth. The Chinese leaders have recently made insistent attempts to gain military assistance from the West in the form of deliveries of modern weapons and combat equipment, as well as aid in the development of the defense industry. In this connection, the visits made to the PRC in May of this year by Japanese military experts deserve serious attention. As statements by the Japanese attest, they had to listen to the "complaints" of the Chinese side about the limited combat capabilities of the PRC Armed Forces. According to available information, the Chinese side is trying to exert pressure on the Japanese Mitsubishi Jukogyo Company, from which Peking is attempting to obtain the technology for the production of the latest automatic rifles.

The Chinese leadership, headed by Hua Kuo-feng, is actively conducting Mao Tse-tung's course toward preparations for war, disregarding the harm they will cause to the national economy by depleting China's already limited resources and by constituting a serious threat to China's neighbors and to the cause of peace throughout the world.

Question: Is the social policy of the Chinese leadership headed by Hua Kuo-feng in the interests of the Chinese workers?

Answer: The new Chinese leadership has begun to declare the need for support from the working class more frequently, but the actual status of the workers in Chinese society has not changed. The establishment of "regions of a new type" is being forced, where "workers merge with peasants and urban merges with rural." If we also consider the fact that the mechanization of agriculture is to be accomplished mainly through the construction of small industrial enterprises in the communes with "reliance on one's own strength" and with a combination of work at these enterprises and participation in agricultural production (according to the formula "both a worker and a peasant"), then we can see that the problem of the consolidation of the PRC working class, or even of its mere quantitative growth, is still far from any kind of resolution.

No information has been received from the PRC about any kind of concrete practical measures taken by the new leaders to increase the authority of the working class in society or to establish more favorable political, material or other conditions for this class. We know that during the "Cultural Revolution," Mao Tse-tung accomplished a counterrevolutionary coup, during the course of which the vanguard of the working class--the CCP, as a party of the Marxist-Leninist type--was devastated. The activities of trade unions were halted at the same time. Even now, the CCP does not perform the functions of a vanguard of the Chinese working class, the trade unions have been deprived of any kind of right to defend the interests of the working class, and the labor legislation which guarantee the workers certain benefits has not been



reinstated. It is indicative that the trade unions have not even been mentioned in public statements by Hua Kuo-feng and other leaders.

The present Chinese leadership has maintained its previous attitude toward the peasantry. Just as during Mao's lifetime, the peasantry is artificially stratified and a special stratum of the "poorest peasants" has been singled out as the regime's basis of support.

Official propaganda has remarked on the alliance of the working class with the peasantry. But the reinforcement of this alliance would contradict the present course toward the introduction of the Tachai and Ta-ch'ing "models" throughout the nation. The economic basis of the worker-peasant alliance consists in the exchange of commodities between urban and rural areas and between industrial and agricultural sectors, but Ta-ch'ing and Tachai represent self-contained economic units which are intended to satisfy their own needs for industrial and agricultural consumer goods to the maximum. For this reason, the question of the economic basis of the worker-peasant alliance in the PRC remains a moot point.

The new Chinese leaders have announced the "revival of the correct attitude" toward the intelligentsia. In his report at the 11th CCP Congress, Hua Kuo-feng announced the need to "give the necessary credit to the role played by the intelligentsia" and declare the objective of establishing a "powerful army of the working class intelligentsia." Reports in the Chinese press and the materials of the 11th congress contain criticism of several aspects of Maoist policy in the areas of education and culture and appeals for the rehabilitation of cultural figures who are currently in disgrace because they were victimized by the "four" and of certain works of literature and art which were just recently called "defective." The slogan "let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools contend" is again being propagandized. Apparently, the present leaders wish to win part of the intelligentsia--the part that has remained loyal to the basic Maoist line--over to their own side.

Hua Kuo-feng has also made mention of the "democratic parties," which were formed by representatives of the old intelligentsia, the national bourgeoisie and "patriotic figures," as part of the "revolutionary united front." This has made it possible for representatives of the national bourgeoisie, who have received an income without working and have had a place in the power structure as deputies of the National People's Congress, members of its Permanent Committee and so forth, to retain their previous status.

There has been little change in the status of youth. During the course of the struggle against the "four," several aspects of the Maoist "educational revolution" were criticized in the press (the assignment of individuals to academic institutions on the basis of political characteristics, regardless of their intellectual level, the cancellation of all examinations, etc.). Several articles have proposed the restoration of earlier procedures in the academic process (VUZ enrollment procedures, entrance examination requirements, etc.). But these demands have not been reflected in any statements



by Peking leaders, in any official documents or in any change in the work of academic institutions. Emphasis is still placed on "sending literate youth to rural and mountain regions." In 1976, another 2 million "literate young men and women" (according to Chinese data) were sent out of the cities and the total number of persons sent to rural areas reached 14 million. This practice is being continued in 1977. The same goals are being set for youth--to study the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" in greater depth and to be, like Lei Feng, "obedient buffaloes" and "rust-proof screws" in the "multimillion-strong army of representatives of the revolution."

The cadre ("kan-pu") issue deserves separate examination. During the last 10-15 years, the group of cadres has been augmented by a large number of new individuals with strong links to Maoism. During Mao's lifetime, cadres on virtually all levels were regularly subjected to purges and administrative reorganizations, were sent from the cities to rural areas to conduct political campaigns and were regularly sent to "schools of 7 May" for "labor tempering," where "brainwashing" was combined with heavy physical labor. All of these practices have been retained in their entirety. According to HSIN-HUA reports, more than 1.5 million employees of government agencies were sent to rural areas in 1976.

In recent years, there have been sharp conflicts between the "old" and "young" cadres, between the persons who rose to these positions during the period of the "Cultural Revolution" and afterwards. Prior to the expulsion of the "four," the old cadres, particularly those working on economic problems, were frequently called "capitalist sympathizers" who displayed "revisionist" (according to the Maoist definition) tendencies.

The atmosphere is still tense at many establishments, academic institutions and enterprises, and there are cases of local confusion and interference. Fearing outbursts of the internal strife so characteristic of China, the Peking leaders are trying to "calm down" personnel on the middle and lowest levels and to alleviate the growing tension by advocating "restriction of the fear of attack" and "directing the attack against the gang of four from beginning to end."

On the whole, the social policy of the Chinese leadership headed by Hua Kuo-feng is contrary to the vital interests of the Chinese workers.

Question: Have there been any fundamental changes in the system for the political administration of the nation during the last year?

Answer: No, there have not. The system for the political administration of the nation has been retained in the form it acquired as a result of the "Cultural Revolution."

The CCP, which has, as was announced at the 11th congress, 35 million members, still represents a political organization which bases its activities on the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung." This premise was formally secured

in the new CCP Charter which was adopted at the 11th congress. The leadership of Hua Kuo-feng has not made any significant changes in the status and nature of the activities of the CCP since the overthrow of the "four."

All references to "individual party leadership" are made for only one purpose--to guarantee the unlimited power of the "leader." The top-level Peking leaders have proclaimed the "confirmation of Chairman Hua Kuo-feng's leading position" as a "great victory." The CCP Central Committee has ordered the "ascription of primary significance to the propaganda of our wise leader, Chairman Hua Kuo-feng." The conferences held in connection with this order prescribed the introduction of obligations of "even stronger love for Chairman Hua and even stronger hatred for the gang of four" and advanced the slogan: "Love for our wise leader Chairman Hua is a concentrated expression of love for the party, state, army and people."

One of the characteristics of the existing order in the CCP is that important decisions, including the decision to conduct a mass purge of the party, are made by a small group of leaders and are usually announced to the public at economic conferences rather than at party forums.

The activities of state organs in the PRC have been impeded. The third (since January 1975) meeting of the Permanent Committee of the NPC [National People's Congress] was held during the first days of December 1976. But no important decisions were made, including decisions regarding the filling of vacant government posts (a new chairman of the NPC Permanent Committee to replace the late Chu Te, as well as appointments to the posts left vacant by the downfall of the "four" and the purge of the four's followers), with the exception of the replacement of the PRC minister of foreign affairs. The convocation of the Permanent Committee and the election of Teng Ying-ch'ao (Chou En-lai's widow) as one of its deputy chairmen were obviously intended to demonstrate the stability of the new leadership and its adherence to the "Mao-Chou line." At the same time, the NPC Permanent Committee has not been performing any of its basic functions envisaged in the constitution of 1975 (interpretation of these laws, the issuance of ukases, etc.). In the same way, no information has been printed on the activities of the PRC State Council, or on legislative and administrative work, including the compilation and ratification of national economic plans and the state budget, control over their fulfillment, etc.

Although the new leaders have accused the "four" of fostering "fascist dictatorship," "suppressing democracy" and so forth, they themselves have not displayed any intention to restore the democratic norms which once existed in China, including universal suffrage. Last December, Hua Kuo-feng announced that in 1977 "all provinces, cities of central jurisdiction and autonomous regions must convene meetings of people's representatives." But no elections were held at these meetings (at the January 1975 session of the NPC, deputies were appointed). As Hua Kuo-feng phrased it, the local meetings of people's representatives are to "elect, on the basis of the thorough exchange of opinions and democratic consultations, such

comrades to the revolutionary committees who meet the five requirements of Chairman Mao Tse-tung for those who continue the cause of proletarian revolution"—that is, they are to conduct a purge of the revolutionary committees.

Since the time of the "Cultural Revolution," all of the major decisions in China have been made in the name of the CCP Central Committee, the NPC Permanent Committee, the State Council of the PRC and the Military Council of the CCP Central Committee. The latter organ is not mentioned in the PRC Constitution or the CCP Charter, but it plays an important role in the administration of the country in conjunction with the top-level party and state command. The Military Council of the CCP Central Committee, headed by Hua Kuo-feng, controls the affairs of the army, the navy, the air force and the people's militia on the national scale and rules military districts and, through them, local organs of state power (provincial revolutionary committees are headed by military district commanders or political commissars).

The army is now the major force guaranteeing control over the state of affairs in the nation. It now has complete control over the militia, which was recently put under the jurisdiction of party committees. Even in the army, however, there is no total unity in top levels and a struggle for power is apparently being waged by the top military leaders.

The instability of the military-bureaucratic regime, which has become even more acute during the last year, is a reflection of the protracted, permanent crisis of Maoism. The Maoist leadership has not been able to win the support of the majority of the population because it has ignored vitally important problems. The negative consequences of the Peking leaders' policy and the constant internal discord in the highest levels of leadership are causing many administrative workers on the middle and lowest levels to waver and become disoriented. Maoist policy is being resisted by precisely the social forces (skilled workers and the intelligentsia) which are particularly necessary for the accomplishment of "modernization." The instability of the regime has also become more acute in connection with a spiritual crisis, which has led to a situation in which Maoist ideas about socialism have been profoundly discredited among large segments of the population and the authority of Mao Tse-tung and his "thought" has diminished considerably.

For the first time in the PRC's history, the leadership of the party, government, armed forces, militarized detachments and organs of internal security is concentrated in one pair of hands. In this sense, Hua Kuo-feng has surpassed even Mao.

The present state of affairs attests to the fact that the machinery of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship in China has remained completely untouched in all of its basic parts and functions, including the system of violence and coercion.

Question: To what degree is the internal political situation in the PRC stable?

Answer: The situation in the PRC is characterized by instability and constant strain, unrest and chaos.

During the last month of 1976 and the beginning of this year, Chinese provincial radio stations broadcasted reports about local conflicts and disturbances. The same kind of reports were published in the press. The news was spread that martial law had been instituted in 17 provinces (Fukien, Hupeh, Kiangsi, Hunan, Shansi, Honan and others), PLA [People's Liberation Army] subunits had been stationed in the government establishments, factories and plants, academic institutions and villages of these provinces, and preparations were being made for an "armed rebellion" in Shanghai. Western news agencies expounded the news reported by Chinese radio stations about a fierce struggle (with the loss of some human lives) and assaults on government buildings in Wu-han, executions in Hupeh, skirmishes in Szechwan, where "the precious lives of many class brothers were sacrificed," raids on party organs in Yunnan, "chaos" in Chekiang, battles in Pao-ting and the armed suppression of unrest there, disturbances in Kweichow, assaults on party committees on all levels in Shantung, etc.

Chinese propaganda is putting the entire blame for these disorders on the "gang of four." And although the Peking leadership has announced that the internal situation is "better on the whole" at the present time, there is still unrest in many provinces. This, in particular, was admitted by Yeh Chieng-ying at the April 1977 CCP Central Committee conference. The Chinese press contains constant appeals for "an attack on the counterrevolutionary elements which are undermining the revolution and production." Public security forces have been given direct control over the operations of industrial enterprises and transportation systems. In many provinces, the courts of law are still trying various kinds of "enemies" and reports are heard of many executions and harsh sentences.

The actual reasons for the unrest and disorder consist primarily in the dissatisfaction of the Chinese workers with the existing state of affairs. It is now clear that the demonstrations in T'ien-an-men Square in the beginning of April 1976 were only a small part of a movement which has become widespread throughout China--mass demonstrations have been organized in more than 20 provinces and autonomous regions of the nation.

The situation was aggravated even more in January 1977 in connection with the first anniversary of Chou En-lai's death. In Peking, the memorial services for Chou were accompanied by the advancement of political demands in big character posters and in oral statements by participants in the demonstrations. They censured members of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee (Ch'en Hsi-lien, vice premier and commander of the Peking Military District, and Wu Te, mayor of Peking) and made appeals for the rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-p'ing and his reinstatement in a top-level post. The demonstrators tried to break into the seat of government--the Chungnanhai. Big character posters demanded that "Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and the party central committee recognize the wishes of the people as soon as possible, restore popular socialist democracy and freedom as soon as possible and



guarantee the masses the right to express their own political views and exercise control over the heads of all courts."

The response of the authorities to these signs of dissatisfaction on the part of the workers has not taken the form of socioeconomic measures, but, just as during Mao's lifetime, of political campaigns, administrative coercive measures and repressive actions, which have all been carried out by the army and security forces under the banner of the "imposition of great order." This is being done under the guise of defense of the policies and "thought of Mao Tse-tung." With complete disregard for the facts, dismissed individuals are implicated in the subversion of the "Cultural Revolution" and subsequent political campaigns, accused of opposing Mao's "strategic course" of preparations for war, etc. The accusations made against the "four" are largely put together with the use of the same formulas which were widely used just recently by these persons themselves to criticize their rivals. This again clearly shows that the struggle in the top levels of the Chinese leadership is not a struggle between "lines," as the participants in this struggle have tried to say, but between individuals who stand behind the same Maoist platform but have differences of opinion on certain shades of meaning and areas of emphasis.

An analysis of the course of events in China since Mao's death attests to the fact that the present process is mainly characterized by the efforts of the so-called "pragmatic" wing of the Maoists to protect, preserve and reinforce the Maoist regime established as a result of the "Cultural Revolution" by means of modifying some of the more compromising principles. These efforts are being made for the purpose of overcoming the acute crisis which has thoroughly revealed all of the weaknesses and defects of the Maoist regime, especially its domestic policy. The latest outburst of struggle for power among the rival successors of Mao has aggravated the situation.

This process includes the spontaneous anti-Maoist trend with the ultimate aim of completely discarding Maoism rather than modifying it. This trend has always existed throughout the history of the Maoist regime and has taken various forms, including public unrest and anti-Maoist demonstrations by the workers.

The present Peking leaders are trying to divert their opponents from actual struggle against Maoism, to involve them in the institution of "reforms," and focus the dissatisfaction of the workers on factors of secondary importance by shifting the responsibility for the misfortunes engendered by Maoism to fictitious individuals who have supposedly deviated from the Maoist course and perverted it. By placing all the blame for economic failures, the pitiful state of affairs in the cultural sphere, the disintegration of the public education system, the repression of the "Cultural Revolution" and so forth on the "four," the present leaders of the CCF are trying to escape criticism of the Maoist regime. According to them, Maoism in itself is not bad, but the way in which it was misinterpreted by the by the "four" was bad.

Current events in the PRC and the changes in its administrative personnel do not attest to any fundamental changes in the nature of the Maoist regime. The present Peking leadership will evidently continue to preserve the banner of the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung." The new leaders have left the Maoist basis of their policies untouched. At the same time, the objective conditions which nurtured Maoism still exist in China--economic backwardness, the numerical preponderance of illiterate or semiliterate peasants and the tenacity of nationalist prejudices.

Question: We know that the Maoist leadership of China has conducted an increasingly active course during the last decade toward the formation of alliances with the most reactionary forces in Japan and western Europe. What "new" elements have been introduced into this course by Hua Kuo-feng's group?

Answer: Japan is the PRC's chief partner in Asia. At a time when the socialist world's positions in Asia have grown stronger as a result of the victories of the Vietnamese and Lao people, it is important to note Peking's gracious attitude toward the Japanese-American military alliance and toward Japanese capital's attempts to expand its influence in Southeast Asia and strengthen its ties with the ASEAN countries on an anticommunist basis. The Chinese leaders are continuing their persistent attempts to impel ruling circles in Tokyo to join an anti-Soviet alliance by demanding the inclusion of an article on "joint struggle against hegemony" in the treaty on peace and friendship with Japan. This article is actually directed against the USSR. In April 1977, top-level Chinese military leaders had several meetings with representatives of the Japanese Defense Agency to discuss military matters. The Chinese leaders have gone so far as to favor the restoration of Japanese military potential and the unification of China with Japanese militarism in an anti-Soviet, antisocialist bloc in the East. In justifying the policy of reviving Japanese militarism, the Peking leadership has said that "Japan must have the necessary weapons for self-defense." Besides this, Yu Chan, PRC deputy minister of foreign affairs, had a conversation with a Japanese delegation in which he spoke of the need to strengthen Japan's "self-defense forces," provocatively hinting that this nation "would not have to stand alone in the event of war with the USSR." The Chinese leadership definitely supports the territorial claims that certain circles in Japan have made on the USSR.

Peking's course in regard to Japan is aimed at the support of the forces in this nation which advocate militarization and revanchism. This is endangering the interests of socialism and peace in Asia.

Under the present leadership, China's policy in regard to the western European nations is still based on hostility toward the socialist community. Peking is inciting reactionary circles in the western European states to subvert detente and intensify confrontations with the socialist states. Chinese propaganda is still constantly reiterating that the conference in Helsinki supposedly "introduced nothing of a positive nature" into the

European state of affairs and that Europe is still the "major potential spot for world cataclysm" and the "threat" to western Europe on the part of the Warsaw Pact "has become even greater." Peking's rapprochement with the western European nations belonging to NATO is taking place on the pretext of strengthening "general security" against the "growing threat" of the Warsaw Pact. In conversations with a delegation of French journalists in November 1976, Chinese officials, including Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and the heads of the PRC Ministry of Public Security, formulated Peking's line and aims in international affairs in the following way: War is inevitable and detente does not exist; we want Europe to be powerful and its defense against the USSR to be stronger."

Peking heartily approved of the military preparations and arms race of the NATO countries. It established contacts with the headquarters of this bloc as early as 1975 and, since that time, has essentially coordinated its own antisocialist actions and propaganda with this imperialist bloc. This was quite clearly manifested in the negative reaction of Peking and the NATO countries to the proposal of the Warsaw Pact nations on the refusal to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in Europe and in the attacks in the Chinese press on the socialist states' initiative in connection with the Vienna talks on the limitation of armed forces and arms in central Europe.

In its fight against positive tendencies in Europe, Peking is still relying on the most reactionary politicians: the Tories in England, revanchists and the West German Christian Democratic Union-Christian Socialist Union bloc, etc. In November 1976, Chairman Bartolomey of the Christian Democratic Party faction in the Italian Senate was received in Peking; in March-April 1977, the Chinese received Deputy Chairman Filbinger of the Christian Democratic Union, and in April, it was the turn of M. Thatcher, leader of the English Conservatives.

The FRG is still the focal point of the western European policy of the PRC. Relations between China and the FRG are being developed more intensively and thoroughly than relations with the other western European countries. The Chinese leaders are particularly supported by revanchist forces in the FRG; these forces wish to nullify the situation that has come into being in Europe as a result of postwar development and the process of detente. The Chinese leaders have expressed agreement with the militant antisocialism of these forces and with their adherence to the policy of continuation of the arms race and opposition to detente. PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua incited the West German revanchists to reconsider the principle of the inviolability of postwar boundaries in Europe, instructed Filbinger to prevent the "German nation from being partitioned forever" and expressed the wish that it could be reunited "within the near future." The Chinese side did its utmost to underscore the community of Chinese and West German interests in this connection, which will aid in the coordination of policy.

Contacts between Peking and Bonn are becoming even more intensive. In February 1976, a delegation from the Christian Democratic Union consisting of Alfred Droegeger and Werner Marx traveled to the PRC. They were received by Hua Kuo-feng, whose meeting with these individuals unequivocally underscored his intention to continue the previous political course. He himself expressed this intention during the ensuing talks. China was visited by Uwe Ronneburger, chairman of the Land Organization of the Free Democratic Party in Schleswig-Holstein. There was an exchange of military attaches between Bonn and Peking. Hans Matthoefer, Bonn's minister for research and technology, visited China for the purpose of officially establishing cooperation between the two nations in the utilization of thermonuclear energy. The FRG was visited by a group of Chinese petroleum experts. The Peking leaders support all attempts by reactionary imperialist forces to undermine the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin and, consequently, to make this city a hotbed of dangerous crises once more. The PRC leaders' complete and unconditional support for the London declaration of the three Western powers and the FRG on West Berlin provides the most convincing proof of this position.

In a conversation with Margaret Thatcher, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien commented that there was "much in common" in the views of the Chinese leaders and the leader of the English Tories on several important international issues, particularly in their desire to work against the policy of detente, "which does not even merit discussion." In April 1977, he tried to convince American congressmen that American troops "could not be withdrawn" from Europe, saying that these troops "play an indisputably positive role and should not only remain there, but should also be reinforced."

An important part of the contacts between the Chinese leadership and representatives of ultra-rightist groups in the western European states consists in plans to aggravate the situation in Europe, block the moves made by the socialist nations to develop political and economic cooperation with the capitalist countries on the principles of peaceful coexistence and interfere in the successful conduct of the Belgrade meeting of representatives of the states which signed the Final Act of the all-European conference in Helsinki.

Question: What is the policy of the new Peking leadership in regard to the developing countries?

Answer: The new Chinese leadership is making increasingly overt attempts to turn the developing countries into a sphere of Chinese influence and to make use of these countries for the realization of China's own hegemonistic plans.

Peking is disorienting the developing countries by declaring that they "constitute the major force in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism." Under the guise of "antihegemonism," they are trying to push the nations of the Third World into confrontations with the socialist states and divert them from the struggle against apartheid, racism, imperialism and all remaining traces of colonialism.



At the same time, China is demonstrating its solidarity with reactionary pro-imperialist regimes and hostility toward progressive forces in the Third World. At the 31st Session of the UN General Assembly, it again declined to support Angola's bid for membership in this organization. In this matter, just as in several others, Peking has tried to justify its own position by attacking the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

In Africa, Peking is being actively supported by Zaire. In April 1977, China, acting in concert with the imperialist powers, hastened to the aid of the Mobutu Government. At the time of the well-known events in the province of Shaba, emergency supplies of Chinese weapons were delivered to Zaire.

Peking is establishing broader contacts with the fascist junta of Pinochet. The Chinese authorities have given the junta an opportunity to make use of the preferential interest-free loan of 62 million dollars which was extended to the Popular Unity Government in 1972. A new Chinese loan in the amount of 55 million dollars is now being negotiated. At present, 120 Chinese specialists are working in Chile. The PRC has invited Chile to take part in the Canton Spring Fair in 1977. Statements by the Chilean ambassador to Peking testify to the fact that the junta intends to intensify its economic and cultural contacts with China.

China has expressed disagreement with resolutions No 242 (1967) and No 338 (1973) of the Security Council on the Middle Eastern issue and has taken a negative stand in regard to the Geneva Conference. At the 31st Session of the UN General Assembly, China declined to vote on the resolution on the Middle Eastern situation and on the peace conference to settle the crisis in this region.

The racist regime in South Africa is enjoying Peking's moral support. It is no coincidence that top-level politicians in racist South Africa have recently spoken out in favor of the establishment of contacts and cooperation in African affairs with the Chinese leaders. Vorster has even justified his own policy by quotations from Mao Tse-tung. The PRC, however, while making verbal declarations of its "definite support" for the positions of the developing countries, is actually demonstrating indifference to their genuine concerns and needs. For example, for practical considerations China has expressed general agreement with the proposals of the developing countries in regard to the creation of non-nuclear zones in Latin America, Africa, South Asia, the Middle East and other regions. The Chinese delegation at the 31st Session of the UN General Assembly supported the resolution on non-nuclear zones in various regions and the zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. When the proposal on the "thorough examination of the question of zones free of nuclear weapons in any form" was considered, however, the Chinese delegation abstained from the balloting. Peking took an equally demagogic stand in regard to the establishment of a new international economic order. The Chinese leaders call themselves defenders of the interests

and demands of the developing countries, foster these demands and even make some of them more pointed. In doing this, Peking wishes to derive maximum advantage for itself, to acquire an exclusive position for the PRC in the system of Third World foreign economic ties and, mainly, to divert the developing countries from the struggle against their real exploiters.

At the 31st Session of the General Assembly, just as in the past, the Chinese camouflaged their differences of opinion with the countries in the Third World, particularly in the United Nations, by abstaining from the balloting on those issues on which they had taken an essentially negative stand which differed from the stand of most of the developing countries (China declined to vote on 20 of the 79 resolutions passed at the session).

The new Chinese leadership is still conducting a reactionary policy in regard to the developing countries--a policy which is hostile to the cause of socialism and beneficial only to imperialist, neocolonialist circles and their agents in the Third World.

Question: In light of the current situation in China, what are the present chief objectives of Marxist-Leninists and Soviet Sinology?

Answer: The Marxist-Leninist parties have been quite successful in their ideological and political struggle against Maoism, in defending the principles of internationalism and in reinforcing the unity of action of the fraternal parties.

The materials of the 11th CCP Congress and statements by Peking officials, particularly those of Hua Kuo-feng, on major issues of Chinese policy attest to the fact that the Chinese leadership has remained completely faithful to the principles of Maoism while simultaneously taking advantage of the authority of Marxism-Leninism and the ideals of socialism. Mao Tse-tung is called the "greatest Marxist-Leninist" of our era, who has allegedly "made an outstanding contribution to all areas of Marxism-Leninism." Hua Kuo-feng and other Chinese leaders say that one of the great services performed by Mao was his reorientation of China and the CCP from a policy of friendship and cooperation with the Marxist-Leninist parties and with the Soviet Union to a policy of confrontation and schism. Hua Kuo-feng calls all of this Mao's great contribution to the "struggle against contemporary revisionism."

This makes it essential to continue our resolute ideological struggle against Maoism, to thoroughly reveal its danger to world socialism and to demonstrate that Maoism is the antithesis of socialism and that Maoist ideology and policy are not only incompatible with Marxism-Leninism, but also directly hostile to it.

The anticommunism of the Maoists is also manifested in their attempts to weaken the vigilance of the masses in respect to American imperialism and the other imperialist powers. In order to conceal their own alliance with

American imperialism and to justify their cessation of the struggle against it, the Maoists have tried to convey the impression that the struggle against American imperialism is less crucial now than in the past.

Acting in unison with imperialist propaganda, the Maoists are assisting ruling circles in the capitalist nations to prevent the public from learning the reasons for the economic crises in these nations and from exposing the true culprits to blame for all the misfortunes imperialism has brought to millions of workers.

Maoism has entered the same channel as the anticommunism of the capitalist world and has become imperialism's accomplice in deluding the workers in the capitalist nations.

It is precisely the Maoists who divide Marxism-Leninism into "general" and "particular" principles. They are using every possible means to propagandize the idea of dissipating this international doctrine among "national quarters."

It is precisely Maoism, camouflaged by Marxist phraseology, which is one of the vehement enemies of proletarian internationalism, preaching national narrow-mindedness and aloofness. Maoism is waging its struggle against proletarian internationalism from a standpoint of great-Han chauvinism, simultaneously attempting to revive and utilize traces of the nationalist way of thought in the mentality of different groups in the socialist countries. Sowing enmity and alienation among the peoples of the socialist countries--this is the main strategic line in the Maoists' subversive activities against the socialist community.

The last 10 years of struggle against Maoism have provided all Marxist-Leninists with conclusive proof of the exceptional significance of the principles of proletarian internationalism and of the importance of a correct combination of international and national factors in the activities of each party and each communist.

The experience of the Chinese revolution and the lessons of recent events in China have demonstrated the actual effect the substitution of nationalism for internationalism has had on the CCP itself and on the cause of socialism in China. Proletarian internationalism and the support of the world communist and workers movements and international socialist forces played an exceptionally important role in the victory of the Chinese revolution. It was precisely international solidarity and a close alliance with the socialist world which compensated for the relative weakness of the Chinese proletariat, aided in revealing its leading role in respect to the peasantry, diminished the pressure exerted by petty bourgeois spontaneous forces and the nationalist ideology on the working class and the CCP and aided in increasing the political authority of the working class. After the triumph of the Chinese revolution, cooperation and a close alliance with the socialist world ensured that the young People's Republic of China would be protected against imperialist aggression and neutralized the economic blockade of the PRC that was organized by American imperialism.

The history of the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party shows that it was precisely at those times when the party adhered firmly and consistently to the principle of proletarian internationalism that it had the greatest success in revolution and socialist construction.

The ideology and policy of Maoism are directed against the fundamental principles of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, against the very essence of socialism and against the bases of the international communist movement. Any compromises in the struggle against Maoism can work toward the anti-Marxist, antisocialist goals of Peking, can reduce the strength of the world communist and workers movement and can become a form of opportunism. In view of these facts, it is obvious that the struggle against Maoism's attempts to aid in the emergence and expansion of nationalist distortions is of crucial importance to the communist and workers movement.

For the world revolutionary movement and for truly democratic forces, the struggle against Maoism is now becoming an integral part of the struggle for socialism, peace and international cooperation, and the freedom and independence of peoples. This struggle is of a principal nature and its primary significance for China itself and for the Chinese people also consists in the fact that it is being waged for the purpose of defending the prospect of a socialist future in the PRC.

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## OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS IN VIETNAM

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1977 pp 73-90

[Article by Nguyen Khanh Toan, chairman of the SRV Committee on the Social Sciences]

[Summary] The revolutionary process has been continuous for almost half a century in a nation that was little known to the outside world only 50 or 60 years ago. As a result of this process, imperialist forces have been driven out of Vietnam.

The struggle for the liberation of Vietnam, which took the form of confrontation between the forces of revolution and counterrevolution, has gone through several stages in the last 50 years. Inspired by the example of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the first Vietnamese communists, headed by Comrade Ho Chi Minh, founded a militant working class party. They led millions of workers and peasants in a struggle against the colonizers and feudal lords for independence, freedom and a better life. In August 1945, the Vietnamese revolution won an important victory. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam came into being. For the first time in Asia, a small colonial country became a worker and peasant state under the guidance of a working class party. The English, American and French imperialists were enraged and frightened by this and tried to smother the new republic. Resorting to subversive activities, espionage and political, military, economic and diplomatic pressure, they embarked upon open and underhanded intervention in Vietnam. But all of their attempts failed. The communist party, headed by Comrade Ho Chi Minh, followed the example of the October Revolution, united the Vietnamese people and led them to victory.

The victory of the Vietnamese people was also made possible by the support and assistance of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states and the working class in the capitalist states. The August Revolution of 1945 put an end to colonial and feudal domination, established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and began a new era in the history of the nation. The war of resistance against the French colonizers (1946-1954) was one in which the Vietnamese people had to contend with the entire imperialist world. The

aggressive French colonizers were supported by other imperialist forces in an attempt to seize control in Vietnam and to suppress the world revolutionary movement. The war of resistance against American aggression (1965-1973) supplemented and secured all of the other victories of the Vietnamese people and reunited the two halves of this nation. The imperialist line of defense in Southeast Asia was undermined and socialism gained greater influence.

There have been few examples in world history of the kind of harsh trials faced by the Vietnamese people for thousands of years. But now the fate of this land lies in the hands of the people. Heroic Vietnam has become a member of the great and glorious socialist family. Vietnam was the first colonial country to free itself of imperialist domination. It did this with the assistance and guidance of the Communist Party of Vietnam. From the time of its birth, this party prevailed over all other political forces in the patriotic front. It became the sole leader in the Vietnamese revolution. It has always upheld communist principles and retained its implacable revolutionary will. The Communist Party of Vietnam is a Marxist-Leninist party operating under the slogan "Workers of the world, unite!"

It was under this slogan that Lenin and his Bolshevik Party persistently fought for the victory of the socialist revolution during the imperialist era. The October Revolution in Russia was a characteristic example of the creative application of Marxist-Leninist principles. It united all revolutionary and progressive forces, established dictatorship by the proletariat, put an end to exploitation and militarism and began a new era of equality, fraternity, justice and peace. From their first moments, the October Revolution and Soviet Russia won the sympathy and support of oppressed people everywhere, including the awakening people of the East. The most significant event of our era has been the triumph of the October Socialist Revolution. It transformed the dreams of mankind into social reality and became a beacon of liberation for all of the world's people.

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## ECONOMIC POLICY OF JAPANESE STATE: ILLUSIONS AND REALITY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1977 pp 91-105

[Article by V. K. Zaytsev]

[Text] Important changes have been seen in the patterns of Japanese economic development in the 1970's. Growing economic difficulties of an internal and external nature have caused substantial reduction in the growth rates of the GNP. For example, while average annual real rates of economic growth remained on the level of 10 percent during 1955-1965, they dropped to 8.5 percent between 1965 and 1975 and are expected to drop to 6.5 percent during the next decade.<sup>1</sup> These average indicators conceal an absolute reduction of 1.2 percent in the GNP in 1974--the first reduction of the postwar period--and an insignificant rise of 2.1 percent in 1975.<sup>2</sup>

Judging by estimates in official forecasts, the prevailing view in the present Japanese Government is that the ultra-high rates of economic growth are a thing of the past; the Japanese economy is experiencing a period of adaptation to the new internal economic order, which is characterized by slower rates of development and a rise in prices on raw materials. This requires that Japan "submit to low, but unstable rates of growth."<sup>3</sup> Business circles in Japan also feel that "the nation is experiencing a turning point in its history" and that the economic crisis of 1974-1975 is not "just a temporary marketing phenomenon, but is rooted in such structural restraining factors as raw material, energy and environmental problems and so forth."<sup>4</sup>

Under these conditions, the long-term goals of Japanese economic development and the basic aims of industrial policy are being reconsidered. This is also reflected in the direction taken by state economic policy in Japan in the 1970's, in which the need has been declared for a change in areas of emphasis in the development of the production sphere toward the priority development of branches requiring high scientific input, improvements in the social structure and a rise in public welfare.

The very fact that these goals have been given priority in the state economic policy of Japan should be regarded as an important point in the history of Japanese economic policy. As we will demonstrate, however, the

fundamental features of the economic policy of the capitalist state in general and Japan in particular impose substantial restrictions on the types of social goals which can be pursued effectively by state policy.

In bourgeois economic science, patterns of economic development are divided into two fundamentally different types: production-oriented and welfare-oriented economic development. In the capitalist society, the latter is completely identified with the developed consumer society.<sup>5</sup>

In this article, we will not concern ourselves with the scientific grounds for this kind of division; we will only point out the fact that the characteristic features of the first type of economy, according to this system of classification, are a high percentage of savings, a low level of consumption, a lower rate of rise in salaries than in labor productivity, a high profit norm and unequal distribution of income. The economy of the second type is characterized by a relatively low percentage of savings, a high level of consumption, internal demand which exceeds the dimensions of the national product, a deficit in the balance of payments and so forth.

Among the industrially developed capitalist nations, the U.S. economy is considered to be a classic example of the second type of economy, while the most typical example of the economy of the first type has been the Japanese economy until recently. According to many bourgeois economists in the West and in Japan, Japanese economic development in the 1970's "has been characterized by a transition from the first to the second type, and the acceleration of this transition is the highest goal of state economic policy."<sup>6</sup>

It is true that all of the developed nations of the West went through a stage in their historical development during which the basic goal of economic policy was the augmentation of production potential.

We should recall that at the end of the 19th century Japan was a technically backward and poor nation with almost no industry or technology of its own. In order to ensure the independence of the nation, Japanese ruling circles attempted to catch up with the West. For this reason, industrialization was extremely necessary to their military and economic interests. The policy directed at the realization of this goal took the form of state intervention in private production activity and the establishment of close ties between the state and businessmen.

After the defeat of Japanese militarism in World War II, the need to ensure accelerated economic growth and rapid industrialization became even more acute. In the postwar years, the Japanese Government, on the basis of an agreement concluded with the leaders of the business community, adhered to a policy of singling out strategically important branches and giving them special government assistance in the form of duty-free imports of equipment, accelerated amortization, loans from state banks, tax privileges, quotas on raw materials, etc.



The policy of accelerated growth required a guaranteed high level of production investments and the promotion of exports for the purpose of expanding production capacities and acquiring currency for the financing of imports. For this reason, the Japanese Government took part in financing production companies through the Bank of Japan; this ensured a high level of investments. A series of tax reforms gradually changed the progressive nature of the income tax in Japan: Profits were taxed at lower rates than salaries, which contributed to the accumulation of capital and ensured a high level of savings. The high level of indirect taxation also stimulated savings. The structure of government expenditures was subordinated to the need to augment private investments. In its economic policy of the 1950's and 1960's, the Japanese Government deliberately underestimated predicted growth rates and, consequently, contributed to the reduction of tax revenues. Later the budget surplus was returned to the private sector through tax privileges and state subsidies. These economic levers contributed to the redistribution of financial resources in favor of the more rapidly developing branches and corporations. In conjunction with other factors, state policy and the state program for development aided in the modernization of the industrial structure, the growth of production and the GNP and the expansion of exports.

Growth Rates of GNP and Capital Investments in  
Major Capitalist Countries in the 1960's and Early 1970's (in %)

	Average Annual Growth Rates		Proportion of Investments in GNP
	GNP	Capital Investments in Fixed Assets	
Japan	11.1	14.8	33.1
United States	4.0	4.4	14.1
England	2.8	4.5	17.9
West Germany	4.8	5.6	25.8
France	5.8	9.0	25.6
Italy	5.7	5.0	20.6

Source: K. Miyazawa, K. Niino, K. Saito, "Modern Economic Theory in Japan," Tokyo, 1973.

The expansionist tendencies of Japanese capital were made particularly clear in the Japanese State's policy of the 1960's. The so-called "Plan for Doubling National Income," which was drawn up at the end of 1960 by the Ikeda Cabinet, revealed the intention of the Japanese state-monopoly oligarchy to intensify the process by which production resources were being concentrated in the hands of the large monopolies, which were trying to strengthen and expand their own international influence. Renowned English economist G. Allen wrote that "the main reason for Japan's economic success of the postwar period has been its practice of concentrating all efforts on the attainment of a single goal--the restoration and development of production potential--in the hope of thereby quickly becoming one of the world's most highly developed nations in the economic and technical fields."

The state policy emphasizing the stimulation of a high level of private production investments, particularly in branches of heavy industry and the chemical industry, bore fruit. In the 1960's, the Japanese GNP almost tripled, its economic growth rates were the highest in the capitalist world and it was in Japan that capital investments had the greatest impact.

Until 1964, the OECD included Japan in the group of nations of average development, and Japan had a chronic deficit in its balance of payments. The modernization of the industrial structure and the intensification of branch production increased the percentage accounted for by added value in each unit of exports, which led to an increase in net currency revenues. In 1965, Japan surmounted the obstacle of the deficit in its balance of payments, and by 1969 the Japanese GNP, calculated in dollars, exceeded the GNP of West Germany, becoming the second largest in the capitalist world.

In the 1960's, the private sector of the Japanese economy was highly receptive and responsive to new undertakings by the state, which was based on the hope of future support from the state in such matters as budget allocations and subsidies, protection against foreign competitors, the formation of anti-depression cartels, credit and tax benefits, etc. It is obvious that state measures had a substantial effect on the behavior of the private sector during these years. It is precisely this aspect of Japanese activity that many bourgeois economists tend to exaggerate. The allegorical term "Japan Incorporated" is being widely used in bourgeois literature on Japanese affairs. This term underscores the common goals of the state and businessmen and their agreement on the basic issues of economic development.

When this matter is approached from a Marxist-Leninist standpoint, however, it becomes obvious that the private sector's support and consideration for state policy are not due to any unique "Japanese model" of state-business partnership, but to the subordination of state policy to the fundamental long-range interests of Japanese monopolistic capital.

As early as the 1960's, at a time of rapid economic growth, certain problems became increasingly acute--such problems as environmental pollution, the insufficient amount of capital investments for social needs and housing construction and the undeveloped system of social security. Until the early 1970's, however, although the goals of social development and public welfare were formally advanced by the state, they were actually placed in a position of secondary importance in relation to the traditional trinity: production growth, higher labor productivity and export expansion.

If we analyze the interconnection between program directives and their actual fulfillment, we can readily discover a feature that has been characteristic of postwar Japan as a whole. The directives concerning production growth have been fulfilled and even overfulfilled while the extremely modest objectives in the area of improved public welfare have remained on paper. In other words, objectives promising profits for the private sector were attained while "unprofitable" goals (the development of the social infrastructure, facilities for public youth and so forth) were ignored, although

they acquired greater significance as the developmental process continued. Since production indicators were given priority in state policy, Japanese monopolistic capital regarded the system of government measures not as a "road to slavery" for itself, but as "an opportunity to combine their own desires--to acquire maximum profits--with nationwide goals of production growth and higher productivity."<sup>8</sup> As a Japanese economic journal pointed out, as long as "the Japanese people reconcile themselves to poor environmental conditions and a relatively low material standard of living, economic growth was stimulated, and foreign markets were expanded by means of intensive exports of surplus production."<sup>9</sup> Therefore, state economic policy was only effective within the strictly limited boundaries of the class interests of the Japanese bourgeoisie.

We cannot deny that the more than 10 years (the second half of the 1950's and the 1960's) of almost continuous economic growth, the scientific and technical revolution and the larger role played by the state in the regulation of the Japanese economy contributed to a certain rise in the formerly extremely low standard of living of the Japanese people, which essentially took the form of an increase in monetary income. For example, in nominal terms, consumer expenditures in Japan doubled between 1957 and 1963 and more than quadrupled during 1963-1974 (with a simultaneous dramatic rise in prices). Nonetheless, the Japanese consumers postponed more than one-third of their potential consumption, which contributed to an increase of approximately 450 percent in growth capital investments during 1963-1973. The low level of the "quality of life" and the Japanese people's uncertainty about the future have been reflected in a high level of personal savings, which is 1.5-3 times higher than in western Europe and the United States.<sup>10</sup>

According to prominent Japanese economist K. Miyazawa, by conducting a course of capitalist rationalization according to the Western model, "Japan gained much, but, on the other hand, also lost a great deal, which has been particularly apparent in the degradation of the environment and the low level of the quality of life."<sup>11</sup> J. Nakamura concludes that "high growth rates will demand enormous efforts and great sacrifices from Japan."<sup>12</sup> American economist G. Gregory writes that "there is no evidence that the Japanese have been made happier by the rise in their monetary income."<sup>13</sup>

Economic science has still not provided us with any kind of objective indicator to tell us whether the Japanese are happier today than in the past. But a new macroeconomic indicator, designed in Japan and called "Net National Welfare" (NNW), deserves serious consideration. An analysis of the economic content and structure of the NNW indicator suggests that the Japanese economists had the goal of constructing a single general indicator of economic welfare which would be more accurate than the GNP indicator in reflecting the level of the consumption of goods and services with a direct or indirect effect on the welfare of the individual. This was accomplished through a fundamental restructuring of some of the components of the GNP and through the inclusion of several components in the NNW which are conventionally regarded as consumption and are not calculated as part of the GNP.

The NNW indicator is calculated as the sum of the following components: state consumption; individual consumption; the level of the consumption of durable goods; services of state social capital; free time; activity outside the market; expenditures on environmental protection; environmental pollution; the negative consequences of urbanization. The third through ninth components are calculated in conventional monetary terms, and three components, seven through nine, reflect "negative welfare."<sup>14</sup>

On the basis of the general theoretical idea of the NNW indicator, Japanese economists experimented with calculating this indicator for 1955, 1960, 1965 and 1970. According to these calculations, there was no perceptible gap between the GNP and NNW in 1955. By 1970, however, the GNP had considerably surpassed the NNW and the respective figures were 73.2 trillion and 44.2 trillion yen. The real average annual rate of growth in the GNP was 12.1 percent during 1966-1970; the real NNW indicator rose much more slowly during this same period--on the level of 8.6 percent.<sup>15</sup> In other words, a serious gap came into being between the economic growth of Japan, reflected in Japanese GNP statistics, and the level of welfare.

It is true that the integral coefficient of the level of welfare is an extremely vague category. Works by bourgeois economists do not contain any precise definition of the concept of welfare, although they admit, in principle, that it should include an assessment of political and social factors as well as economic indicators. The NNW indicator now being used in Japan is of a limited nature and is only applicable to economic welfare. Its object is limited to elements which can be calculated in monetary terms by one method or another on the basis of available statistics. It should also be mentioned that the great difficulties involved in the acquisition of practical assessments substantially restrict the indicators reflecting "negative welfare," which, in turn, leads to the overstatement of the total NNW. Nonetheless, the calculations of the NNW indicator as a whole have graphically demonstrated the theoretically known fact that, during the period of high growth rates in Japan (1955-1970), the welfare of the general Japanese public was sacrificed to the augmentation of the production potential of capitalist enterprises.

Therefore, as the scales of the Japanese economy grew broader, the gap between the growth rate of the GNP and the rise in public welfare became deeper. Since the beginning of the 1970's, the rising level of consumption and the diversification of public demand in Japan have led to perceptible changes in views on the content and results of economic growth. It has been universally recognized that, under present conditions, economic growth in itself cannot engender improved welfare and a high quality of life for the individual. In recent years, certain views have become popular in Japan which totally reject such criteria of the level of welfare as rates of economic growth and the size of the GNP, and the objective of "zero" or even "negative" production growth has been recommended as the goal of economic development.



In its most concentrated form, the criticism of the policy of stimulating production growth has made itself apparent in Japan in the nationwide campaign against environmental pollution. Japanese economist T. Mizoguchi wrote that, "in the 1960's, criticism of environmental pollution was basically directed against individual enterprises, but as this problem spread throughout the nation, these protests took the form of criticism of the economic system giving rise to pollution."<sup>16</sup> The acute nature of the pollution problem in Japan can be seen in the following comparisons: Japan has the highest GNP in the world per square meter of flat land—that is, the most highly populated land (14 times greater than in the United States, 5 times greater than in France and Italy, 3.5 times greater than in England and 1.7 times greater than in West Germany).<sup>17</sup> Japan has 344 motor vehicles per square mile while the United States has only 41.<sup>18</sup> Tokyo's per capita park area was only 1.4 square meters in 1974—a figure much lower than in Washington (40.8), Stockholm (68.4), London (28.8) and other large cities in the world.<sup>19</sup> Despite the fact that Japan has the most rigid state standards on environmental conditions (almost twice as high as in the United States), they are not observed everywhere, and Japan has the reputation of the most "polluted nation in the world."

The 1970's have been a time of growing public dissatisfaction in Japan with the inadequacy of capital investments for the improvement of living conditions (institutions for the sanitary inspection of environmental conditions, academic, cultural, consumer, medical, municipal and entertainment facilities, parks, national game preserves, etc.). The present situation in Japan is precisely the one that the Japanese were warned about by prominent American bourgeois economist J. Galbraith. He wrote that, in Japan, "the growing GNP combines expanded private consumption with meager public consumption."<sup>20</sup>

It is true that although Japan is catching up with the developed nations of western Europe or has completely caught up with them in the sphere of, for example, annual consumption, monetary income and so forth, it is still far behind them in terms of the absolute and relative amount of capital used for public purposes. Economic development in this nation has not only resulted in a rise in individual demand, but also has elevated the collective demands of the Japanese, has made the Japanese public more concerned about the state of the environment and has placed greater demands on the quality of life. These new demands can no longer be satisfied merely through a further rise in day-to-day consumption. Improvement is required in the non-production infrastructure and rates of capital investments for social purposes must be accelerated. For example, in terms of per capita consumption, Japan has gone beyond England in recent years, but, according to the estimates of Japanese scientists, it will take more than 10 years for Japan to catch up with England in terms of the amount of capital invested for social purposes.<sup>21</sup>

Therefore, while the stimulation of high rates of economic growth has been the logically substantiated goal of Japanese economic policy for the 25 years since the end of the war, the priorities of consumers are undergoing

a gradual evolution and it is now time for a change, as the Japanese press has stated, in Japanese policy. In reference to the great changes in Japanese values, the JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL wrote that the changes that have taken place in the Japanese economy are evolving into resolute demands that the government "shift priority in the distribution of national resources from the production sphere to the comprehensive promotion of the growth of public capital to be used for environmental protection and the development of a system of public welfare."<sup>22</sup>

These conclusions are confirmed by the results of a public opinion poll, which attest to the fact that the Japanese are not concerned as much about income and consumption levels as about environmental pollution, the housing shortage, the poor quality of housing, rising prices and the low level of social security. For example, in answer to the question: "On the whole, has economic growth had a positive or negative effect on Japan?"--18 percent of the respondents over the age of 19 said "positive" and 24 percent said "negative." The respective figures for youth (20-24 years) were 14 percent and 34 percent. In answer to the question: "What should the basic goal of national economic policy be in the future?"--only 8 percent said "economic growth" while 58 percent said "a rise in social welfare and the establishment of good living conditions."<sup>23</sup> Therefore, the results of the public opinion poll indicate that most of the Japanese feel that the slight rise in income during a period of rapid economic growth does not compensate for the deficiencies in the quality of life which resulted from this kind of growth in the capitalist system of Japanese economic management.

The beginning of the 1970's was marked by the sharp intensification of internal conflicts in Japan and in all of the other nations of the capitalist system. The currency, ecological, inflationary and energy crises which seized the capitalist world and galloping inflation intensified inter-imperialist conflicts, particularly in the area of foreign economic ties. For Japan, which depends more on foreign sources of energy and raw materials than the other developed capitalist nations, the growing crisis signaled that the prospects for economic development would become much worse.

As a result of the oil crisis of the end of 1973 and the subsequent cyclical and structural crisis of 1974-1975, which was the most severe crisis of the postwar period, it became obvious that Japan's potential for maintaining high rates of economic growth by its previous method of relying on the branches of heavy industry and the chemical industry had already been substantially exhausted.

In the first place, as Japan's share in world trade grew, it became more difficult for it to maintain the same rates of growth in imports of the raw materials and energy resources needed for its heavy industry and chemical industry.<sup>24</sup> While the period of high rates of economic growth in Japan coincided with a period of low import prices on raw material resources, the price of petroleum, which is the major force in industrial production, is now so high that it is having an extremely negative effect on the balance

of payments. According to the estimates of Japanese economist M. Tatemoto, if the indicator of the relationship between Japanese exports and imports in 1970 is taken as 100, the rise in the price of crude oil has reduced it to 60.<sup>25</sup>

Furthermore, as we have already mentioned, the destruction of the environment has become an extremely urgent problem in Japan, and the branches of heavy industry and the chemical industry are among the most dangerous polluters. Public protests are making it extremely difficult to find a location in Japan for the construction of a new heat and electrical power station or a petrochemical or metallurgical combine.

One of the most important factors affecting the state of the Japanese economy is the degree of maturity achieved by the basic branches of industry. Traditionally, the Japanese economy has followed Western examples of industrial development. Japan has progressed, stage by stage, from technically simple branches of light industry to the more capital-intensive and material-intensive branches of heavy industry and the chemical industry.

At the beginning of the 1970's, the basic branches of the Japanese economy, which had made the greatest contribution to the high rates of growth, had essentially, as Japanese economists pointed out, "fulfilled their historical mission."<sup>26</sup> Such industries as the steel, automotive, ship building, petrochemical and other industries have already reached the stage of maturity and, although they continue to provide employment and currency revenues, they are already displaying symptoms of decline. This was made apparent by the crisis of 1974-1975, which had the greatest effect on precisely these branches. For example, the Japanese automotive industry reduced its output of vehicles by 7.3 percent in 1974 for the first time in its history. Surplus capacities, a reduction in internal demand, a decrease in export growth rates and a drop in labor productivity levels have become the characteristic features of these branches. Other factors have also emerged which are symptomatic of the potential erosion of Japan's relative supremacy in the branches of heavy industry and the chemical industry (a rise in wages and other production costs).

Under these conditions, the objective course of historical development has made it necessary for Japan to change its previous tendency toward ascribing the leading role to the branches of heavy industry and the chemical industry which require high material and energy input. The need to find new guidelines for the development of the industrial structure and the national economy as a whole has required that forecasts play a more important role in Japanese economic management. There is greater interest in long-range government plans for development, which, according to Japanese economists, have reached a "crucial turning point."<sup>27</sup>

In 1971, the Japan Industrial Structure Study Council (Sankoshin), a consultative agency of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), drew up a long-range plan for the structural reorganization of the Japanese economy. This global plan, which has been given the name of the "industrial

and foreign economic policy for the 1970's," contains an appeal for the accelerated development of branches requiring high scientific input and low material and energy input. In 1974, Sankoshin published a report entitled "A Long-Range Forecast of the Industrial Structure," which formulated the quantitative guidelines of the premises of the 1971 report and forecasted the development of the Japanese industrial structure up to 1985. Reports of this kind, modified and supplemented in accordance with changes in economic conditions, are expected to be published each year and the forecast period will be extended each year.<sup>28</sup>

Plans for the long-range structural reorganization of the Japanese industrial structure stipulate four basic groups of priority branches.

The first group includes branches in which the major role is played by research and engineering. These include the production of computers, aircraft, electromobiles and industrial robots, nuclear power engineering, the recycling of production waste and the development of marine resources.

The second group consists of branches involving complex assembly. They represent progressive technology and require highly skilled manpower. These include the production of communications systems, office equipment, tools with digital program control, equipment for the control of environmental pollution, academic equipment, prefabricated buildings, powerful construction equipment, etc.

The third group includes branches producing goods in current fashion. These satisfy a variety of consumer demands and include the production of fashionable clothing, furniture, household appliances, household articles, etc.

The fourth group consists of the branches making up the knowledge industry. These include various information services, consultation services, the production of pocket computers, the publishing industry, etc.<sup>29</sup>

New priority branches have been chosen on the basis of such criteria as the size of profits, the rates of rise in labor productivity, the content and conditions of labor, environmental effects and international division of labor. According to the authors of these plans, a rapid transition to this kind of industrial structure under the conditions of a market economy require the institution of a tax on added value, flexible stimulation of priority branches by means of credit and finance controls, involvement of the private sector in the development of the non-production infrastructure and a new stage in the internationalization of economic ties.

Therefore, the Sankoshin plans depict a new long-range prospect for the reorganization of the Japanese industrial structure. The arguments in favor of this kind of structure have many convincing features: Branches requiring high scientific input pollute the environment less, are less dependent on imported raw materials, represent branches in which Japan's future international supremacy is more probable, reflect the requirement



for a rise in labor productivity, conform to the reduced rates of increase in labor resources, etc.

Much is now being written in Japan in reference to the fact that the government's goal of a structural reorganization of the economy has been agreed to by private capital and a mutual understanding has been reached on this matter by the state and the monopolies. Even though the businessmen do agree with the long-range course of state policy, however, this does not mean that all of them wish to give up their own immediate interests. The new priority branches are now mainly in the earliest stages of development and their products are primarily intended for the satisfaction of internal demand. If an increasing percentage of national resources is redistributed among these branches in accordance with these plans, productivity in the basic branches (which are simultaneously the basic export branches) will be reduced and, consequently, their international competitive potential will be reduced. Under these conditions, it will be more difficult for state policy to gain the support of private capital than in the past and conflicts of interest between the state and the monopolies will become more typical of the Japanese economy. Japanese economist S. Hayashi has correctly pointed out that, "in the final analysis, the factors determining the significance of any state policy are the trust and support of the private sector, as this kind of policy is not legally binding and can only be carried out on the basis of so-called 'administrative controls.'"<sup>30</sup>

It should also be noted that the elaboration of the general economic policy of the state has always required reconciliation of the conflicting interests of various ministries and departments in Japan, which have traditionally had considerable independence of action and even greater independent authority. This is why the elaboration of a long-range economic policy involves the extremely difficult task of classifying and ordering various measures, coordinating departmental interests that are frequently contradictory and mutually exclusive and determining priorities from the nationwide standpoint.

In the past, when the industrial policy of the state was concentrated around a limited number of key branches, the MITI was its chief executor. Now the economic and structural policy of Japan is becoming more complex and acquiring broader scope. Now it involves almost all ministries and departments, each of which represents its own interests and the interests of the business circles associated with it.

Even in the presence of general recognition of the problems facing the nation and agreement on the general principles of long-range economic policy, the different ministries and the groups of monopolistic capital associated with them generally disagree on the time and procedures for conducting concrete measures. Since the ministries and departments in Japan have limited contact with one another and the implementation of certain state measures is completely the responsibility of individual ministries, different views on concrete issues can have a serious effect on the general course and speed of the accomplishment of nationwide tasks.

In practice, this leads to the "paralysis" of government measures--a situation characterized by a multitude of plans but an almost total absence of real action. According to economist T. Uchida's metaphorical description, the Japanese long-range programs "are like a drawing of a rice cake.... They depict grand projects, but the necessary conditions for their realization do not exist."<sup>31</sup>

Therefore, the complexity and magnitude of the Japanese economy and the complicated nature of the decision-making process are the reasons for the large gap between recognition of the need for change, the elaboration of a general economic policy and the concrete implementation of this policy. As for the long-range plans for the reorganization of the Japanese industrial structure, the first two stages have now been essentially completed, but the actual accomplishment of this reorganization is only beginning and is encountering great difficulties. And these difficulties are not connected so much with bureaucratic laziness in the completion of new tasks as with the presence of real conflicts of interest between different groups of the Japanese bourgeoisie.

Guidelines for the reorganization of the industrial structure were included in the current so-called "Economic Plan for the Second Half of the 1970's" (1976-1980 fiscal years). This is the eighth state economic program that has been officially adopted by the Japanese Government since the war. According to many Western commentators, its most impressive feature is the fundamental change in traditional priorities.

The new "economic plan" is subtitled "for a stabilized society." It is based on the "life cycle" theory of former Prime Minister T. Miki and stipulates that the chief objectives of state economic policy for the 5-year period are "the guaranteed emergence of the Japanese economy from the crisis and a transition to long-term stable growth."<sup>32</sup> The plan advances four basic goals: the guaranteed stability of prices and full employment; the creation of stable and favorable living conditions; the promotion of world economic development and international cooperation; and the establishment of a basis for long-term stable growth.<sup>33</sup>

For the first time in Japanese forecasting practices, objectives related to the expansion of production activity do not prevail in this "economic plan." Real average annual rates of growth in the GNP are planned for only slightly above 6 percent. Planned rates of economic growth have only been lower during the period of the 1956-1960 fiscal years.

Predictably, the problem of future growth rates has gained the greatest amount of attention from the Japanese press in its critical analysis of the new "program." Some press reports have stated that it will be extremely difficult to ensure a growth rate of 6 percent in the GNP, while others have implied that the state's establishment of such low growth rates can only make it more difficult to solve the problem of public welfare.

Evidently, all these arguments about growth rates serve no practical purpose. The proposed 6-percent growth rate does not mean that the economic policy of the Japanese Government will depend strictly on the attainment of this goal. In the capitalist society, "government actions envisaged in programs," Japanese economist T. Mizoguchi has noted, "can change as a result of changes in economic conditions and, for this reason, they can only be regarded as an illusory image of government policy."<sup>34</sup>

The Japanese Government's statements about a general "reorientation" of long-range economic policy toward "a rise in welfare," which have been publicized so widely by the Japanese bourgeois press, also appear quite illusory. The government's new plans only confirm the unrealistic nature of this kind of reorientation in the capitalist economy of Japan.

The indicators of the new "economic plan" attest to the orientation of state policy toward the stimulation of intensive investment activity: Average annual rates of growth are to be 13.1 percent for private investments in fixed productive assets, 15.4 percent for investments in housing construction and 13.15 percent for state investments.<sup>35</sup> The reduction of average annual rates of growth in exports to 14.4 percent and in imports to 13.2 percent (the respective indicators for the 1970-1975 fiscal period were 18.7 percent and 21.9 percent), is expected to establish equilibrium in Japanese international transactions (including the balance of current accounts and the balance of long-term capital investments) by the 1980 fiscal year, when the expected positive balance of 4 billion dollars in current accounts will cover the deficit in the balance of long-term capital investments.<sup>36</sup> These figures indicate that possibilities for importing raw material resources and problems connected with export potential and the balance of payments are not regarded as factors which can seriously restrict future economic growth.

Despite the fact that the planned rates of production growth will be much lower than in the past in most of the basic branches of production, calculations based on the intersectorial model have shown that there will be no perceptible change in the industrial structure in favor of branches requiring high scientific input. The industrial structure will undergo almost no changes whatsoever before the 1980 fiscal year.<sup>37</sup>

The plan's emphasis on the expansion of international economic cooperation reflects the objective process of the internationalization of the Japanese economy and the economic policy of Japanese monopolistic capital.

At this time of acute inter-imperialist conflicts, Japan is striving for guaranteed stable deliveries of raw materials and energy and to find different sources for their acquisition. Besides this, as the range of Japanese exports becomes broader, the national bourgeoisie in many nations tends to demand higher customs duties and the imposition of quotas on Japanese goods. The outburst of stronger protectionist measures is frightening Japanese exporters. For this reason, they feel that one of the important ways of neutralizing these factors will consist in increasing

Japanese foreign economic aid to the current level in the other developed countries (approximately 0.7 percent of the GNP).<sup>38</sup>

Japan is rapidly becoming one of the world's chief exporters of capital. For example, at the end of March 1975, total direct Japanese investments overseas amounted to 12.7 billion dollars. According to the estimates of the MITI's Sankoshin, the foreign investments of Japan will reach 40.9 billion dollars by 1980 and 80.7 billion by 1985.<sup>39</sup> The major stimulus for the intensive export of capital is the desire of businessmen (or monopolies) in many branches of the Japanese economy which have reached a "state of maturity" for a more favorable (from the standpoint of profits) distribution of capital abroad. Other factors are the problems connected with the import of the necessary quantity of raw materials and energy resources (this was the main reason for the establishment of multinational companies in the steel industry) and the need to "export" some of the branches responsible for the greatest environmental pollution. It is obvious that if important national production associations are trying to locate some of their capacities abroad, special measures will have to be taken to ensure stable international relations, to protect existing investments and to lay the necessary basis for future investments. Therefore, the plan's emphasis on the expansion of international cooperation primarily reflects the interests of monopolistic capital in Japan and is directed toward the prevention and elimination of potential obstacles to further economic growth in the sphere of foreign economic relations.

The government policy displays a desire to solve the problems in the Japanese economy which have been engendered by "high growth rates" in the interests of large capital and, despite the demagogic declarations of the Japanese Government, does not envisage any substantial measures to improve the living conditions and welfare of the Japanese workers. For example, the plan calls for state investments of 100 trillion yen (in prices for the 1975 fiscal year) for the 1976-1980 fiscal period, but only 28.8 percent is to be used for the improvement of living conditions.<sup>40</sup> Just as in the past, most of the state capital investments will be used for the development of the production infrastructure (roads, communications, ports, etc.) and for the creation of broader possibilities for the functioning of private capital.

The substantial increase envisaged in the financial expenditures of the state (an average of 13.9 percent annually) makes it particularly important to find sources of additional financial resources. The major way of acquiring these additional resources will consist in a tax increase which will be justified by the slogan of "a higher level of welfare requires higher taxes." During the 5 years, taxes and other payments are to increase by 3 percent and social security contributions are to increase by 1.5 percent.<sup>41</sup> Despite these measures, a deficit of around 6 trillion yen is expected in the state budget right up to the 1980 fiscal year. This means that the shortage of state funds for financing the acquisition of land and the development of the educational and social security systems will become even more acute.



The Japanese Government intends to float special loans to cover the deficit in the budget. This will naturally contribute to inflation, which attacks the pockets of the workers first of all. For this reason, the plans to reduce the rate of rise in consumer prices to 6 percent by 1980 and the rate of rise in wholesale prices to 5 percent seem totally unrealistic.<sup>42</sup> At the same time, the profits of corporations, the level of which decreased somewhat during the crisis years, are expected to grow by an average of 17 percent a year.<sup>43</sup>

Therefore, an analysis of the new goals of the Japanese Government's economic policy indicates that the shift in emphasis from growth to improved welfare is more of an illusion than a reality. The new phrases conceal old goals. Ruling circles in Japan declared their desire for a significant reorientation of economic policy toward a higher level of welfare and social security for the population, a level which is now considerably lower than in the developed countries of Western Europe and the United States. But the actual degree to which this goal has been approached to date is inconsistent with these declarations. We have every reason to predict that realistic measures will only be taken in this sphere to the extent that they represent conditions for the social and political stability necessary for ensuring future growth.

Under the conditions of the capitalist system of economic management, which is based on hard and fast principles of private ownership and the desire for maximum profits, the state's potential for reorienting economic policy on behalf of social welfare is restricted by the class interests of the bourgeoisie, which cannot be ignored without endangering the very existence of the capitalist order. A substantial change in priorities in the area of national development requires that the state establish complete control over the capital investments of monopolies and over crises and nationalize property. But this would signify a radical change in the relationship between the state and the monopolies, which is essentially impossible if the monopolistic bourgeoisie retains its present role as the dominant class in society.

It is precisely this, that represents the source of the conflicts between the logic of the long-range economic policy of Japan and the difficulties involved in concrete measures, particularly on a short-term basis. The lack of correspondence between the long-range "programmed" aims of the state and its actual economic policy is the reason for the demagogic and palliative nature of measures to promote social welfare. The state, which guards the interests of the bourgeoisie, not only fails to restrict the private-ownership egoism of the monopolistic corporations, but, to the contrary, stimulates it. For this reason, the Japanese workers are not likely to trust the government's plans for social welfare, which promise much but are always refuted by life itself.

# FOOTNOTES

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31. GENDAI KEIZAI, 1974, No 13.
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33. "Economic Plan for the Second Half of the 1970's," Tokyo, 1976, pp 7-10.
34. "TOYO KEIZAI Statistical Almanac," Tokyo, 1973, p 48.
35. TOYO KEIZAI TOKEI GEPPU, 1976, No 7.
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## SOUTH KOREA IN U.S. FAR EASTERN POLICY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1977 pp 106-124

[Article by D. T. Kapustin, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] South Korea has always been assigned an exceptionally important role in postwar U.S. policy in the Far East. This has largely been due to its location in continental Asia, directly adjacent to the borders of the socialist countries. Metaphorically speaking, the line of demarcation in Korea (generally along the 38th Parallel) is the boundary between two worlds in East Asia--the capitalist world and the socialist world. It is precisely here, in Korea, that imperialism first attempted a "test of strength" after the end of World War II, but was confronted by the strength and unity of the socialist countries.

American imperialism has turned South Korea into its forepost in Asia and has made it one of the connecting links in the so-called "defense perimeter of the United States," which was formed in the beginning of the 1950's in the shape of a huge arc, stretching from Alaska and the Aleutian Islands to Australia and New Zealand, passing through Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Thailand. This "defense perimeter" was supposed to be cemented by military and political agreements with the United States on a bilateral and bloc basis.

A treaty on "mutual defense" with no specific time limit was concluded by the United States and South Korea on 1 October 1953 and went into effect on 17 November 1954. This treaty and other subsequent agreements with the United States served as the political basis for the existence of the South Korean regime (in Syngman Rhee's time as well as in Park Chung-hui's). "Legalizing" the construction of American bases (at the end of 1971 there were 36 of these<sup>1</sup>) and stationing U.S. armed forces on Korean territory, Washington took military and political control over South Korea and turned its Far Eastern ally into an obedient tool of American imperialism.

The extensive U.S. economic and military aid received by Seoul was also an important factor facilitating this kind of subordination. Even according to official data, economic aid during the 1948-1970 period amounted to



4 billion dollars, and military aid (from 1953 through 1969) amounted to 2.9 billion.<sup>2</sup>

American scientist Kim Se-jin, commenting on "America's constant concern and support" for South Korea, has said that the United States, starting from the ground up, created an enormous South Korean army of more than 600,000 servicemen (in terms of size, the South Korean Army occupies the fourth-sixth place in the world), equipped it with modern weapons and are still exercising operational control over it. "It was precisely American material support," he stresses, "that served as the basis for economic revival, and it was precisely American-inspired anticommunism that became the basis of South Korean political ideology."<sup>3</sup>

Ruling circles in the United States make no secret of the fact that they, with the assistance of their proteges, have sown and fostered hatred for the DPRK in the South Korean population. They have stated, for example, that Syngman Rhee was elected head of the South Korean regime because "he shared the United States' views on two issues of crucial importance": the granting of separate "independence" to the South in 1948 and the support of anticommunist aims, by means of force, both within the regime and in regard to the North.<sup>4</sup>

When public anger led to the downfall of the Syngman Rhee clique, the United States, using a method it had tested in several nations, assisted in the assumption of power in Seoul by "strong personalities" from the military, who established a dictatorial police state. American scientist E. Reischauer writes that the United States "was the godfather of the right-wing dictatorship" and promised to protect it, even though "the American people would undoubtedly have refused to take on this kind of commitment."<sup>5</sup>

In order to "contain" the forces of socialism and the national liberation movement in Asia, the United States not only increased the number of its servicemen in South Korea to 64,000 (by the end of the 1960's but also deployed part of these troops directly adjacent to the demilitarized zone. Besides this, nuclear weapons were secretly brought into South Korea.

In the 1960's, American diplomacy attached particular significance to the interrelations between their Far Eastern allies, especially Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, in an attempt to reinforce their mutual relations by means of direct political and military ties on a bloc basis. Under the strong pressure exerted by the United States, South Korea reestablished relations with Japan (a treaty on the basis of these relations and several agreements were signed in June 1965, after 14 years of negotiations). In 1966, the ASPAC [Asian and Pacific Council] political alliance was formed and the most active role in this alliance was played by precisely these U.S. allies. Washington subsequently tried to turn it into a military bloc with the energetic assistance of Seoul and Taipei.

By the end of the 1960's, U.S. policy had undergone perceptible changes. U.S. President R. Nixon proposed a new foreign policy, the purpose of which consisted in adapting U.S. policy to the new balance of power in the world

and to objective changes in world affairs and attaining goals dictated by the class essence of American imperialism by the means and methods at the disposal of the U.S. Government.<sup>6</sup> The "Nixon Doctrine," as this theory came to be called, marked a new stage in American policy in Asia, particularly in relation to South Korea. Here it is important to stress the fact that the basic ideas of this doctrine (with certain deviations and modifications) lay at the basis of the political course of the Ford Administration and have been taken on by current U.S. President J. Carter.

#### R. Nixon: New Approach--Old Goals

The "Nixon Doctrine" primarily concerned Asia and called for flexible and thorough consideration for "changing circumstances in a changing world." Its "basic elements" were: partnership with allies (of varying degrees), a willingness to negotiate, the elimination of "rigid" foreign policy commitments, and military aid. There is every reason to associate this doctrine with American-Chinese "normalization" or the "new approach to China."<sup>7</sup>

This is how M. Green, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs and one of the promoters of the Nixon Doctrine, frankly described its basic premises: "This is not at all a doctrine of true withdrawal. Our problem is not how to leave Asia, but how to stay there. This is the purpose of the partnership and the force and the negotiations for which the United States has declared its willingness.... We are trying to begin an era of negotiations with the PRC."<sup>8</sup>

Therefore, U.S. Asian policy, based on the principles of the Nixon Doctrine, essentially presuppose, on the one hand, a new approach to China and, on the other, loyalty to the principles of alliance, including loyalty to the United States' Far Eastern allies (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan), which had once been given the responsibility of "containing China." This policy proclaimed the unity of American allies in Asia as one of its chief objectives, and Japan was supposed to play the major role in its attainment. In his 1970 message to Congress on foreign policy, the American President called Japan "the key to the success of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia." He underscored the fact that "peace, prosperity and progress in the Pacific will depend primarily on cooperation between the United States and Japan."<sup>9</sup>

The major premise of Nixon's new Asian policy consisted in making use of the U.S.-Japanese agreement on security to involve Japan--the second most powerful nation in the economic sense (in the capitalist world)--in the attainment of American goals and relying on its potential to share political "responsibility" and the burden of military expenditures in the Far East and in Southeast Asia. The plan called for the United States to agree to some of the demands and claims of the Japanese Government: the return of Okinawa and the recognition of special interests in South Korea, Taiwan (which then accounted for 50 percent of all Japanese capital investments in Asia) and the nations of Southeast Asia. According to a UPI report, in closed hearings before a Senate subcommittee investigating U.S. overseas military commitments

at the end of 1969, A. Johnson, deputy assistant secretary of state, said: "The relations between the United States and Japan and Japan's position in relation to other Asian and Pacific countries will play an increasing role in the development of this vast region of such great importance to the United States."

An equally important role was to be assigned to the United States' other Far Eastern allies--South Korea and Taiwan. The South Korean and Chiang Kai-shek regimes were more "convenient and obedient partners for Washington due to their complete dependence on the United States. This made it possible for the United States to use them to exert pressure on its other Asian allies, especially Japan, in the necessary direction for the American Government, particularly for the formation of (as the engineers of the doctrine put it) "an alliance of noncommunist forces in Asia." The strategic location of South Korea and Taiwan--their direct proximity to the borders of the PRC and the boundaries of the socialist community--was also taken into consideration, as well as the fierce anticommunism of both regimes and their exceptionally energetic political activity to form a military and political alliance in East Asia in a model suiting Washington.

The Nixon Doctrine called for the gradual withdrawal of most American military personnel from the territory of the allies. Plans were simultaneously made to strengthen the military potential of the allies, both with the aid of direct deliveries and sales of American weapons and by means of all-round encouragement of the allies' own efforts in this direction.

This "increasingly independent role" of the allies was given special emphasis by Nixon in his speech in Guam, when he said that "otherwise they would not learn to take care of themselves." He said that the key to understanding the means by which the United States intended to continue playing its important role in Asia after withdrawing its troops from Vietnam and from other territories lay in a combination of the principle of replacing U.S. strength with the forces of America's allies and the willingness of the American Government to come to their aid in the event of nuclear threat and to loyally adhere to all treaty commitments.<sup>10</sup>

The plans of American ruling circles to form a military and political alliance in the Asian and Pacific region were based on the idea of a "regional balance of power." They carefully prepared the soil here in advance to prevent the assumption of excessive power by a strong rival capable of threatening U.S. global interests. The Nixon Administration attempted to lead its troops away from the Chinese border while maintaining multileveled control over various parts of the region--through the mechanism of the "nuclear umbrella," with the aid of the Japanese-American agreement on security and by means of bilateral defense agreements with the allies.

By guaranteeing the unity of its allies in East Asia, Washington hoped to alleviate the "rigidity" of bilateral agreements on defense, including the agreement with South Korea, and probably intended to take on some kind of

mediating role in Asia in the future. R. Nixon frankly spoke of the need for the Asians "to solve their own problems and settle their own conflicts," promising them assistance in the event of the threat of attack by a great power with the use of nuclear weapons.<sup>11</sup>

An analysis of the basic goals of the "new Asian policy of the United States," proposed by Nixon, leads to the conclusion that South Korea was assigned an important role in U.S. Asian policy. It was intended to play this role within the framework of close interdependence with America's allies, especially the Far Eastern allies. Besides this, in the determination of this policy (just as in the assessment of the situation on the Korean peninsula), the "globalistic" approach prevailed, based on consideration, above all, for South Korea's political and strategic importance to American imperialism, as a result of which Korea's internal problems, particularly the major problem--the problem of national reunification, were ascribed secondary importance.

The political experience of recent years has shown that several of the most important objectives of the Nixon Doctrine have not been attained and others have been subjected to substantial pragmatic corrections. This applies above all to the "new approach to China." As we know, Peking initially regarded the Nixon Doctrine as a whole as an anti-Chinese program and prepared for a political confrontation with the United States in Asia. As the doctrine was implemented, however, Peking detected its weak points (primarily in respect to the Far East) and saw an opportunity to achieve a certain degree of mutual understanding with Washington and the satisfaction of some of its own goals, dictated by its own hegemonistic ambitions.

The major weak points of the Nixon Doctrine became evident precisely in the area of allied relations. In the first place, the United States was not able to ensure the unity of its allies in Asia. Less than a year after Nixon's speech in Guam (by the summer of 1970), it became obvious that any attempts to form a Pacific and Asian military and political bloc or to relegate military functions to the ASPAC political alliance were doomed to failure, despite the particularly active steps taken by Seoul and Taipei in this direction. Most of America's allies, Japan above all, expressed reluctance to join any kind of alliance, even one with an indirect anti-Chinese underlying motive, especially at a time when Washington was striving to establish contacts with the Chinese leaders.

At the same time, the United States' new course in Asia and, in particular, the diplomacy of "small steps" in relations with Peking escalated centrifugal tendencies in the camp of America's Asian allies, which ultimately led (after R. Nixon's visit to Peking) to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC by some of them (the Philippines and Thailand) and to a reassessment of the status of American troops on their territory.



Serious friction--both economic and political--has existed and still exists between Japan and the United States. Japan has frequently protested against the role assigned to it by American recipes and has agreed primarily with those that have been in the interests of Japanese ruling circles. The leaders of the nation have openly said that the situation calls for examination of the problems of Japanese security "from a more independent standpoint" and even the possibility of "using an opponent's forces to win victory over them."<sup>12</sup>

This policy has naturally evoked dissatisfaction on the part of America's "small" Far Eastern allies--South Korea and Taiwan. These countries saw more than Japan's military weakness outside of the American-Japanese alliance. For them, Japanese "independence" in Asian affairs was associated with the Japanese occupation of not long ago, with the demagogic slogans of the "great East Asian sphere of joint prosperity," with the role of Japan as "an older brother" and so forth. The Seoul and Taipei leaders became even more suspicious when the Japanese monopolies began their intensive economic penetration in the 1960's into the spheres of their own "traditional influence," even though South Korea and Taiwan were also interested to some degree in broad economic ties with Japan.

Despite the serious conflicts between the United States' Far Eastern allies, which are caused by historical factors as well as political and economic ones, American diplomacy was able at first to take the important step of forcing Japan to assume a "special responsibility" for the South Korean and Taiwan regimes. On 19-21 November 1969, negotiations were held between Japanese Prime Minister E. Sato and R. Nixon. The communique on these negotiations stated that "the security of the Republic of Korea is inseparable from the security of Japan" and that the preservation of peace and security in the Taiwan region is also "an exceptionally important factor for Japanese security."<sup>13</sup> In essence, this appeared to be a commitment taken on by the Japanese Government to be the United States' ally in supporting the South Korean and Chiang Kai-shek regimes. But there was also an obvious difference in the phrasing of "commitments." This was later confirmed when the Japanese leaders explained that if war should break out on the Korean peninsula, Japan would be "obliged to immediately take action in support of any military operations begun by the United States in Japan, even before the United Nations makes a decision on whether this war in Korea is aggressive or not" and that, in the event of combat in the Taiwan Strait, Japan "would naturally be deeply concerned about the situation of this state (the Taiwan regime--D. K.), which it has recognized."<sup>14</sup>

The Seoul regime, which had a generally positive reaction to the results of the Nixon-Sato meeting, tried to amplify these results by appealing to the Japanese Government to "reinforce the system of military cooperation" between Japan and South Korea. This appeal was made in a document entitled "The Security Problems of the Republic of Korea in the 1970's," which was sent to Tokyo and expressed the desire of the South Korean leaders to involve Japanese ruling circles in the active formation of a "trilateral defense

structure" (United States-Japan-South Korea) as a basis for a future regional military and political bloc.<sup>15</sup> At that time, Japan took an evasive stand on this matter.

Along with the efforts to actively involve Japan in the orbit of American policy in Asia, other important measures of the Nixon Doctrine were being carried out, such as the search for channels of communication with Peking and the reduction of U.S. military presence on the Chinese periphery (the implementation of "Vietnamization" plans and the cessation of U.S. naval patrols of the Taiwan Strait). These aspects of U.S. policy were regarded with extreme suspicion in Seoul.

In October 1969, reports were leaked to the press that the U.S. Government was considering the withdrawal of one division of American troops from South Korea without connecting their presence with the existence of 40,000 South Korean troops in Vietnam.<sup>16</sup> This announcement contradicted the assurances Nixon gave Pak Chong-hui during their talks in San Francisco on 22-23 August 1969 in reference to the fact that the U.S. president "did not intend to withdraw" American troops from South Korea.<sup>17</sup>

The South Korean press was soon full of advice to "give serious thought to compensation for losses" and to "revise the plan for defense in general and take complete responsibility for it." The influential Seoul newspaper, HAN'GUK ILBO, warned the Nixon Administration against any attempts to "make peace with Red China at the expense of South Korean security," stressing the fact that it would be a flagrant error on the part of the United States to go so far in its attempts at rapprochement with Peking that it would lose the military support of South Korea.<sup>18</sup>

Nonetheless, on 6 July 1970, the United States officially informed the South Korean Government, through its ambassador to Seoul, of its intention to reduce the size of its armed forces in South Korea by 20,000 persons. This decision marked the beginning of a new important stage in Washington's relations with its Far Eastern allies. While continuing to declare its fidelity to the agreements with its allies, the American administration simultaneously began to reduce its armed forces on territories directly adjacent to the PRC. This primarily applied to troops not involved in the Vietnam war, which naturally affected the United States' other allies in Asia.<sup>19</sup>

In Seoul, the White House's decision evoked open and fierce opposition. Since the Pak Chong-hui regime had made previous statements to gradually prepare the public for the idea that "American troops cannot stay in Korea forever,"<sup>20</sup> the criticism was mainly focused on the "poor timing" of the step taken by the Nixon Government.

An important announcement was made by the Japanese Government. Y. Nakasone, director of the Defense Agency stated that although the reduction of American troops in South Korea could affect the national security of Japan,

its armed forces would not take on the role of the American troops after their withdrawal.<sup>21</sup> In response to this, the then South Korean ambassador to Tokyo hastened to inform representatives of the press that Seoul also did not wish Japan to become involved in the problem of the withdrawal of American troops.<sup>22</sup>

The ruling clique in Seoul tried to arouse passion over the issue of the reduction of American troops. The prime minister threatened the dismissal of his cabinet. During a visit to South Korea on 24-26 August 1970, the U.S. vice-president encountered such dissatisfaction with the White House's decision that he had to contact Nixon by telephone several times. The two sides could not reach an agreement, as serious differences of opinion arose in the assessment of the degree of tension in Korea and the "threat from the North" (that is, the DPRK), as well as a difference of views on the size of American aid.

The resolute resistance of Seoul and the many accusations made by other American allies in connection with the new U.S. policy in Asia made a great impression on Washington. American experts on East Asia concluded that the Nixon Doctrine, which had the goal of "giving the Asian people greater pride and faith in their own strength, had the opposite result."<sup>23</sup>

But the U.S. Government did not change its mind. By October 1970, the withdrawal of troops began and it soon became obvious that the United States was withdrawing precisely the division which had guarded the 18-mile section of the demilitarized zone.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, the entire 155-mile line of demarcation between North and South Korea was transferred to the control of the South Korean Army. It is evident that this was the central consideration in the idea of the reduction of troops in Korea, as the remaining American units were located in the rear and did not automatically join battle in the event of minor conflicts.

The decision to reduce U.S. troops in South Korea was made by the United States in a one-sided manner, and the agreement on this matter, which was signed on 6 February 1971, was a formal expression of Seoul's belated approval and primarily clarified U.S. obligations in connection with the 5-year program for the modernization of the South Korean Army.

At the same time, the stormy reaction of the South Korean regime and the attempts made by Seoul to blackmail the United States by withdrawing its troops from Vietnam evidently had a definite effect on Washington. In the beginning of 1971, it became known that President Nixon had instructed the Defense Department to postpone indefinitely the plans for the continued withdrawal of American troops, as the State Department believed that an immediate second round of reductions could create serious political problems in South Korea, where presidential and parliamentary elections were to be held in the spring of 1971.<sup>25</sup> In subsequent years, right up to the presidential campaign of 1976, the question of new reductions was not raised.

The active process of Chinese-American rapprochement, which took on a bilateral nature after the beginning of Peking's "ping-pong diplomacy," marked an important stage in the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia and resulted in significant changes in the balance of power in the Far East. For some time, the American policy in regard to China had overshadowed the alliance aspects of the Nixon Doctrine, which evoked the dissatisfaction of America's allies and caused Japan to accelerate the normalization of its own relations with the PRC. Although the United States did not intend to break its political ties with its allies and took every opportunity to reiterate its basic commitments in accordance with bilateral agreements, the American administration was forced to avoid taking sides (particularly, for example, in the Taiwan issue) and to make certain compromises for the purpose of further rapprochement with Peking.

On the whole, the stand taken by the United States in regard to South Korea during the Nixon Administration can be described as a position of complete support with simultaneous attempts to perpetuate Japanese "involvement," to exert pressure on Seoul for the purpose of its greater political flexibility and to achieve a mutual understanding with Peking on the Korean problem.

An analysis of the Shanghai Communique, for example, indicates that the problem of Korea was the topic of intense discussion during R. Nixon's visit to the PRC. On the whole, the two sides registered different views on this matter, although their ambiguous phrasing and silences reflected their desire to not call any attention to this. The results of the American-Chinese summit meeting demonstrated, above all, that the American and Chinese leaders were approaching the Korean issue from the standpoint of broad, global interests which were dictated by the ambitions of the ruling circles in their nations. There was also some evidence of willingness to compromise on form and, in some areas (the presence of U.S. armed forces in South Korea), on essence as well.

It should be emphasized that it was precisely during this period that Peking's double-dealing position became increasingly apparent. It officially supported the DPRK on the issue of national reunification and, in particular, on the issue of the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from South Korea, but confidentially expressed "recognition" of the need for the American military presence in the south of the Korean peninsula.

The rapid Chinese-American rapprochement of 1971-1972 caused some harm to the United States' allied relations in the Far East. This was primarily true of Japan and its "special responsibility" for the South Korean and Taiwan regimes.

Even before the American-Chinese summit meeting of 7-9 January 1972, talks were held in San Clemente between the U.S. President and the Japanese prime minister. At a press conference here, E. Sato implied that the premises of



the American-Japanese communique of November 1969 in regard to South Korea and Taiwan had lost their meaning and that Tokyo, in contrast to Washington, did not have military treaty obligations to these regimes and could take a more flexible stand in relation to Peking.<sup>26</sup>

Representatives of the Seoul Ministry of Home Affairs announced that the remarks of the Japanese prime minister reflected far-reaching political maneuvers which were intended to ensure better positions in the coming Chinese-Japanese negotiations and that, in their opinion, the premises of the joint Sato-Nixon communique were still in force, despite Sato's denial of them.<sup>27</sup> It is true that the prime minister's remarks were quickly amended by the Japanese foreign minister and, in a subsequent official exchange of notes, Japan confirmed its adherence to the articles of the communique.<sup>28</sup> But this zigzag by Tokyo did not remain an isolated episode.

The normalization of relations between Japan and the PRC in the fall of 1972 resulted in Taiwan's cancellation of the "peace treaty" of 1952, which had actually represented a political alliance between Tokyo and Taipei. Although Japan maintained active economic ties with the Taiwan regime and the Tanaka and Miki governments later tried to improve bilateral relations, Japan's political guarantees to Taiwan were cancelled at that time, including those deriving from the Nixon-Sato communique of 1969.

Ruling circles in Japan continued to display extreme fluctuation in their views on their previous obligations to Seoul. For example, the Japanese Government did not support the plans of the South Korean leaders to preserve ASPAC and, for several years, avoided any kind of confirmation of its obligations to Korea, which were stipulated in the Nixon-Sato communique, by making reference to the new situation in the region. At the same time, Japan supported the commencement of peace talks by the two Korean sides (for example, in the Tanaka-Nixon communique of 1 August 1973) and the Japanese leaders began to emphasize the need for peace and stability on the entire Korean peninsula more frequently.

Evidently, the desire to enter a field of broader maneuvers in regard to the Korean problem can be explained by the fact that the Japanese Government started to doubt Seoul's theory about the "threat of attack" by the DPRK, announcing on 29 August 1974 that, in its opinion, this threat did not exist.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, in an explanatory note, the minister of home affairs stated that Japan did not consider the South Korean Government to be the only legal government on the Korean peninsula and that it interpreted Article 3 of the "Treaty on the Basis of Interrelations" between Japan and South Korea of 1965 as "recognition of the sovereignty of the Seoul Government only on the territory of South Korea."<sup>30</sup>

When the cabinet headed by T. Miki took power in December 1974, however, Japan's position began to change once again. Foreign Minister K. Miyazawa first said that the situation in Korea was "disturbing" and, after his visit to the United States in April 1975 (not long after the fall of the

Saigon regime), he declared that the premises of the Nixon-Sato communique of 1969 were still in force.<sup>31</sup>

The dialogue between Peking and Washington and the reinstatement of the PRC's rights in the United Nations marked the beginning of a policy of adaptation of the South Korean regime to the new situation in the Far East with a preservation of the military and political alliance with the United States. The basic directions of this adaptation, which took place under the control of the United States and with its active assistance, were the following:

First, the commencement of a dialogue with the DPRK. We know that the United States insisted on this and had advised the South Korean leaders as early as 1970 to determine the spheres in reference to which South and North Korea could begin a dialogue.<sup>32</sup> Although the leaders of the South Korean regime announced the "inevitability of future dialogue with the North,"<sup>32</sup> American researchers pointed out that "South Korea is making a pretense of interest in the problem of unification for the purpose of gaining time to reinforce its own positions."<sup>34</sup>

Secondly, the rejection of some previous premises of South Korean foreign policy. This was reflected, in particular, in the rejection of the Korean variant of the "Hallstein Doctrine," in the attempts to establish trade relations with the nations of eastern Europe, in the official authorization of the ships of some socialist countries to enter South Korean ports and so forth. But these measures were classified as "compulsory" in the face of current realities, particularly the widespread recognition of Peking.<sup>35</sup>

Thirdly, attempts to establish contacts with the PRC. These attempts were made as early as August 1971, when the South Korean foreign minister announced his willingness to consider the establishment of diplomatic relations.<sup>36</sup> Similar attempts were made later as well; for example, in the fall of 1971 with Canada as a go-between, and in March 1973 in connection with Peking's claims to parts of the continental shelf of the Yellow Sea.

Fourthly, new tactics in the United Nations and changes in the approach to the problem of national unification. Here the influence of the United States was quite obvious. The United States was not only attempting to ensure that the reestablishment of the PRC's rights in the United Nations would not harm the Pak Chong-hui regime politically, but also began to reinforce South Korea as a separate political entity, even if this would be to the detriment of Korean reunification, which was acknowledged to be the "unconcealed desire of all Koreans" by a UN commission.<sup>37</sup>

In 1971 and 1972, the Korean problem was not discussed in the United Nations due to the commencement of direct contacts between the two Korean sides. At the beginning of 1973, however, it became obvious that UN discussion of the Korean issue could not be postponed again. The world public was convinced that the direct negotiations between the South and North had not

brought the resolution of the unification problem a single iota closer. The UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea was forced to admit that the matter had not gone beyond declarations of intent.<sup>38</sup> Many American politicians and scientists concluded that the negotiations were a tactical move by Pak Chong-hui, and not a step toward reconciliation, and that he was doing this to win popularity with the masses and to use the dialogue as a bargaining point in relations with America, in the fear of being left "orphaned" in Asia.<sup>39</sup>

Within 2 months after the beginning of the session of the General Assembly, on 23 June 1973, the South Korean president unexpectedly announced that Seoul proposed that both parts of Korea join the United Nations and other international organizations.<sup>40</sup> (This announcement was particularly unexpected, as the South Korean leaders had quite recently demanded that the United Nations not interfere in Korean affairs and not aggravate the schism in the nation.) But in doing this, as the South Korean prime minister said at a press conference, Seoul "was objecting to any proposal on the withdrawal of UN armed forces as long as the danger of aggression exists on the Korean peninsula."<sup>41</sup>

Seoul's new tactic was obviously the result of American diplomatic pressure. We know that the U.S. secretary of state went to Seoul in June 1973 for negotiations and described Pak Chong-hui's announcement as promising.<sup>42</sup> U.S. and South Korean tactics were directly coordinated by D. Pepper, his assistant secretary for international organization affairs.

Seoul realized that there was almost no chance that the DPRK and South Korea would be simultaneously admitted to the United Nations.<sup>43</sup> Nonetheless, the South Korean delegation worked closely with the American delegation, which had taken the initiative in this matter. The position of the U.S. delegation was alleviated by the fact that it knew more about Peking's feelings than ever before. H. Kissinger, who had been appointed U.S. secretary of state not long before, was the first to tell the world that the PRC did not object to the presence of U.S. troops in Korea.<sup>44</sup> His trip to the PRC (in the middle of November 1973, on the eve of the discussion of the Korean issue in the First Committee) demonstrated that the American-South Korean tactic in the United Nations was engineered with consideration for Peking's actual stand on the Korean issue. According to American sources, the formula in the United Nations was worked out by Kissinger and Chou En-lai on the basis of an agreement concluded in Peking.<sup>45</sup>

Because of this, the American tactic of "calm" discussion prevailed when the committee considered this problem, without the fierce debate of past years. Besides this, Deputy Secretary of State C. Porter (the former ambassador to South Korea) made a speech in which he connected the presence of American troops with the treaty on mutual defense with South Korea and not with the UN mandate.<sup>46</sup> This thesis, which was enthusiastically taken up by other American diplomats, signified that even the loss of the UN mandate would virtually have no effect on the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea.

On 21 November 1973, the First Committee of the United Nations decided with general approval to discontinue the balloting on the two drafts of the resolution on Korea and to declare a consensus (agreement) on the dissolution of the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, expressing the hope that the dialogue aimed at the peaceful unification of Korea would be continued by the two sides.<sup>47</sup> This proposal was approved by the General Assembly.

One of the characteristic features of South Korean foreign policy under the conditions of the new situation in Asia is its dual nature. Seoul's official response to the announcement of R. Nixon's visit to the PRC and its results was a positive one, but statements by the leaders of the regime constantly expressed the idea that the relaxation of tension in Asia has not extended to the Korean peninsula. This has been a way of justifying demands for political and military assistance from the United States and increased repression within the nation.

As we know, the South Korean ruling clique first used the North-South dialogue as a pretext for forcing the adoption of the new Constitution of South Korea, in accordance with which Pak Chong-hui assumed dictatorial powers for life. With the aid of several emergency measures, harsh police terror was established in relation to any disagreement with the policies of the regime and the slightest criticism of the president and the new constitution.

Several American congressmen have criticized the administrative methods of Pak Chong-hui. But all of Washington's official actions have demonstrated that it is mainly concerned with the existence of a "strong authority" in Seoul and the desire to avoid "destabilization" in South Korea, which could undermine the attainment of the United States' chief objectives in this region. The South Korean rulers have been successful in using this for their own purposes.

#### G. Ford: A Step Backward

The Watergate scandal marked the end of R. Nixon's presidency, but not the end of most of the principles which lay at the basis of the new U.S. policy in the Far East. At the same time, political realities made some adjustments in the American course.

The crushing defeat of American imperialism in Indochina led to an important shift in the areas of emphasis in U.S. policy in Asia. By 1 May 1975—that is, on the day after the fall of Saigon—U.S. Secretary of Defense J. Schlesinger announced that after the departure from Vietnam the "frontal zone of defense" would be western Europe and South Korea. This idea was also expressed in statements by the new U.S. President and secretary of state. For example, H. Kissinger said on 16 May 1975: "We believe that the defense and security of Korea are important for the security of the entire northwestern part of the Pacific Ocean and are of extreme importance in our relations with Japan."<sup>48</sup>



During this period, another important detail of American-South Korean relations became apparent. When the defense budget for the 1976 fiscal year was being examined in the American Congress, the fact that the United States had deployed 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons and 54 aircraft for their delivery in South Korea was officially announced for the first time. Besides this, some of the nuclear warheads were located close to the line of demarcation.<sup>49</sup>

The major characteristic of U.S. "post-Vietnam" policy in the Far East has been Washington's energetic efforts to reinforce Japan's "special responsibility" for the South Korean regime and to thereby establish a new military and political structure composed of the United States, Japan and South Korea. There is already no room in this structure for Taiwan, which has become a separate object of Chinese-American maneuvers.

The new areas of emphasis in Washington's Asian policy have been approved by the Japanese rulers, who were disturbed by the failure of the American adventure in Indochina. As early as 9 June 1975, the Japanese prime minister announced that American aircraft would be permitted to take off from Japan in the event of a confrontation on the Korean peninsula.<sup>50</sup> On 23 July 1975, Foreign Minister K. Miyazawa made an official visit to Seoul, during the course of which an agreement was concluded on the resumption of economic aid to the South Korean regime and the establishment of bilateral relations, which were extremely strained after Kim Tae-chung, South Korean opposition leader, was kidnapped from Japan by the Seoul secret police.

The central event in the efforts to establish a trilateral "defense" structure in Northeast Asia was the Japanese prime minister's visit to the United States on 5-6 August 1975. The Miki-Ford joint declarations stated that "the security of the Republic of Korea is of the greatest importance for the preservation of peace on the Korean peninsula, which is, in turn, necessary for safeguarding the peace and security of East Asia, including Japan."<sup>51</sup>

If we compare these phrases to the similar statements in the Nixon-Sato communique of November 1969 ("the security of South Korea is of vital importance to the security of Japan"), it is not difficult to see not only the connection between them, but also a definite difference. This difference consists in the fact that the previous rigid interdependence of the fates of Japan and South Korea has been eliminated, but it has been associated with the security of all East Asia and not simply with the security of the entire Korean peninsula. Obviously, this formula was in the interests of all members of the new alliance, since Japan would have wanted a certain degree of freedom of action in relation to its ties with the United States for the "stabilization" of conditions in the region. South Korea could not rely on Japan without American support and pressure, but it needed the political and economic assistance of both nations, while the United States was striving to attach both of its Far Eastern allies to one another and to direct them into the channel of its strategy in Asia, taking the peculiarities of their

interrelations into consideration. An analysis of this document and the practical actions of Washington and Seoul has provided grounds for references to their desire to maintain the status quo in Korea and to reinforce the positions of the South Korean regime.

The planned U.S.-Japanese-South Korean alliance lacked only one element to make it a closed bloc: military ties based on a treaty between Japan and South Korea. It was precisely this that was the focus (in the summer of 1975) of Washington's and Seoul's major efforts. Pak Chong-hui, for example, frankly stated in a NEW YORK TIMES interview that he "had suggested to the Japanese leaders that special relations in the area of defense be established between Japan and South Korea, since both of them are connected by military treaties with the United States."<sup>52</sup>

This was also the purpose of an entire series of political steps taken by the United States, particularly the U.S. secretary of defense's visit to Seoul and Tokyo at the end of August 1975. In explaining the military needs of the South Korean regime, J. Schlesinger made the announcement that the United States "will keep the size of its forces in South Korea on the previous level in the future" and, in the event of a conflict on the Korean peninsula, "will reserve the right to use tactical nuclear weapons."<sup>53</sup> This announcement by one of the top U.S. leaders not only signified a departure from the most important principle of the Nixon Doctrine ("nuclear response" only to intervention by a great power with the use of nuclear weapons), but also represented unconcealed nuclear blackmail. At Schlesinger's talks with M. Sakata, head of the Japan Defense Agency, the two sides agreed that Japan would join the United States in contributing to the safeguarding of South Korean "security" by means of offering the use of its military bases in the event of military action in Korea, as well as by guaranteeing rear support.<sup>54</sup>

During the second half of 1975 and the entire year of 1976, the expansion of ties in various areas within the trilateral alliance was exceptionally rapid.<sup>55</sup>

The Ford Administration did not even consider the question of a new reduction of U.S. armed forces in South Korea and the intensive augmentation of the Seoul regime's military potential continued. It became known that the Pak Chong-hui regime was drawing up a new five-year plan for the modernization of its armed forces, even though the first program (1971-1975) was still far from completion. At the end of 1975, it was reported that the cost of this program would be around 5 billion dollars, and 3 billion was to be obtained in the form of credit and loans from abroad--that is, mainly from the United States and Japan.<sup>56</sup>

The efforts of Washington, Tokyo and Seoul to establish a trilateral alliance in direct proximity to China met with extreme restraint in Peking. This "restraint" was particularly graphically demonstrated during the discussion of the Korean issue at the 30th Session of the UN General

General Assembly. The Chinese representatives, just as in the past, made no reference to the attempts of the United States, Japan and South Korea to establish a military alliance, even though they supported the draft of the resolution of the socialist and neutral countries on Korea. The PRC representative, following the Government of the DPRK, rejected H. Kissinger's proposal to convene a conference of "concerned parties" on Korea in its restricted (the DPRK, the PRC, the United States and South Korea) or more broad composition, stating that the considerable changes in circumstances since the time of the truce made the only practically acceptable move the conclusion of a peace treaty in place of an armistice "by means of consultations between the actual parties concerned in the Korean truce."<sup>57</sup>

During this period, the hypocrisy of the PRC stand on the Korean problem became particularly evident. In confidential talks with the Americans, the Chinese representatives approved of the existence of U.S. troops in South Korea. This was reported, in particular, by Congressmen C. Percy, J. Anderson, P. Mink and others who visited the PRC in August 1975 and January 1976.<sup>58</sup> The WASHINGTON POST, a newspaper closely associated with the State Department, quite frankly stated in this connection: "Calling itself a communist country, China is nonetheless energetically signaling to the United States that it wants American troops to remain in South Korea."<sup>59</sup>

New light was shed on Peking's views on South Korea and the Korean problem by G. Ford's visit to the PRC on 1-5 December 1975. Although no joint announcement was signed, H. Kissinger said at a press conference in Peking on 4 December that the Korean problem had been discussed and added: "Our views are not identical, but they are characterized by understanding and we hope that both sides will continue to display restraint in regard to the Korean peninsula."<sup>60</sup>

Soon after this visit, the Japanese newspaper YOMIURI reported one important detail of the Chinese-American talks. The paper reported the news that during his meeting with G. Ford, Mao Tse-tung suggested to the U.S. President that they exert joint pressure on the governments of the DPRK and South Korea for the purpose of ensuring that they conduct a policy suiting both Peking and Washington. The Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs, in an analysis of this report, said that it was plausible, since it has been reinforced by subsequent statements by American leaders about taking a common stand with the PRC on the Korean issue.<sup>61</sup> The report was also confirmed by South Korean news agencies.

The course taken by the United States in regard to South Korea was reaffirmed in the Pacific Doctrine which was made public by G. Ford in Honolulu on 9 December 1975, immediately after his trip to the PRC and several East Asian countries. It was noteworthy that the last of the five basic elements of the new doctrine (American power as the basis of stable equilibrium in the Asian and Pacific regions; partnership with Japan; the normalization of relations with the PRC; close and friendly ties with other Asian states; the

settlement of political conflicts) was directly connected with Korea. The U.S. President announced: "There is still tension in Korea. We have close ties with the Republic of Korea and we will remain involved in the cause of peace and security on the Korean peninsula, confirming at the same time the presence of our armed forces here."<sup>62</sup> Even then, however, American public opinion was increasingly inclined to recognize the need for a gradual withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from South Korea. E. Reischauer published an article with an appeal that the current obligations of the United States to the Seoul regime be replaced with "more general obligations in respect to peace in this region."<sup>63</sup>

But this idea did not correspond to the goals of the Ford Administration. In any case, this became obvious when the Permanent Council of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK sent a letter at the beginning of 1976 to the parliaments and governments of all nations, requesting them to aid in guaranteeing a lasting peace in Korea and accelerating the unification of the North and South without outside intervention. The letter contained a demand for the dismissal of the "command of the UN Armed Forces" and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea.<sup>64</sup> Washington responded by proposing the old idea of a quadrilateral conference on the Korean problem, and Peking declared in a letter of response from the Permanent Committee of the PRC National People's Congress of 13 March 1976 that it "completely supports the firm and just stand of the DPRK," stressing the fact that "the presence of American troops in South Korea is the greatest obstacle to the accomplishment of independent and peaceful unification of their motherland by the Korean people."<sup>65</sup>

In summing up the results of the short presidency of G. Ford, we can state that his administration's policy represented a specific "defensive reaction" to the defeat of American imperialism in Indochina. This led to a shift in U.S. strategic interests in the Asian and Pacific region to the region of Northeast Asia, in accordance with which Korea began to be regarded as the most important forepost of imperialism in Asia, the preservation of which the United States began to connect with the establishment of a U.S.-Japanese-South Korean military alliance on the basis of previously concluded bilateral allied agreements.

Despite the obvious continuity with the policy of the previous administration, in several important aspects the political course of G. Ford took a step backward in comparison to the Nixon Doctrine. By continuing to give all-round support to the South Korean regime, Washington revealed its desire to make the Korean problem a topic of discussion by a limited group of participants, in which the major role would be played by the United States and the PRC.

#### J. Carter: Promises and Reality

James Carter's move to the White House suggested that changes would be made in the question of American military presence in South Korea, since the new American President had said during his campaign that he was in favor of the withdrawal of American land forces and the removal of tactical nuclear weapons.



Just before the start of the "presidential race," in the beginning of 1976, the Brookings Institution in Washington published a book by renowned expert on Far Eastern affairs Ralph Clough, "Deterrence and Defense in Korea. The Role of American Armed Forces," which was immediately adopted as the "Korean program" of J. Carter. The author of the book felt that it was necessary to allow the United States 2 years or so to "come to its senses" after Indochina, to weigh its strength and capabilities and to take on nothing in Korea that might undermine the faith of the allies in American obligations or give rise to suspicion about the weakening of U.S. influence. After this, according to Clough, the government could consider the removal of nuclear weapons and land forces, but with the retention of the air force--depending on the situation, acting in close cooperation with South Korea and Japan and taking the feelings and views of North Korea into account. The "Clough Plan" envisaged the future complete withdrawal of U.S. troops as a result of the guaranteed relaxation of tension in the relations between the two Korean sides, considerable progress in the negotiations between these sides, recognition of North and South Korea by the four largest powers (the United States, Japan, the USSR and the PRC) and their admission to the United Nations.<sup>66</sup>

In this program, aimed in the final analysis at the separation of Korea in the global interests of American imperialism, the Nixon Doctrine thesis of the gradual withdrawal of land troops was present, but there was also an extremely important new element--the thesis of the primary importance of the withdrawal of nuclear weapons.

Without exaggerating the importance of R. Clough's proposals, we must emphasize the fact that President Carter's first steps were taken precisely in this direction. Here we must remember that they coincided with the period during which relations between Washington and Seoul become cooler due to the bribery of several American legislators by South Korean intelligence agents and the reports published on the surveillance of the South Korean president by American CIA agents.<sup>67</sup>

During Japanese Prime Minister T. Fukuda's visit to Washington on 21-22 March 1977, a joint communique in reference to the withdrawal of American land forces from South Korea stated: "After consultations with the Republic of Korea and Japan, the United States will act in a manner that will not constitute a threat to peace on the Korean peninsula." J. Carter also confirmed that the United States would retain its obligation to defend South Korea.<sup>68</sup>

But it was noteworthy that the Japanese side did not express its views on this announcement, even though the prime minister had declared as early as 14 February 1977 that "the government will not object to the gradual withdrawal of American troops from South Korea if this is done in such a way that it will not disrupt the military equilibrium of the Korean peninsula."<sup>69</sup> Evidently, Japan continued to adhere to its recently occupied stand of non-intervention in the bilateral problem of the United States and South Korea.

The reason for this stand, considering the dissatisfaction in the nation's ruling circles with Carter's plans for Korea, consisted in the fact that "Japan cannot express its opposition, as there is no threat to peace, security and stability in the Far East."<sup>70</sup>

The attention of observers was also drawn to the fact that South Korea was not mentioned this time (in contrast to the joint announcement by Miki and Ford of 1975) in the point agreed upon by the two sides on the "importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula for the security of Japan and the entire Far East."

In May and July 1977, top-level American representatives discussed concrete plans for withdrawal in Tokyo and Seoul.

After the talks in Seoul, the South Korean leaders, as the American press reported, "recognized the inevitability of withdrawal with obvious dissatisfaction" but declared that the removal of U.S. land forces should be compensated for by deliveries of modern weapons for the next 4 or 5 years and an increase in the combat strength of the South Korean Army.<sup>71</sup>

At the same time, American "hawks" in the military and Congress, as well as certain groups in Japan, have recently exerted stronger pressure on the Carter Government. Evidently, one result of this was J. Carter's announcement which hinted at the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons by the United States in Korea.<sup>72</sup>

The results of the American-Japanese-South Korean consultations put an end to the hopes of all those who believed the promises about the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea and the announcements of a desire for the relaxation of tension on the Korean peninsula. It became obvious that the United States will withdraw only 6,000 soldiers by the end of next year and will leave 13,000 servicemen (mainly from the air force) in South Korea after the completion of the 5-year program of reduction. The United States simultaneously intends to increase its military aviation by one-fourth.

If we consider the fact that the United States will simultaneously continue to re-equip the South Korean Army and increase military aid to Seoul dramatically (including by means of the transfer of weapons to the air force and navy), it becomes obvious that this means a significant increase in the combat potential of American-South Korean forces in Korea.

The Carter Administration is still in its first stages. Its first steps, however, have already indicated that his goals in South Korea are the same as those proclaimed in the new Asian policy of R. Nixon: To reduce the "physical presence" of the United States in the interests of the American ruling class and to protect itself against automatic involvement in possible conflicts, particularly nuclear, on the Korean peninsula, but to preserve its main strategic and political positions in South Korea at all costs, since South Korea is the last American forepost located directly on the

Asian continent, the loss of which may have a serious effect on the political orientation of Japan and, in general, on the American presence in all of Northeast Asia.

The steps taken by the new administration of the United States have not in any sense been a solution to the problem, but, rather, a unique camouflage under the guise of half-hearted measures. For example, the removal of nuclear weapons will not eliminate the threat of nuclear war in Korea, since the bases on Okinawa are the same kind of forward nuclear points aimed at Korea, China and the Soviet Union. There have also been signs that the Seoul regime is hungry for nuclear weapons of its own.

Besides this, the withdrawal of U.S. land forces will be accompanied, according to Washington's plans, by the "modernization" of the South Korean Army. It is obvious to everyone that this will begin a new stage in the arms race on the Korean peninsula. It is important to stress the fact that, according to the data of the U.S. Congress, military aid during the last 7 years has more than doubled that of the preceding 16 years and amounted to 6.5 billion dollars in the middle of 1975.<sup>73</sup>

Recently, the WASHINGTON POST reported that the Pentagon has submitted a plan to the Carter Administration on the rendering of additional military aid to the Pak Chong-hui regime for a sum of 8 billion dollars.<sup>74</sup>

The enormous amount of military aid to South Korea is the major means of reinforcing the Pak Chong-hui regime, one of the most rigid and antidemocratic governments in the world. For this reason, no matter what kind of lofty phrases the White House uses in reference to the "defense" of human rights in other countries, the example of South Korea--the United States' ally--eloquently testifies to the fact that the American Government is closing its eyes to the scandalous terror and violence in South Korea for the sake of its own political interests.

With the overt and covert connivance of Washington, the Pak Chong-hui regime elevated the idea of "the augmentation of strength for Korean unification by means of a victory over communism" to the status of a state doctrine; this envisages the acceleration of economic development and the intensive augmentation (with the active assistance of the United States) of South Korean military potential. The DPRK press has justifiably called this aggressive theory a rephrasing of Syngman Rhee's doctrine of Korean unification by means of "a march on the North."

As for the Soviet Union's stand on the Korean problem, for more than 30 years it has remained clear and consistent. It was concisely and cogently reaffirmed in General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev's responses to the questions of the editor-in-chief of the Japanese ASAHI newspaper: "We support the DPRK's proposal on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea and the establishment of favorable conditions for the unification of the nation on the basis of peaceful democratic principles

without any kind of outside intervention." L. I. Brezhnev stated that this view was shared by most of the states belonging to the United Nations.<sup>75</sup>

The position of the DPRK is also a peaceful one, which was reconfirmed in DPRK President Kim Il-sung's interview in the French newspaper LE MONDE.<sup>76</sup> In this interview, he reiterated the proposal that "the Korean problem be solved completely independently and without any kind of foreign intervention" on the basis of "peaceful national unity, surmounting differences in regimes and ideologies." The idea of a confederation of the North and South was proposed as the first practical step in the gradual unification of the country. President Carter's stand on the question of the withdrawal of American troops from Korea was also criticized in this interview as a position which departs more and more from his campaign promises.

Our analysis shows that the situation that has now taken shape around the Korean problem is an extremely complex one. Nonetheless, it provides certain opportunities for a search for acceptable alternatives in the interests of the Korean people and with consideration for the positions of the largest powers in the region--Japan, the United States, the PRC and the USSR.

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## SOME ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF CHINA'S RURAL AREAS IN THE 1970'S

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1977 pp 125-144

[Article by L. A. Volkova, candidate of economic sciences, and V. I. Potapov, candidate of economic sciences]

[Summary] China's rural areas, where more than 80 percent of this country's population lives, have a direct effect on the nationwide economic and political situation. Agriculture is the most important branch of the PRC economy. It provides 70 percent of the raw materials used in light industry and accounts for more than 50 percent of budget revenues, 70 percent of export goods and 40 percent of national income. The agricultural sector is an important source for the accumulation of resources for the development of heavy industry and the rural areas represent a vast sales market for industrial commodities.

The agrarian policy of the Chinese leaders is aimed at political goals as well as economic objectives: the satisfaction of national demand for agricultural goods, the acquisition of resources for the financing of economic construction programs and the maintenance of political stability in rural regions.

The Chinese leaders have chosen different ways of attaining these goals during different stages in the nation's socioeconomic development. During the first 8 years after the founding of the PRC (1950-1957), the Chinese Communist Party instituted several important measures in the rural regions, the chief ones being the agrarian reform and the cooperative movement. These measures played the deciding role in the rapid restoration and development of agriculture. But when the Chinese leaders embarked on their adventurist course called the "Great Leap Forward" in 1958, they led the national economy to the brink of crisis. The "Great Leap" called for a dramatic increase in industrial and agricultural production, but the nation did not have the necessary resources for this and, by 1960, agricultural production had already dropped to the 1952-1953 level.

It took 5 years for agriculture to recover from this. During 1961-1965, the Chinese leaders had to abandon their former plans and provide the peasants



with some kind of material incentive to work. Agricultural production gradually climbed to the 1957 level. But the state of the economy was not good. The standard of living of most peasant families was pitifully low and collective farming had virtually been discredited.

The "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," which began in 1966, considerably aggravated the economic difficulties that had been inherited from the "Great Leap." During this "revolution," it became particularly obvious that the Maoist leaders wished to use the civilian branches of the economy, including agriculture, to build up the defense industry for the purpose of implementing their chauvinistic and nationalistic plans. Since 1970, there has been something of a departure from a few of the negative aspects of Chinese economic policy and more concern is being displayed for the economic problems of the rural areas.

Since the end of 1975, the PRC leaders have been promoting the establishment of Tachai-type communes more enthusiastically. This will make it easier for them to manipulate material and manpower resources within the commune framework and to gain total control over the rural population. Private subsidiary farming is again being allowed to a certain extent. Until the end of 1976 the private plot was called a "breeding-ground for capitalism," but now the Maoists have had to recognize the importance of the private farming sector, which produces 25 percent of the agricultural goods purchased by trade organizations. Despite all of these efforts, the Chinese leaders have not been able to solve the economic problems of the rural population. Their solutions are ineffective and are being resisted more and more by the Chinese peasants.

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## WITH LENIN IN SPIRIT (SCENES FROM THE LIFE OF HO CHI MINH)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1977 pp 145-155

[Article by Ye. V. Kobelev]

[Summary] Many prominent figures in the international communist movement have said that the most memorable day in their lives was the day when they first set foot on Soviet soil. Ho Chi Minh is one of these. He was filled with revolutionary enthusiasm when he came to Soviet Russia in July 1923. His wallet was almost empty and his luggage consisted only of a small bag, but these were unimportant details to the 33-year-old youth who was one of the first Vietnamese to visit the nation where his childhood dreams of liberty, fraternity and equality had come true.

Ho Chi Minh left his native land in 1911, burning with the desire to learn more about the world and work toward the liberation of his motherland from the domination of foreign oppressors and greedy feudal authorities. He traveled for 6 years and then settled in Paris for another 6 years. The year of 1920 was a turning point in the development of his ideological views and political outlook. This was when he read one of Lenin's works for the first time. After that, his fondest wish was to visit Lenin's land and meet with the great man himself.

Several months after Ho arrived in Moscow, V. I. Lenin died. The Vietnamese patriot was grief-stricken by the news and resolved to make a thorough study of everything Lenin had ever written and said about the colonial issue to make up for his disappointment. This was not a simple matter: Only a few of Lenin's works had been translated into foreign languages. Ho spent many long hours poring over these works until he felt that he thoroughly understood Lenin's theories and views on colonialism.

As a Comintern worker, Ho Chi Minh plunged into the very center of Soviet sociopolitical life. He took part in virtually all of the large-scale political measures undertaken in Moscow and spoke at many Soviet workers' mass-meetings. He spoke at the Fifth World Comintern Congress in June 1924, the first communist forum held without the presence and guidance of the founder and leader of the Comintern, V. I. Lenin. He met N. K. Krupskaya

and was amazed by the simplicity, kindness and modesty of this woman he idolized. She spoke to him with sincere sympathy about the unfortunate status of Vietnamese women.

In December 1925, Ho went to Canton, where he did political work with Vietnamese emigrants for 2 years. But he did not sever his ties with Soviet Russia. He regularly sent reports on current events in South China and Indochina to the Soviet news agency and, for the rest of his life, he propagandized the achievements of Lenin's nation and appealed for unification with the Soviet Union in a struggle for peace throughout the world.

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## INITIAL REACTIONS IN CHINA TO TRIUMPH OF GREAT OCTOBER

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1977 pp 156-167

[Article by R. A. Mirovitskaya, candidate of historical sciences]

[Summary] The Great October Socialist Revolution radically changed the course of world events. It inspired the masses to fight for national liberation and social progress, commenced the revolutionary renovation of the world and marked the beginning of mankind's transition to socialism and communism.

On 10 November 1917, the largest Chinese newspapers reported the victory of the Russian Revolution. The Chinese public's ideas about the events in Russia were vague and confused due to several objective and subjective factors, including the peculiarities of the national liberation movement, the state of Chinese public opinion and the nature of the news sources available to the public. The Chinese mass media did not have direct contact with Russia and had to make use of the reports of Western news agencies. Consequently, they reprinted many slanderous and false statements about the Bolsheviks, the measures being taken by the Soviet authorities and the situation on the civil war front. The progressive Chinese public constantly expressed doubts about the validity of these rumors and insisted on the need to send Chinese correspondents to Soviet Russia.

Soon after the revolutionary victory, the Soviet Government took active steps to provide foreign governments and the world public with valid information about Soviet foreign and domestic policy. Foreign correspondents were encouraged to visit the young republic.

The reports of witnesses and participants in the events in Russia represented an important channel of information. China primarily received reports of this kind from Chinese workers who had been returning to their native land through Russia at the time of the revolution. Some Chinese Marxists and communists began to publish journals and newspapers which contained articles on Soviet life. During 1919-1921, the prestige and popularity of the Soviet nation grew in China. The Red Army's victory over the united forces of international and Russian counterrevolution contributed to this process.



Revolutionary groups in China began to abandon their vague ideals of national revival and to concentrate on the need for an anti-imperialist struggle and a mass movement for the liberation of China.

Chinese youth enthusiastically traveled to Russia to work and study there. Courses in the Russian language began to be taught in Shanghai. The growing interest in Soviet Russia also stimulated a desire to study Marxist literature. The Chinese communist movement came into being and sympathy for Soviet Russia became the characteristic distinguishing revolutionary patriots from counterrevolutionary forces in China.

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COMMEMORATING FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF CHINESE PEOPLE'S NATIONAL LIBERATION  
WAR AGAINST THE JAPANESE INVADERS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1977 pp 168-179

[Article by A. S. Titov]

[Summary] Forty years ago, on 7 July 1937, the Japanese imperialists began a lengthy and bloody aggressive war against China. Japan had already seized Manchuria--the richest area in China, several times the size of Japan, with a population of 30 million--in 1931 with the connivance of England, the United States and other capitalist powers. Not satisfied with this huge slice of China, Japan prepared to gain control over the rest of the country as well.

When the Japanese began their new war in 1937, they did not expect China to resist for long. They were certain that the Chinese would surrender within a few months. They had good reason to expect this: The Japanese Army was technically superior to the Chinese, the Chinese central government was weak and did not enjoy nationwide support, and there were many pro-Japanese elements among the top Chinese rulers and generals, with whose assistance Japan hoped to bring the central government to its knees. But the invaders made a fatal error in failing to foresee the possibility of resistance by the multimillion-strong Chinese population. In spite of the heavy losses during the first stage of the war, the Chinese people grew more and more determined to oust the invaders and defend the independence of China.

When the militarists encountered this stubborn resistance, they began to treat the civilian population harshly and cruelly. They pillaged and burned the cities and villages they conquered, raped women and murdered helpless old people, women and children. By means of these monstrous acts, they hoped to frighten the Chinese and prevent national unity. But this was another gross miscalculation. Their evil crimes only escalated the war of resistance.

From the very beginning, the Chinese people's struggle was of an international nature. China was not only fighting for its own liberation, but also in the interests of all progressive mankind. It was fighting against one of the partners in the aggressive bloc. The just war of the Chinese met with the

sympathy and support of the international proletariat, especially the people of the Soviet Union.

The "nonintervention" policy of the English and American governments actually pandered to the aggressors. These governments restricted themselves to hypocritical expressions of sympathy for China and other meaningless diplomatic gestures. Ruling circles in England and the United States made concessions to the Japanese in the hope that they would follow their victory in China with an attack on the USSR. In 1938, Japan received 125 million dollars in American loans and credit to finance Japanese purchases of military equipment and ammunition. English bankers financed Japan's trade operations with Germany and Italy. China, however, did not receive a single cent from the United States or England until 1939.

The Soviet Union condemned the Japanese aggression and encouraged international agencies to take effective measures to curb this aggression and to establish peace in the Far East. Later, the Soviet Union declared war against Japan, crushed its army in Manchuria and forced imperialist Japan to surrender unconditionally. This changed the political and strategic situation in the Far East and created exceptionally favorable conditions for the development of the revolutionary national liberation movement in China. Still later, Manchuria was quickly turned into the main strategic base of the Chinese Revolution with the aid of the USSR and the subsequent struggle which led to the founding of the PRC was also carried out with Soviet aid.

These are the facts that are being ignored by the present Chinese leaders. They are fostering hatred for the USSR--the only great power to give China real support in its darkest hours--and are taking active steps to develop economic, political and even military cooperation with Japan--with the same Japanese militarists who committed crimes in China for so long.

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**CANTON COMMUNE (COMMEMORATING THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ARMED REBELLION IN KWANGCHOW ON 11-13 DECEMBER 1927)**

**Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1977 pp 180-189**

**[Article by T. N. Akatova, candidate of historical sciences]**

**[Summary]** Soviet rule was declared in Canton 50 years ago, on 11 December 1927. This event came to be known as the Canton Commune and has been given an honored place in the history of the Chinese revolutionary movement. The rebellion was organized by the CCP and was carried out under its guidance. The revolutionary workers of Canton were the main force. They were supported by revolutionary-minded soldiers and suburban peasants.

This was a time of severe difficulties for revolutionary democratic forces. The Revolution of 1925-1927 had been brought to a halt by the treacherous Kuomintang leaders. Canton, a city known for its glorious revolutionary traditions, became the site of bloody terrorist actions by the Kuomintang against the Communist Party and revolutionary workers and peasants. Between April and October 1927 alone, 29,430 revolutionaries were killed in China, 31,300 were wounded and 32,000 were arrested. The CCP went underground and began to prepare for the transformation of Canton into a revolutionary base. This was to be a difficult job. The Canton workers did not belong to any single organizations; moreover, their many trade unions were frequently at odds with one another.

The organizational plan for the rebellion envisaged the training and mobilization of three major groups: workers, revolutionary soldiers and the Kwangtung peasantry. The revolutionary spirit of the rebels was quite impressive, but they were poorly armed. There were few rifles or handguns. The fighters made their own grenades out of clay, swords and bamboo spears and even armed themselves with sticks and stones. The work with the soldiers was simplified by the fact that the troops in Canton included underground communists.

The rebellion began in the early hours of 11 December. The rebels, who had vowed to fight to the death, advanced on the police department, the central bank, the post office, the electric power plant, telegraph stations, military



barracks and prisons. More than 2,000 political prisoners were released; they immediately joined the uprising.

On 13 December the militarists entered the city. Armed to the teeth and supported by the imperialists, they were immeasurably stronger than the revolutionaries. The unparalleled heroism and bravery of the rebels could not compensate for their lack of equipment and experience. The rebellion was crushed with unprecedented cruelty. Within a few days, at least 5,700 workers had been shot, hanged or burned alive. The tragic end of the Canton Commune was an important historical lesson. It proved that the CCP had not conducted enough preliminary work with the masses and with revolutionary organizations. The CCP overestimated the extent of internal schism within the Kuomintang and did not expect reactionary forces to gain imperialist support.

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## CHINESE CLASSICAL DRAMA: GENERIC CHARACTERISTICS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1977 pp 190-197

[Article by V. F. Sorokin, candidate of philological sciences]

[Summary] As a literary genre, the drama came into being fairly late in China. Chinese poetry and prose have a history that goes back thousands of years, but the earliest extant Chinese plays were probably written in the beginning of the 13th century. They were written in the south in the last days of the Sung Dynasty and were called *hsi-pen*. Fate was not kind to them: After about 2 centuries, this genre completely disappeared until three plays were discovered by accident in 1920. Shortly after the birth of the *hsi-pen*, another dramatic genre arose in the north of China--the *tsa-chu*. Written in the time of the Yuan Dynasty, these plays came to be called the "Yuan drama." They were regarded as classics and, in some respects, as a standard against which later plays were measured.

The Yuan drama surpassed all preceding literary genres in terms of the diversity and complexity of its plots and the variety of character types presented in these plays. The genre reached the height of its popularity in the second half of the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th. We know of the names of more than 700 *tsa-chu* written during these 2 centuries (there were actually many more), and approximately one-fourth of these are still extant.

The *tsa-chu* represented a synthetic literary form, in which dialogues were combined with performances on stage and singing to musical accompaniment. The genre was indisputably a form of folk art and the more orthodox literary figures in China did not wish to admit the *tsa-chu* to the "hallowed halls of literature" for centuries. It is interesting that the *tsa-chu* have come down to us in a completely finished and developed form. There are no traces of transitional, undeveloped forms. This lends credence to the assertions that the genre was created by a single writer--most probably K'uan Han-ch'ing.

The *tsa-chu* were always written in four acts. The first act was the exposition of the drama. The relationships between some of the characters were revealed and the plot began to unfold. In the second act, the action became

more complex and new characters were introduced. In the third act, the conflict reached its height and there was generally an unexpected reversal of events. This was usually connected with the unexpected appearance of a new character. In the fourth act, all mysteries were solved, all misunderstandings were cleared up, the evil were punished, the innocent were rewarded, the sufferers were avenged, lovers were united--in short, the plot was resolved. This dramatic formula gained such a firm hold that it could not be due simply to formal dramatic rules; it must also reflect the prevailing interpretation of real events.

Dialogues and arias alternated in each play. In most cases, the aria repeated or amplified the ideas expressed in previous dialogues, but with greater eloquence and emotion. In this way, the aria represented something like a lyrical commentary on the action.

The Yuan drama's faithful depiction of human concerns, sufferings and aspirations has guaranteed it a place of honor in the history of Chinese literature and world drama.

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## PROBLEMS OF SECURITY IN INDIAN OCEAN REGION

Moscow PROBLEM DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1977 pp 198-199

[Review by Yu. M. Ryakin of the book "The Indian Ocean; Security Problems" by Devendra Kaushik, translated from the English, general editing and preface by Professor G. P. Kim, Moscow, Progress, 1976, 232 pages]

[Text] The problem of ensuring security in the region of the Indian Ocean is becoming increasingly important and crucial in our day. By now, virtually all of the nations in the world have already expressed their views on this matter in one way or another. This topic was given a great deal of attention at the conferences of the nonaligned states in Lusaka (1970), Algiers (1973) and Colombo (1976). It has been discussed at every session of the UN General Assembly since the 26th session in 1971. The proposal submitted to the United Nations by India, Sri Lanka and several other countries on declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, free of nuclear weapons, the military bases of non-coastal states and so forth, has had great repercussions. The problem of the Indian Ocean has been the subject of many statements in the world press and hundreds of special scientific studies. This is undoubtedly connected with the objective fact that this vast region encompassing the basin of the Indian Ocean is playing a growing role in the development of international relations.

The socioeconomic development of countries in this region and the current tendency toward stronger political and economic cooperation and the overcoming of existing political conflicts and the relative weakness of economic ties constitute important prerequisites for the gradual establishment of this region as an independent political and geographic entity.

Around one-third of the world's population lives in the region of the Indian Ocean. In many of these nations, the national liberation movement has displayed constant growth. These countries have considerable natural resources, supplies of which are being depended on to an increasing degree by the industrially developed capitalist countries (suffice it to say that more than 65 percent of the oil reserves of the entire capitalist world are located in the region of the Persian Gulf and around half of all oil production takes place here). Finally, the most important shipping channels pass through the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean is the transportation artery which,



along with the Trans-Siberian Railway, connects the Eastern and Western parts of the Soviet Union.

Unfortunately, Soviet literature still does not include any monographic studies on the problem of the Indian Ocean. This makes it all the more important that a Russian translation has been published of a book by D. Kaushik, renowned researcher of international relations in Asia and progressive public figure in India.

In this work, D. Kaushik basically considers the problem of the security of the Indian Ocean as part of the struggle of the Asian people for detente and peace. The author defines his study as an attempt "to trace the recent events occurring in the Indian Ocean zone which are related to questions of security in this region" (pp 18-19). In addition to this general goal, the author has also set himself the task of describing the "true state of affairs" in the Indian Ocean zone, since most of the vast quantity of foreign literature on this topic "is intended to justify various actions taken by the Western powers in the Indian Ocean and misrepresents the policy of the Soviet Union and the peace-loving Afro-Asian countries" (p 18). In this connection, we should mention D. Kaushik's attempt to deliver a logical rebuff to the allegations being spread by imperialist propaganda about some kind of "Soviet naval threat" to the security of the Afro-Asian countries which is simply a rephrasing, in the "spirit of the times," of the myth concocted in the 19th century by English imperialism about the "Russian threat" to South Asia. The reworking of this myth is supposed to serve as a propagandistic cover for the growing military and political penetration of the Indian Ocean by the Western powers.

In view of the author's goals, his desire to thoroughly analyze the growing military and political activity of the Western powers in the Indian Ocean zone during the 1970's is completely understandable. D. Kaushik asserts that the United States has already enlarged the zone of operations of its 7th Fleet in the Indian Ocean. While at the beginning of the 1960's the United States had a communications system in the Indian Ocean zone that was adequate for short-range naval and air force operations, it is now turning its base on the island of Diego Garcia into a large military complex for the conduct of combat operations on a broad scale. Regarding the installation of military bases as the major element in its permanent military presence, the Pentagon has set up a broad bow-shaped network of naval and air-force bases (from Japan to Australia and through the Indian Ocean to Southern Africa and the Persian Gulf). Besides this, the United States maintains a close military and political partnership with Australia and New Zealand in the Indian Ocean and makes use of its allies in various types of aggressive blocs and groups for the execution of its own plans. D. Kaushik notes that England has definitely "not given up its desire to remain in the Indian Ocean" (p 45). On the contrary, it has become more active in the Western part of this zone. In accordance with the Simonstown Agreement (1970), it regularly conducts joint maneuvers with the naval forces of South Africa. At the same time, England is trying to revive SENTO, directing the attention

of this organization to the need to combat the national liberation movement in the south of the Arabian peninsula. France is constantly augmenting its military presence in the Indian Ocean. In November 1972, a NATO Assembly adopted a resolution to extend the sphere of the aggressive actions of this bloc to vast regions of the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean.

Imperialist forces are concentrating mainly on safeguarding their own, quite substantial economic interests in this part of the world by any means possible. Some idea of the magnitude of these interests can be gained from the following statistics: The United States, for example, has invested around 2 billion dollars in the petroleum industry in the Persian Gulf; the profits annually squeezed out of this region by American monopolies amount to more than 1.5 billion dollars. American capital investments have also been substantial in other countries and regions located along the perimeter of the Indian Ocean. D. Kaushik notes that American capital investments in Malaysia amount to 200 million dollars; in 1970, American capital investments in various enterprises of the mining, timber, fish, sugar, oil-refining and processing industries of Indonesia, as well as in the construction of roads and ports, amounted to 600 million dollars. A special position is occupied by South Africa: American capital investments here increased from 467 million dollars in 1964 to 692 million dollars in 1969 (pp 61-62).

The factor of "economic interest" is an important reason, but not the only reason, for imperialism's growing military and political activity in the Indian Ocean zone. The Pentagon regards the augmentation of its military strength in the Indian Ocean as a good opportunity to exert pressure on the United States' opponents, including the Soviet Union, by establishing a threat to their territories or shipping lanes on the part of American naval and air force units equipped with nuclear missiles. Besides this, according to the calculations of American strategists, the very existence of permanent U.S. military presence in the region should have a "reassuring" effect on America's allies and on local reactionary and pro-imperialist circles. The notorious "gun boat diplomacy" still occupies an important place among the political means and methods of imperialism. The Pentagon has taken on the function of a policeman in this part of the world and is trying to suppress the national liberation movement. As the author points out, the United States' interest "in remote islands and Australia envisages...punitive actions against the national liberation movement in various parts of Asia and Africa and against disobedient countries which have tried to prevent the deliberate exploitation of the natural resources of this region" (p 64).

D. Kaushik states that military penetration of the Indian Ocean region by such nations as Japan and China will be quite probable in the near future. The author comes to the sound conclusion that "both China and Japan are striving to take their place among the world's largest naval powers during the next decade, and they may encroach upon the Indian Ocean. Their appearance in the Indian Ocean with the approval or the assistance of the United States will indisputably add new facets to the problem of security in this region" (p 81).

D. Kaushik devotes a great deal of space to an analysis of the Soviet Union's stand on the issue of the Indian Ocean, logically examining it within the framework of the Soviet proposal on the creation of a system of collective security in Asia. The USSR's views on the Indian Ocean problem were set forth in detail by L. I. Brezhnev in his speech at the 25th CPSU Congress. The Soviet Union, which has always supported the proposal to establish a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, stresses the fact that the dismantling of foreign military bases, which represent the main element of permanent military presence, will be of the greatest importance in the resolution of this problem. The USSR feels that the struggle to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace is working in the same direction as the Soviet initiative on the safeguarding of peace and security in Asia by means of concerted effort by the nations of this continent.

The problem of the Indian Ocean is one of the important and complex problems in contemporary international relations requiring thorough investigation. In this connection, we must agree with Professor G. F. Kim, the author of the preface to D. Kaushik's book, who says that this book represents "an important contribution to the comprehension of the problem of collective security in the Indian Ocean zone" (p 17).

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## PAST AND PRESENT OF BURMESE PEOPLE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1977 pp 200-202

[Review by Yu. N. Gavrilov, doctor of historical sciences, of the book "Notes on the Political Life of Burma, 1962-1971," by Thakin Chit Maung, Moscow, Progress, 1976, 294 pages]

[Text] On 4 January 1978, Burma will celebrate the 30th anniversary of its independence. The last 30 years have been difficult for the Burmese people. Years went by before the nation was able to completely enjoy the results of its hard-won independence. Only the Revolutionary Council formed in 1962, which was made up of representatives of the patriotic officer corps, active participants in the anticolonial struggle and advocates of progressive socioeconomic development, began to carry out reforms to strengthen the state and the national economy. As a result, under the guidance of the Revolutionary Council serious changes took place in the nation and provided new opportunities for Burma's advancement along the path of noncapitalist development. At present, there are no foreign enterprises in Burma and the property of large landowners and feudal lords has been expropriated. The nationalization of the basic means of production has also been accomplished in Burma. The state has control over the banks, foreign trade, railway and air transport, the petroleum industry, mining and power engineering. In the area of foreign policy, Burma adheres strictly to a policy of positive neutrality and favors the peaceful settlement of all disputes in international relations. The Union of Burma's friendly political, economic and cultural ties with our nation and with the other socialist states are constantly being developed. Burma's independent foreign policy, which is based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and is aimed at the development of friendly relations with all nations in the world, has met with the understanding and support of the Soviet people.

Direct cooperation between Soviet and Burmese social scientists began in 1955. Since that time, works by Burmese authors have regularly been translated into Russian.<sup>1</sup>

1. See Aung San, "The Burmese Challenge. Articles and Speeches," Moscow, 1965; Ne Win, "Burma on a New Path," Moscow, 1965; "Pidota--Novaya Birma" [Pyidawtha--The New Burma], Moscow, 1965; Do Mya Thin, "The Question of Land-Ownership in Burma," Moscow, 1961; Thakin Lwin, "The History of the Burmese Workers' Movement," Moscow, 1972.



Each publication of this kind gives us a better understanding of different aspects of public life in friendly Burma and is greeted with pleasure by specialists as well as by all Soviet readers displaying an interest in the current problems in the development of the liberated countries in the East. All of this applies completely to the book by Thakin Chit Maung which is being reviewed in this article.

The author is a prominent political figure in Burma, an active participant in the struggle for the attainment and consolidation of the nation's independence and the struggle for world peace, and one of the administrators of the Burma Society for Friendship and Cultural Ties with the Soviet Union.

In 1930, at the age of 15, Thakin Chit Maung joined the national patriotic organization "Do Bama Asi-ayon" ("Our Burma"). Since that time, he has been an active fighter for the independence of his nation and for the interests of the working people, especially the peasants; for many years, he headed the All-Burma Peasants Organization.

In 1950, Thakin Chit Maung and his followers founded the Burma Workers Party (BWP) as a sign of protest against the antihumanitarian and pro-imperialist policy of the U Nu Government and the right-wing socialist leaders supporting this government. The party program stated that it recognized scientific socialism as its ideology and had the goal of constructing socialism in Burma by peaceful means. The BWP initiated the unification of leftist legal political forces and headed the National United Front formed in 1956, which united around 100,000 individuals.

In December 1952, a uniting congress of the two legal leftist parties in Burma--the Burma Workers Party and the Party of People's Comrades--was held in Rangoon. The United Workers Party of Burma was founded and its ideological basis was declared to be Marxism-Leninism. Thakin Chit Maung was elected the chairman of the new party. The party expressed support for the political declaration of the Revolutionary Council, "The Burmese Way to Socialism."

Thakin Chit Maung has written several books on the history of Burma and its political, economic and social problems. His latest work, consisting of three sections--on history, economics and politics--has been translated into Russian.

Thakin Chit Maung is the first Burmese author to attempt to analyze the history of feudal and colonial Burma from a materialistic standpoint and to disclose the reasons for the decline and fall of the United Burmese State which was unable to withstand the English conquerors. He also uses the highly productive method of studying colonial Burma in its interrelationship with the history of India and the neighboring nations in Southeast Asia. This has made it possible for the author to present interesting comparisons and contrasts in the political, economic and social lives of neighboring nations.

A large part of the book is devoted to the struggle for national independence and, in particular, to the revolutionary activity of Aung San, famous son of the Burmese people. The author places a high value on the role played by Aung San in the struggle for national independence, the governmental unification of the nation and the determination of the basic guidelines for truly separate and independent development and expresses regret over the fierce struggle for political power that was waged by different groups in Burma after the tragic death of Aung San. During the course of this struggle, the chief enemy of Burmese independence--imperialism--was ignored, which greatly harmed national interests and placed a heavy burden on the shoulders of the Burmese people.

In disclosing the factors which made it possible for the Burmese bourgeoisie to conduct an antihumanitarian policy, Thakin Chit Maung correctly points out the fact that an important role in this was played by the lack of unity of the progressive forces favoring the socialist course of development.

The basic conclusion drawn in this section is that the future of Burma is connected with socialism, as Aung San repeatedly declared. Thakin Chit Maung focuses the reader's attention on the imperialists' constant plots against the people of the liberated nations. "Imperialism uses economic and military agreements in its own interest, organizes military blocs and bases for its own goals and even resorts to overt aggression if it sees that a nation has chosen the path toward socialism and is carefully following this path.

"For this reason, the people of the young, recently liberated states must do everything in their power to preserve and reinforce national unity in the interest of struggle against their chief enemy" (p 49).

A long section in the book is devoted to the national question--one of the most complex internal problems in the majority of the young sovereign states. In Burma this problem is complicated by the fact that most of the ethnic minorities (there are 67 nationalities and ethnic groups in Burma with more than 130 languages and dialects; the Burmese proper constitute approximately half of the population) live in the mountains and outlying districts and are more backward economically than the Burmese proper, from whom they are distinguished by many of their own traditions, customs and cultural standards. All of this requires great caution and farsightedness in the resolution of the national problem. Thakin Chit Maung believes that Burma can make use of the experience of the socialist nations, particularly the Soviet Union, in solving this problem.

The two main parts of the section on economics are the criticism of the economic policy of the U Nu Government and the positive analysis of the economic measures of President Ne Win's Government. On the basis of abundant factual material, most of which is being made available to the Soviet readers for the first time, Thakin Chit Maung proves that although the U Nu Government used socialist slogans for demagogic purposes, "Burmese economic and

social life remained ensnared by remnants of colonialism and the fetters of feudal-landowner exploitation." Besides this, the influence of foreign capital increased considerably during the years when the U Nu Government was in power.

Pointing out the positive nature of the measures carried out by the Revolutionary Council, which undermined the positions of English, French and other foreign capital in the national economy, as well as the positions of large national and local capital, Thakin Chit Maung also directs the reader's attention to the quite severe economic difficulties experienced by Burma. The author sees the reasons for these difficulties in the following: The agrarian reform has never been completely carried out, priority is given to the service sphere rather than to the production sphere, foreign trade objectives are vague, excessively broad and premature nationalization has been carried out in the area of domestic trade, the cooperative movement in urban and rural areas has not been given the necessary attention and the government has not been firm enough in the struggle against inefficiency and economic mismanagement.

The Soviet reader will undoubtedly be interested in Thakin Chit Maung's list of the tasks being performed during the present stage in the development of the Burmese revolution: the elimination of man's exploitation of other men; the demolition of the old social structure of the semifeudal-colonial type; and the establishment of the political authority of workers and peasants, the entire laboring public. The author also presents his own definition of socialist democracy: "Socialist democracy is based on the political authority of the laboring public--workers, peasants and the technical and creative intelligentsia--who decisively reject the bourgeois-landowner course of development in the construction of a socialist state. Socialist democracy presupposes the genuine democracy of all of the working people, the majority of the population, and the liquidation of the political power of capitalists and landowners."

For the first time in Burmese scientific-political literature, Thakin Chit Maung attempts to present a thorough analysis of the activities of the national democratic government which took power in March 1962. He gives a positive evaluation to the policy documents of the revolutionary democrats and describes the measures instituted by them as "the beginning of the underdeveloped nation's departure from the capitalist course to socialism."

The author devotes a great deal of attention to the political reforms of the revolutionary democrats and the establishment of their leading political organization--the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP).

The organizational establishment of the BSPP, which took place at a time of fierce political struggle between the advocates and opponents of non-capitalist development, dragged on for 9 years. Its first congress was held in 1971. The second party congress (1973) stipulated that the party would play the leading role in Burmese society. The draft of the new

constitution was also ratified at this congress and was then approved by 90 percent of the vote in a national referendum.

The adoption of the new constitution and the establishment of elected organs of state power on its basis (at the beginning of 1974) represented an important step in the democratization of the current regime. Although the army still played an important role, the presence of elected organs of state power--the People's Congress and local people's councils--has introduced a qualitative change into the system of state administration.

The role of the BSPP as the ruling political party has become much more significant in the new state power structure. According to established practice, important political decisions are first discussed and adopted at plenums of the BSPP Central Organizing Committee and are then submitted to the People's Congress for discussion and approval. District and regional committees of the BSPP, elected by the democratic method at the corresponding party conferences, are taken a more active part in the resolution of local problems.

Thakin Chit Maung points out the fact that the BSPP is still not relying enough on mass organizations in its practical activity and that the party itself, despite the fact that its influence in the political life of the nation has increased considerably, is still not a vanguard revolutionary party. This party, with its 170,000 members and 870,000 candidates for membership, still has many passive and uninvolved persons in its ranks who joined it for selfish purposes.

The author feels that a cardinal problem of the present stage in national development is the need to strengthen the worker-peasant alliance. An alliance between the workers and the peasants, the author stresses in the book, can be established during the course of their joint struggle against "the reactionary alliance between the bourgeoisie and the feudal landowners" and their "strong external allied--imperialism"; this alliance between workers and peasants takes shape during their joint struggle against the authority of the bourgeoisie and the landowners and for the establishment of "their own political revolutionary authority"; the alliance between the working class and the peasantry can be truly lasting if it is based on the planned and proportional development of the economy and if the international solidarity of the workers of the entire world is established and reinforced. Thakin Chit Maung calls for the reinforcement of the international solidarity of workers of all nations.

Thakin Chit Maung's book will give the Soviet reader a better understanding of the great achievements of the Burmese revolution as well as the complex problems in its development. In this way, it will contribute to the development of mutual understanding and friendship between our countries.



## TWO DESTINIES OF UIGHUR PEOPLE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1977 pp 202-205

[Review by A. A. Valitova, candidate of philological sciences, of the book "Vozrozhdeniyy uygurskiy narod" (The Reborn Uighur People) by M. Ruziyev, Alma-Ata, 1976, 212 pages]

[Text] In this year marking the 60th anniversary of Great October, all of the peoples of our nation are summing up the results of their progressive development along the socialist path. The historic destinies of the Uighur people and the distinctive features of their political, socioeconomic and cultural development have been the subject of many years of research by Mashur Ruziyev, old communist, participant in the struggle for the national liberation of the Sinkiang people, journalist and historian. The publication of his book "Vozrozhdeniyy uygurskiy narod" was essentially the result of all of his scientific and journalistic activity, in which he combined the study of historical literature, archives and press reports with his own personal observations. As a careful researcher and passionate journalist, he examines the history of his people from a standpoint of party conviction and organic involvement in the destiny of the Uighurs.

The author of the work being reviewed has an excellent grasp of the difficulties involved in a thorough exposition of the centuries-long cultural and historical process of Uighur development in the past and during the Soviet period. He set himself two major goals in this work: an exposition of the basic stages in the history of the Uighurs and a description of the life of the Soviet Uighurs after the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The composition of the book also conforms to these goals: The first section is entitled "Historical Information About the Uighurs" and the second is called "The Uighurs in the USSR." This composition is completely justified by logical and historical considerations, as it gives the author an opportunity to use abundant factual material to demonstrate the vast difference between the destinies of the Soviet and Sinkiang Uighurs and the superiority of the Marxist-Leninist solution to the national problem in the USSR, a solution in the fundamental interests of the working masses.

In the first part of the book, the author traces the process of the historical formation of the Uighur people in Central Asia--on the Orkhon River and

in East Turkestan (which the Ch'ings renamed Sinkiang after they conquered this territory). As we know, the Uighurs were one of the most ancient Turkic-speaking peoples of Central Asia who created a rich and original material and spiritual culture. Many orientologists have commented on their highly developed culture. Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. Yu. Yakubovskiy wrote the following about the Uighurs: "They turned to a settled life of agricultural labor earlier than the other Turkic peoples, made the break with shamanism earlier than the others, adopting Manicheism at first and then Buddhism as well, developed a written language of their own earlier than the others and became the most cultured of the races living between China and Transoxania."<sup>\*</sup>

The Uighur people repeatedly established and reestablished their own state system, which remained in existence for several centuries. The author of the book presents a logical system for classifying the stages in its development: the Uighur Principality on the Orkhon in the 8th-9th centuries (pp 17-23), the Karakhanid State of the 10th-12th centuries (pp 24-27), the Uighur Turfan State of the 10th-14th centuries (pp 24-36), the Kashgar Khanate and the Ili Sultanate of the second half of the 19th century (pp 50-69). The significant amount of experience accumulated in state administration by the Uighur medieval civilization was put to use in the Mongol empire and in the Chagatay settlement, where Uighurs served as civil servants, advisers, treasurers and scribes (bitikchi and bakhshi). From these Uighurs, the nomadic races learned the skills and methods of organizing state affairs.

The author stresses the fact that the development of an original written language was one of the great cultural achievements of the Uighur people. This system of writing spread through Central Asia and the area now known as Soviet Central Asia (where it virtually replaced the Arabic alphabet). A variant of the Uighur system of writing, which was also adopted by the Mongols, remained in existence until the introduction of the new alphabet. From the Mongols, the Uighur alphabet passed to the Manchurians. Therefore, the contribution of the Uighurs to Oriental culture was quite significant.

The author has been able to present a succinct and generally accurate summarization of all available material on the lengthy process of Uighur development and to describe the different forms of economic management, historically determined social institutions, material and spiritual cultures and socio-economic relations in Uighur society during different periods in history.

The author devotes a great deal of attention to an analysis of the national liberation struggle of the Uighurs against the Ch'ing dynasty (the rebellion of 1765 in Uch-Turfan, the rebellion of Djihangira-Hadji of 1825-1828, etc.). A special chapter discusses the national liberation movement of the Uighurs

\* A. Yu. Yakubovskiy, "Arabic and Persian Sources on the Uighur-Turfan Principality of the 9th-10th Centuries," in the book: "Trudy Otdela istorii, kul'tury i iskusstva Vostoka Gosudarstvennogo Ermitazha" [Studies of the State Hermitage Section on Oriental History, Culture and Art], vol IV, Leningrad, 1947, pp 423-424.

during the second half of the 19th century and the formation of the Kashgar Khanate and the Ili Sultanate. Here the author devotes particular attention to the rebellion of Yakub-beg in 1864 and subsequent events, as well as the independence movement of the Ili Uighurs and the establishment of the Ili Sultanate.

M. Ruziyev discloses the causes giving rise to an exceptionally important event in history—the migration of the Ili Uighurs in 1881-1884 to Semirech'ye on Russian territory (pp 69-80). The author correctly notes that the immediate reason for the migration was the Ch'ing military commanders' traditional practice of harsh reprisals against Uighur rebels and the population. One of the Uighur petitions cited in the book attests to this (p 71): "When we heard that Kuldja was being turned over to the Chinese, we were seized by terror and alarm. We do not want to remain under Chinese dominion and we request the Russian tsar to accept us as his subjects."

The Ch'ing government did not wish to lose such fine farmers and craftsmen as the Ili Uighurs and Dungans. It therefore declared amnesty for those who had taken part in the rebellion and turned to the population of the Ili territory, asking them to remain in their old place of residence and continue their farming. "Most of the population did not pay attention to these appeals," M. Ruziyev stresses, "and persistently tried to move to Russia. There is no question that it was not an easy matter to leave their native land and their homes, but their fear of the Ch'ing regime dictated this choice."

In discussing the reasons for the move, the author correctly states that, "during the 10 years of the Russian protectorate, the Uighurs had an opportunity to compare the treatment they had received at the hands of the Russians and Chinese and were able to witness many things. For example, while representatives to local organs from the native population had previously been appointed from above, under Russian rule they were elected by the population itself.

"The disputes of the Iliis were settled by the Russian authorities. Conditions were gradually established for the development of the economy and trade. Taxes were reduced and several feudal obligations were canceled. New roads, bridges and buildings were constructed. A hospital was opened in Kuldja and medical assistance was given to the population. In comparison to the terroristic regime of the Ch'ings, all of this was a tremendous step forward" (p 71).

Naturally, even after the Uighurs had moved to Semirech'ye, the life of the working strata of the Uighur population, which were the victims of double oppression—purely feudal oppression and the oppression of the tsarist administrative bureaucracy—was extremely difficult. The purifying storm of the October Revolution released the Uighur workers from this yoke.

In the second part of the book ("The Uighurs in the USSR"), M. Ruziyev describes the basic stages in the development of the Soviet Uighurs: the period of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Civil War (pp 121-145), the period of socialist construction (pp 146-162), the Great Patriotic

War of 1941-1945 (pp 163-172) and the postwar period (pp 173-187). This generally accepted system for classifying the stages in the history of all of the peoples in the Soviet Union is completely applicable to the Uighurs, as it reveals the common features in the development of the Uighur people and the development of all Soviet peoples in the process of the formation of the Uighur socialist nationality and the construction of socialism and communism.

The author discloses the leading role played in this process by the Russian people, primarily the working class, and the assistance given to the Uighurs by other peoples--the Kazakhs and Uzbeks. This great military, political, economic and cultural assistance, which was based on principles of proletarian internationalism, ultimately liquidated the horrifying backwardness of the national districts and equalized the levels of development of the Central Asian territories (including those populated by the Uighurs) and the more developed regions of the nation.

The central position in this study is occupied by a description of current processes in the economics, politics and culture of the Soviet Uighurs.

The book being reviewed gives the reader an understanding of the triumph of the Leninist doctrine on the courses for the development of previously backward nations and nationalities, using the destiny of the Soviet Uighurs as an example, and contains a concrete historical analysis of abundant factual material, on the basis of which the author repudiates the pseudoscientific flights of fancy and antihistorical falsifications of the ideologists of Maoism in regard to the status of the Uighurs and other peoples in the USSR. In the Soviet Union, conditions have been created for the first time in history which allow each national group, including the Uighurs, to not only follow its own national traditions, but also make use of all the best and most progressive from the political, economic and cultural experience of the fraternal peoples.

Special chapters discuss the spiritual culture of the Uighur people: "The Uighur Culture from Antiquity to the Great October Socialist Revolution" (pp 96-120) and "The Culture of the Soviet Uighurs" (pp 188-207).

These chapters present a particularly graphic and impressive description of the rich culture established in the past by the Uighur people, of the way in which cultural monuments and treasures began to disappear and be destroyed during the period of the harsh Ch'ing regime and of the brilliant ascent of the science, culture, art and literature of the Soviet Uighurs during the present stage, during the period leading up to the 60th anniversary of Great October.

This ascent and the rebirth of the Soviet Uighurs are particularly striking in comparison to the extinction of the Uighur culture in Sinkiang, which is being destroyed by the great-Han nationalist policy of Peking.



While we are underscoring the merits of this book, we must also point out some omissions. Although the author correctly emphasizes the role played by Soviet scientists in the study of the Uighur history, literature and language, his list of experts on Uighur affairs (p 193) does not include such honored scientists as V. V. Bartol'd, A. Yu. Yakubovskiy, Ye. E. Bertel's, A. K. Borovkov, K. Usmanov, Z. Bashiri and E. R. Tenishev, who have made a significant contribution to the study of the Uighur people. Finally, special mention should have been made of prominent historian T. R. Rakhimov, whose works on the history and language of the Uighurs played a significant role in the establishment and development of the Soviet Uighur culture: He was one of the first Uighur poets and his verses were printed in the earliest collections of poetry of the 1930's—"The Rays of Dawn," "The Flame of Liberation" and "The Sparks of Revolution"; in the 1940's, he was the organizer and editor-in-chief of the Uighur sociopolitical and literary journal SHARK KHAKIKATI ("The Pravda' of the East") in Tashkent and trained many scientific pedagogues of the Uighur nationality as well as Russian experts on Uighur affairs.

The author should also have taken greater care to spell proper names, place names and the names of historical works in accordance with the standards that have been adopted and have become traditional in Soviet orientology.

In writing his description of the Karakhanid State and its culture in the part of the book dealing with Uighur history, the author should have used the corresponding section written by A. Yu. Yakubovskiy and printed in "Istoriya narodov Uzbekistana" [The History of the Peoples of Uzbekistan] (vol 1, Tashkent, 1947) as a guide. This would have made it possible for him to evaluate these events more precisely. After all, the Karakhanid State, which took shape on the territory of East Turkestan and part of Central Asia (with three capitals in the cities of Balasagun, Kashgar and Urgen), was the joint creation of the people of Central Asia and their genetic relatives, the Kashgar Uighurs. During the Karakhanid stage and subsequent periods, the cities of Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan were large cultural centers of the Moslem East and had close contact with Central Asian cities.

On the whole, however, the book being reviewed is a useful and necessary publication which will be of indisputable interest to the scientific community and to the general Soviet public.

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## SERIOUS STUDY OF ANCIENT CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1977 pp 205-208

[Review by M. L. Titarenko, candidate of philosophical sciences, of the book "Filosofskiye i obshchestvenno-politicheskiye vzglyady Syun'-tzy. Issledovaniye i perevod" (The Philosophical and Sociopolitical Views of Hsun-tzu. Analysis and Translation) by V. F. Feoktistov, Nauka, Moscow, 1976, 293 pages]

[Summary] In recent years, more and more books have been published on the history of Chinese culture and philosophy. The history of Chinese philosophical thought has been expounded in several general works on philosophy and the ancient Chinese classics of philosophical and political thought have been translated. During the last few years, several fundamental works on modern and contemporary ideology have been written. Most of the studies of the last 10 years by Soviet Sinologists and specialists on philosophy and history have been critical analyses of the Maoist ideology.

One of the most noteworthy recent publications is V. F. Feoktistov's book on the philosophical and sociopolitical views of Hsun-tzu. Hsun-tzu was one of ancient China's greatest thinkers and was one of the last of the renowned philosophers of the "hundred schools of thought." His work marks the culmination point of the classical stage in the development of Confucianism in China, but his ideas go far beyond the rigid framework of Confucius' ethical and political doctrine.

The views and teachings of Hsun-tzu are of a complex and sometimes contradictory nature. His ideas were a synthesis of the teachings of many schools. Representatives of orthodox Confucianism called him a "heretic" who "perverted the teachings of Confucius." Although Hsun-tzu borrowed many ideas from different schools, he always referred to these schools in contemptuous tones and was quite critical of all of his predecessors and contemporaries. All of this reduced his stature in the eyes of other philosophers of that time and his works did not regain popularity until more than a thousand years later.

V. F. Peoktistov's book consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion and an appendix containing translations of excerpts from Tsun-tzu's major works, a scientific analysis of these excerpts and a complete bibliography. This attests to the author's solid and fundamental approach to his subject.

The author set himself the goal of analyzing all of Hsun-tzu's philosophical and sociopolitical ideas as a specific system of views occupying a special place in the history of Chinese philosophy, demonstrating the connections between this thinker's views with previous and contemporary currents of philosophical and sociopolitical thought in China, disclosing the class essence of Hsun-tzu's teachings, his sociopolitical outlook and his attitudes toward traditional Confucian doctrine and demonstrating Hsun-tzu's influence on the later development of Chinese philosophy and political thought.

Despite a certain tendency toward sketchy description and oversimplified analysis, the author has written a serious and fundamental work which will fill a gap in Soviet Sinology.

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## ANATOMY OF MAOIST POWER

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1977 pp 206-210

[Review by G. S. Ostroumov, candidate of juridical sciences, of the book "Politicheskii mekhanizm Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki" (The Political Machinery of the People's Republic of China) by L. N. Gudoshnikov, Moscow, 1974, 208 pages]

[Text] One of the major means of understanding the social processes occurring in modern China and making sound judgments about its future consists in a study of the social nature and evolution of the present system of political power in the PRC. During the last 15 years, this kind of study has been extremely difficult due to the insufficiency of official data on the development of the nation and even on what would seem to be the simplest norms of its everyday life.

Under these conditions, one of the most productive areas for the investigation of the nature of power could be an analysis of the machinery by means of which it is executed. What does this machinery actually represent? What are its "physical appendages," its methods of activity and its interrelationship with social groups, the masses and individual citizens? The search for answers to these questions provides a concrete idea of sociopolitical realities and the prospects for changes in them. The theoretical and methodological basis for this kind of approach to the study of power can be found in the classic works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin on the special role played by the machinery of state in the life of society and on the collapse of the old, exploitative system and the establishment of a new, socialist governmental system.

One of the most outstanding and complete works pertaining to this subject is the one written by Doctor of Juridical Sciences L. N. Gudoshnikov, who has been studying the Chinese state structure for more than 25 years. It is interesting that the latest events and tendencies in Chinese political life have corroborated several of the conclusions and proposals advanced in the work being reviewed. For example, the author's predictions in regard to possible changes in the political machinery of the nation, made in connection with the preparations in 1970-1974 for a revision, and essentially the abolition, of the Chinese Constitution of 1954, have by and large been corroborated.



And this has not been a coincidence: The author's judgments and estimates have usually been based on a political and judicial analysis of a substantial amount of factual and scientific material accumulated by Soviet and foreign researchers.

L. M. Gudoshnikov traces the establishment, development and anomalies of the political machinery of the PRC during four important periods: the period of reconstruction (1949-1952), the First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957), the "Great Leap Forward" and the period required for overcoming its consequences (1958-1965), and the "Cultural Revolution" and subsequent years.

The author describes the special and decisive role played by the army in the creation of a system of state organs during the first 5 years after the revolution. The army traditions that took hold in the liberated regions were later echoed in the structure and operational methods of the central and local organs of power. The author's comparison of the legal and actual status of the civil and military administrations, which functioned on a seemingly parallel basis with the latter prevailing, is quite interesting. His indication of some of the traditions of the underground era which were retained by the CCP organizations under new conditions is also interesting. The practice of combining party, administrative and military posts on the most varied levels, the abundance of emergency punitive organs and the extensive repressive campaigns--all of this was naturally not only due to a deeply entrenched respect for past experience, but also, in great part, to the truly acute nature of the class struggle during the first years after the revolution.

As the new regime grew stronger and its counterrevolutionary resistance was overcome, the need for stage-by-stage democratization in the entire political system, the author notes, became increasingly apparent. This was the purpose, in particular, of the campaigns to combat military methods of administration, unadorned bureaucracy and excessive reliance on orders and decrees. The analysis and assimilation of the Soviet experience in state construction played an important role in the establishment of socialist democratic forms in the nation.

The adoption of the Constitution of the PRC in 1954 is described in the book as an important step in the nation's progressive development. The pages devoted to this topic are of indisputable interest, even though they naturally cannot present a complete account of the significant history of the compilation of this important political document and the struggle for its implementation. In general, the basic law of the republic was extremely successful in combining many facets of the Chinese experience with the creatively adapted experience of the Soviet Union and other popular democracies. Unfortunately, the author was only able to provide a fairly sketchy description of the positive and, to a great extent, genuinely innovative practices which were engendered by the process of constitutional legislation. And this is apparently no coincidence. The existing democratic potential lying at the basis of the Constitution of the PRC was never revealed on a broad enough scale. Too many people regarded it as only a matter of decorum. L. M. Gudoshnikov cites many facts attesting to departures from the premises of the basic law by the CCP leaders, especially Mao Tse-tung.

The author justifiably pays a great deal of attention to the way in which the question of socialist legality was raised at the Eighth CCP Congress. On the whole, the congress demonstrated the mature conviction of most of the CCP leaders that "it is becoming absolutely necessary to have complete legality" (Accountability Report of the CCP Central Committee). It is extremely important that the demand for stronger legality was placed on the same level at the congress as the corroboration of the need for the nation to make use of such internationally tried and tested means and methods of socialist construction as national economic planning, economic stimulation, a rise in the welfare of the workers and the development of the initiative of trade unions, youth organizations and other public organizations.

The author analyzes the entire series of measures taken by the Maoists for the purpose of making a fiction of documents of truly historic significance--the Constitution of the PRC and the resolutions of the Eighth CCP Congress. Among these measures, a position of central importance was relegated to the motto of struggle against the "worshippers of foreign patterns," a term which referred primarily to those who were striving for the thorough investigation and consideration of not only Chinese experience, but also the general international experience of socialist construction in the USSR and the other socialist countries.

The author presents thorough and convincing arguments against the previous assessment of the "Cultural Revolution" as a political coup d'etat, the decisive role in which was ultimately played by certain military circles. In this connection, his description of the relations between army organs and the Red Guard organizations is quite interesting. The inspirers of the "revolution" were forced to resort to the establishment of total military control over all life in the nation. This, the author says, signified a "return to the administrative forms of the end of the national liberation war and the period of reconstruction" (p 131). But it is also evident that the organizers of the "Cultural Revolution" were hoping for much more. To all indications, they were not striving merely to avenge themselves against all of their real and imaginary opponents and to seize all power from the hands of statutory party and constitutional state organs. They had another, even broader goal--to establish an "ultra-revolutionary" political system, which would guarantee the effective implementation of their reactionary-utopian ideas about socialism, combined with far-reaching hegemonistic aspirations, over the space of several generations. They made claims to the construction of a fundamentally new, "antibureaucratic" system of authority. In order to make these claims internationally presentable, they even made references to the experience of the Paris Commune, as was done, for example, in the information about the 11th Plenum of the CCP Central Committee in August 1966.

Many of the facts cited in the book indicate that the Maoists were not able to create a truly new political system. They essentially reproduced and established, in a somewhat ready-made form, the historically obsolete experience of the time of the Chinese civil wars: a rejection of universally

compulsory laws, a merger of the party and administrative staffs, a rejection of democratic methods for the formation and operation of organs of authority (including the electoral system), and the extensive use of administrative and military coercion.

The data presented in the book on the "revolutionary committees" and other links in the administrative system of contemporary China debunk the myth of the antibureaucratic nature of Maoist power. It should be noted that this subject deserves separate, more detailed examination. Evidently, the characteristic Maoist tactic of creating opposing factions and groups within the political system also deserves special consideration.

The author's description of the punitive organs operating in the nation suggests that they might more readily be defined as organs of mass terror. Their activities are directed against millions of persons under suspicion, investigation and surveillance, exiles and persons convicted of various crimes in each Chinese province, or, in essence--the entire Chinese population. L. M. Gudoshnikov examines the "Schools of 7 May" as a special adjunct to the all-encompassing system of political surveillance and repression.

The formally re-established Komsomol and trade unions are regarded by the author, along with the militia and various political training groups, as organizations which support the regime and carry out the ideological brainwashing of the masses. The organizations of "poor and middling peasants" could also be included in this part of the political system.

One of the major final conclusions drawn by the author is that the "Cultural Revolution" in China resulted in the establishment and preservation of a regime of military-bureaucratic dictatorship. This regime, L. M. Gudoshnikov writes, "does not now express the interests of any class and has its social basis of support in the peasantry, the social ideals of which are close to feudal socialism" (p 188). This last conclusion requires an important correction. In our opinion, the "secret" of the fairly long existence of this regime consists in the fact that, at the cost of tremendous effort, the all-encompassing repressive military-administrative and ideological machinery of the Maoists is artificially restraining and impeding the progressive development of society and, in this way, is reproducing its social basis of support in the form of largely declassé population strata. In an attempt to guarantee the support of these strata, the regime constantly exploits anti-Sovietism, xenophobia and a distorted interpretation of the class struggle in the Chinese society and in the international arena.

As the course of events in China since September 1976 has shown, Mao Tse-tung's heirs have left his military-bureaucratic dictatorship essentially unchanged, which does not exclude the possibility of its future evolution. In what direction, by what means and how will this system evolve? How great will the force of its accumulated momentum be? In any case, we must agree with the

author of the book being reviewed that China can reach genuine socialism by paying attention to the general international experience in socialist construction, by developing normal, friendly relations with the Soviet Union and all of the nations in the worldwide socialist system and by expressing solidarity with the international communist and workers' movement.

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## FOR PEACE AND COOPERATION IN PACIFIC BASIN

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 4, 1977 pp 211-213

[Article by A. N. Zharikov, deputy chairman of the Committee of Youth Organizations of the USSR]

[Text] The Fourth International Seminar of Young Researchers on Problems of Cooperation in the Pacific Basin was held in the city of Nakhodka in the USSR from 8 through 21 August 1977. The seminar was organized by the Committee of Youth Organizations of the USSR and the Student Council of the USSR jointly with the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, the Soviet Committee for Solidarity With Asian and African Countries and the USSR Academy of Sciences. The Far Eastern Scientific Center of the AN SSSR [USSR Academy of Sciences] took an active part in the organization of the seminar. The Fourth International Seminar of Young Researchers on Problems of Cooperation in the Pacific Basin represented a continuation and development of the tradition of these meetings, which were also held in Nakhodka in 1974, 1975 and 1976.

The fourth Pacific seminar was attended by representatives from a large group of youth, student, trade-union and other public organizations of various political and ideological leanings, young researchers and prominent scientists from 24 countries, as well as representatives of the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Union of Students, the Latin American Continental Student Organization, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers and the Young Federalists of the World.

Lectures, reports and position papers were presented at the seminar by Professor J. Consuerga, chancellor of the Simon Bolivar University and president of the Environmental Protection Society (Colombia); Professor V. V. Gorchakov, rector of the Far Eastern State University; Candidate of Economic Sciences V. I. Potapov, deputy director of the Institute of the Far East of the AN SSSR; Professor R. Carbray of the University of Washington (in Seattle); Professor D. Zagoria of Hunter College (New York); Doctor of Historical Sciences V. P. Lukin, head of a sector at the Institute of the United States of America and Canada of the AN SSSR; Professor S. Uhalley of the University of Hawaii (United States); Professor Y. Kuroda of the

University of Hawaii (United States); Professor Ye. V. Krasnov, chief of a laboratory at the Institute of Marine Biology of the Far Eastern Scientific Center of the AN SSSR; Candidate of Philosophical Sciences M. L. Polishchuk (Moscow State Institute of International Relations); Candidate of Historical Sciences N. Ye. Korolev (Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee); and others.

The seminar was attended by famous researchers Doncho and Yuliya Papazov (Bulgaria), who crossed 14,000 kilometers of the Pacific Ocean in 137 days in 1976.

Seminar participants were greeted by V. A. Romanyuk, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Nakhodka City Soviet of Workers' Deputies; Corresponding Member of the AN SSSR A. I. Krushanov, deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Far Eastern Scientific Center; N. G. Romanov, first secretary of the Primorskiy Kraykom of the All-Union Komsomol; and Yu. I. Ostrovskiy, head of the Far East Steamship Lines.

In accordance with the seminar program, discussions were organized on four basic themes: 1. "The Role of the Pacific Region in the Present Stage of International Relations and Under the Conditions of International Detente"; 2. "Youth and the Problems of the Ocean in Human Activity"; 3. "Problems in the Culture, Education and Development of the Pacific Countries. Youth's Contribution"; 4. "The Ways and Means of Expanding Cooperation Between Youth and Student Organizations in the Pacific Region." A colloquium was also held to discuss the theme: "The Distinctive Features of the Political Situation in the Pacific Basin and Ways of Developing Cooperation in This Region: Predictions and Prospects." A constructive and productive exchange of views on these matters also took place at the seminar.

Seminar participants were quite pleased to note that the international seminars of young researchers on problems of cooperation in the Pacific Basin, which have now become a tradition, are constantly acquiring greater recognition as an important forum for the discussion and formulation of new ideas and proposals concerning the development of mutually beneficial ties between the Pacific nations and the consolidation of peace and security in this region. There is no doubt that these international meetings, at which an extremely broad spectrum of social and political forces are represented, are contributing to deeper constructive cooperation in the region and are participating in the work being done to extend international detente to the Pacific region.

The participants in the fourth seminar of young researchers were pleased to note the positive changes that have taken place in world affairs in recent years, which have made the process of detente a dominant feature in international development. The speeches of seminar participants and the final documents of the seminar underscored the important results of the development of detente and cooperation on the European continent and expressed a firm intention to aid in the promotion of positive processes throughout the world and to make these processes irrevocable.

"The world is indivisible and we are convinced that the process of detente should not bypass certain regions on earth, including the Pacific Basin," the announcement of the results of the seminar states. It was noted that there are real possibilities for this. The victory of the Indochinese people and all peace-loving forces in combatting the aggression of American imperialism and the resulting settlement of the armed conflict in Indochina have led to the liquidation of one of the most dangerous centers of international tension, as a result of which favorable conditions have been established for the safeguarding of lasting peace and security in Asia by means of the concerted efforts of all states in this most densely populated part of the Pacific region. For this reason, a struggle for the consolidation of peace and security, the extensive development of comprehensive international cooperation and the resolution of problems in disarmament are the most urgent tasks of youth and all peace-loving forces in this vast region.

Seminar participants spent a great deal of time discussing the problem of nuclear weapons and announced their determination to prevent a repetition of the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and to eliminate the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

In recent years, important measures have been taken to halt the arms race; several practical steps have been taken in this direction. But it will not be a simple matter to continue the process of detente and supplement its political aspects with military features. The intensification of detente is being impeded by reactionary forces and defense industry groups wishing to escalate the arms race, increase defense expenditures and develop more and more new types of weapons of mass destruction. Seminar participants declared that there can be no reasonable justification for the arms race in our time.

The Pacific Basin also has its serious unsolved problems. The seminar condemned the activities of forces promoting the arms race and striving to create greater tension and set some nations in the region in opposition to others. Serious concern was expressed over the existence of military blocs in this region and the presence of foreign military bases and armed forces on the territory of other states.

The repressive antihumanitarian policy of the fascist and dictatorial regimes in some of the Latin American and Asian countries also represents a considerable obstacle on the path toward progress, peace and cooperation in the Pacific region. In this connection, concern was expressed over the delivery of weapons to reactionary regimes which use them for the suppression of public freedom and independence.

Seminar participants unanimously supported the developing countries' demands for the reorganization of international economic relations on a just and democratic basis, for guaranteed sovereignty over their own natural resources, for national economic development and for deliverance from neo-colonial exploitation.

"We are striving to ensure that the prevailing atmosphere in the Pacific region is one of peace and cooperation, which could be established by concerted effort and based on the principles of the United Nations Charter," the final documents of the seminar state. Seminar participants were able to come to the general conclusion that the principles on which the interrelations between states in the Pacific Basin can be based might be, in particular, the refusal to use force in relations between states and the just settlement of all disputes by peaceful means; the impermissibility of territorial usurpation by means of aggression; respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of state boundaries; nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states; recognition and unconditional respect for the right of each nation to settle its own affairs and institute socioeconomic reforms; recognition of the inalienable and sovereign right of each nation to its own natural resources; and the development of economic, cultural, scientific and other types of cooperation on the basis of complete equality and mutual benefit.

The recognition and adoption of these principles by nations with different social systems would contribute to the establishment of a favorable atmosphere for the attainment of lasting peace and the organization of extensive and mutually beneficial cooperation in the Pacific region.

Speakers at the seminar noted that the further improvement of the political climate in the Pacific Basin, the cessation of the arms race and the freeing of resources for peaceful purposes will contribute to the rapid economic development of states in the region, including the development of the leading branches of industry, transportation and power engineering, and social progress in various spheres of domestic life and will make it easier for the developing countries to institute reforms in the areas of science, education and public health. Experience has shown that egalitarian and mutually beneficial cooperation between nations with different social structures and the expansion of economic, scientific and technical ties on a bilateral and multilateral basis create new opportunities for economic and social progress in all nations of the region.

At the same time, an atmosphere of trust and cooperation in the Pacific Basin would establish favorable conditions for the resolution of problems of great importance to all mankind, such as environmental protection and the intelligent use of natural resources, including oceanic resources and the raw materials of the sea bed and ocean floor which are of such vital importance to the population of this region.

The improvement of international relations in the Pacific region will aid the people of this region in their struggle for political, social and economic liberation, genuine independence, the basic human rights and social progress.

The development of cooperation between youth and student organizations and the establishment of closer contacts between scientists in the Pacific



countries contribute to greater mutual understanding and the unification of efforts in the struggle for peace, security, national independence and social justice.

Participants in the Fourth International Seminar of Young Researchers on Problems of Cooperation in the Pacific Basin called upon youth, scientists, public figures and all progressive forces to work even more persistently and more productively toward detente, the consolidation of peace and the intensification of all-round cooperation in the Pacific Basin and to use all available opportunities to influence public opinion and the governments of their own nations for the purpose of attaining these noble goals.

Seminar participants expressed the certainty that these goals will be supported by the general public in the Pacific nations, will become a firm basis for the concerted efforts of all those interested in the consolidation of peace, cooperation and continued progress in the Pacific Basin and will meet with the sympathy and solidarity of people of goodwill all over the planet.

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